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Chapter 1.Introduction and Summary  
An arrival of a currency crisis can be anticipated through a comprehensive and properly 
specified Early Warning System (“EWS”).  The costs that entail with experiencing a 
currency crisis far exceed the costs of spending a considerable amount of time to 
developing an EWS. In a report done by the IMF(1998), they estimated that emerging 
economies suffer an 8% cumulative loss in real output during a severe currency crisis. 
Likewise, evidence suggests that a simple look at traditional market indicators of 
currency and default risks will not provide much advance warning of an impending 
currency crisis.  In a study done by Sy (2003), he found that the performance of interest 
rate spreads and Credit Ratings were disappointing in the run up to the Asian Financial 
Crisis. Likewise, Goldstein Kaminksy and Reinhart (2000) showed that neither interest 
rate spreads nor sovereign credit ratings ranked high in a long list of Early Warning 
indicators of currency crises.  
 
The creation of an EWS is not something new. In fact, there are in the literature two 
popular methodologies that have been extensively used. These are the Signals approach, 
which is a non-parametric approach, and the Limited Dependent Probit / Logit, which is a 
parametric approach to the anticipation of a currency crisis. However, both rely on an a 
priori dating of a currency crisis which transforms the crisis variable into zeros and ones. 
The disadvantage of such transformation is that it leads to a considerable amount of loss 
of information. Also, the transformation leads to other complications such as a 
misclassification of a crisis period and more. Based on the previous statements, it seems 
plausible to invest time and resources to develop and create an alternative approach to a 
comprehensive and properly specified EWS. That being said, capturing the dynamic 
interactions that the three components of the ISP demonstrate is an important factor in the 
creation an EWS and remains an open area for research aside.  
 
An EWS, as defined by Edison (2000), should consist of two components. The first is a 
precise definition of a crisis and the second is a mechanism that will use the precise 
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definition in order to  generate predictions of occurrences of a crisis. Both components 
are crucial to properly identifying a currency crisis.  
 
In the literature of empirical models of currency crisis, there seem to be almost as many 
definitions of a currency crisis as there are EWS models as different researchers have 
adopted alternative approaches to the definition of a currency crisis (Abiad 2003). Some 
define a currency crisis solely on the basis of a substantial decline in the country’s 
nominal exchange rate while others, particularly Eichengreen Rose and Wyplosz (1994), 
define a currency crisis as one that exceeds an Index of Speculative Pressure (“ISP”) 
whose components include the changes in the nominal exchange rate, and two other 
components which are frequently used by policymakers for intervention in exchange rate 
movements, changes in interest rates and changes in international reserves. The rationale 
behind using an ISP, which is a linear combination of the three components, is that it is 
more comprehensive than solely changes in the nominal exchange rate because it 
captures both successful and unsuccessful attacks on the currency under different 
exchange rate regimes, including fixed exchange rates, crawling pegs or exchange rate 
bands. A successful speculative attack will show up in a change in the exchange rate, but 
monetary authorities have the option to fend off these attacks either by raising interest 
rates or by selling off foreign exchange reserves. Therefore, the ISP captures both 
successful and unsuccessful attacks that manifest in the two other components.  
 
Given the precise definition of a currency crisis, this study seeks to predict a currency 
crisis through the joint determination of the components that make up an ISP via vector 
autoregression (“VAR”). This study jointly determines the components of an ISP because 
it seeks to capture its dynamic interactions, wherein the theoretical literature dating as far 
back as Krugman(1979) suggests and the mechanism that will be used  is  the vector 
autoregression. The novelty of the VAR is that this model provides the researcher with a 
joint distribution of the variables included in the system. Also, the VAR provides the 
weights for the three components of the ISP as they are by products of the VAR derived 
from the variance covariance matrix of the error terms of the three components. 
Furthermore, the model identifies the probability of a crisis. This is accomplished by 
 4 
  
obtaining the distribution of the ISP, where the first and second moments are easily 
constructed given the VAR model that has jointly determined the components of the ISP. 
It is interesting to note that the distribution of the ISP can be derived from the joint 
distribution of the three components given the weights of the three components. 
 
As for the expected results of the study, modeling the dynamic interactions of the 
components of an ISP via Vector Auto Regression will be able to predict a currency 
crisis. The mechanism will be able to provide a high probability when an impending 
currency crisis is nearby. The VAR will be able to provide the distribution of the Index of 
Speculative Pressure given information at time t-1. Finally, the specification will be able 
address specific issues such an a priori dating of a currency crisis as it will identify 
periods of speculative pressures and those of a crisis. Furthermore, The VAR and the 
VARX will point towards the need for searching the possible indicators in the macro-
economy that will help identify a currency crisis. 
 
The thesis begins with a brief introduction of the need for an EWS and summarizes the 
methodology for providing a monthly probability of a currency crisis where its model 
specification is the VAR. The second chapter summarizes the different generations of 
theoretical models of currency crisis. The third chapter looks at the empirical models of 
currency crisis which emphasizes on the three most significant models. The fourth 
chapter uses the VAR specification and applies it to the Philippines. Finally, the fifth 
chapter concludes and provides insights for areas of future research.  
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Models of Currency Crises 
2.1 Introduction 
The various theoretical generation models of currency crisis are summarized and we 
review the implications these models have on EWS and what indicator variables they 
might suggest. The theoretical currency crisis models can be clustered into four 
generations, based on the underlying mechanism that brings about the crisis. 1) 
Fundamentals, 2) Speculation, 3) Contagion and Moral Hazard Driven Investment, and 4) 
Institutions and Others.  
2.2 First Generation Currency Crisis Theoretical Model 
First Generation currency crisis models began with a seminal article by Krugman (1979), 
which was later on refined by Flood and Garber (1984). This theoretical model views 
currency crises as a result of weak economic fundamentals and stresses the role of 
unsustainable government policies that are incompatible with a pegged exchange rate. 
Here, the ultimate cause of the crisis is the fundamental inconsistency of the policy 
measures, fiscal and monetary expansionary policies. 
 
Krugman’s model shows that a government is financing its budget deficits through the 
issue of new money, or simply what has now been termed, monetization. In order to 
maintain the peg, monetary authorities have to gradually decline their holdings of 
international reserves. In light of this occurrence, a gradual decline of reserves is 
regarded as the key indicator of a government trying to defend the peg against speculative 
attacks. Since the amount of international reserves held by a country’s central bank is 
limited, speculators realize that the situation is unsustainable and launch a speculative 
attack on the currency at the precise point where the exchange rate would prevail if the 
central bank were to sell off its remaining holdings of international reserves, the shadow 
rate, equals the fixed exchange rate.  This model implies that there should be a noticeable 
decline in reserves in the period leading up to a speculative attack.  
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The modifications of the basic model provide further evidence on other mechanisms that 
may force the monetary authorities to eventually abandon the peg. A direct result of an 
expansionary monetary policy coupled with an expansionary fiscal policy is a rise in 
import demand which makes the current account worse, from surplus to deficit, a decline 
in surplus, a further decline in a deficit. Indirect results lead to a rise in the price of non 
tradeables and an overvaluation of the real exchange rate.  
 
Overall, this model identifies weak economic fundamentals. Budget and trade deficits, 
appreciations of the real exchange rate typically precede first generation speculative 
attacks. A growing decline in international reserves, a growing current account deficit, a 
growing budget deficit, a growing domestic credit, and an exchange rate overvaluation 
may provide information regarding the vulnerability of a country to a speculative attack.  
2.2 Second Generation Currency Crisis Theoretical Model  
Second Generation Models were motivated by the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
crisis in 1992-93 where fundamentals seem to be quite healthy and did not possess the 
symptoms described in the first generation models namely the inconsistency between the 
continuous creation of domestic credit and a fixed exchange rate. Second generation 
models, associated with Obstfeld (1986 and 1996), suggest that the government 
continuously weighs the cost and benefits of defending the currency, adding that one 
possible important trigger for a crisis is people’s expectation.  
 
To begin, Obstfeld stressed that there may be trade-offs between various policy 
objectives pursued by a government. Benefits and costs vary depending on the economic 
fundamentals. On the one hand, given weak economic fundamentals, a government may 
find it a lot beneficial to abandon the peg. A government may do so in order to possibly 
inflate away the debt burden denominated in domestic currency, and/or follow 
expansionary monetary policies in case of unemployment. On the other hand, given 
strong economic fundamentals, a government may find it beneficial to defend the peg. In 
this case, a government may do so in order to facilitate international trade and 
investment, to gain credibility given a history of high inflation. If an economy is in the 
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middle of being fundamentally weak and strong, a government may be indifferent to 
choosing amongst the two policies, thereby allowing for multiple equillibria, and 
ultimately, leaving the decision to undertake such a policy upon people’s expectations. 
 
As an example, a government may be indifferent to an outcome of low inflation and high 
unemployment or an outcome of high inflation and low unemployment. In line with the 
trade-offs between various policies, the cost of defending the peg rises when people 
expect the peg will be abandoned. A government will decide to abandon the exchange 
rate when debt holders expect higher interest rates and workers expect higher wages, thus 
making the debt burden too high and industries uncompetitive at the current exchange 
rate. In short, the theory suggests that government policies are affected by the market’s 
expectations and the expectations of the market are affected by the government’s 
policies. Causality occurs both ways and this circularity generates multiple equilibria.  
 
The market participants’ beliefs over whether a peg will hold or not can affect the 
government’s actions. Even though an economy may be fundamentally stronger than 
expected, but if people expect a devaluation in the near future, they could put enormous 
pressure on the central bank by converting their domestic currency to foreign currency 
before the devaluation actually occurs. Due to the possibility of multiple equillibria, 
second generation models explained crises as self fulfilling outcomes.  
 
The Second Generation Models show that currency crises can occur due to: 1) certain 
government policy actions, 2) possibility of multiple equilibria, even in the absence of 
fundamental weakness, and 3) self fulfilling expectations of market participants. 
 
Mariano et al. (2001) argue that in view of the possibility of multiple equilibria, even in 
the absence of fundamental weakness, and self fulfilling expectations, it should be noted 
that fundamentals have to be in a certain range of vulnerability in order for the market to 
consider the possibility of a devaluation or depreciation. In fact, Morris and Shin (1998) 
pin down a unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks and point out 
that the unique equilibrium is obtained by introducing uncertainty about fundamentals or 
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other investors’ beliefs explicitly into the model. The second generation models 
suggested that anything that affected the government’s decision whether to maintain or 
abandon the peg might contain information on the likelihood of a crisis occurring. If a 
particular economy is constrained, it will be likely that it will be strained by that 
particular constraint such as high unemployment or a large fiscal deficit. Indicators such 
as level of unemployment, inflation, the amount and composition of debt, financial sector 
stability were some of the factors that were pointed out.  
2.3 Third Generation Currency Crisis Theoretical Model  
In the wake of the 1997-98 Asian Financial and Currency Crisis, another generation of 
currency crisis models emerged since none of the causes described by the first two 
theoretical models of currency crisis were responsible. Third Generation theoretical 
models are concerned with the issue of contagion, where the occurrence of a crisis 
elsewhere may provide indications of a looming crisis on a country that may be related in 
terms of trade links and similar macroeconomic characteristics as indicated by 
comparisons, and the issue of a Moral Hazard Driven Investment. Masson (1998) 
discusses three reasons why crisis occurs in clusters.  
 
One, there may be common external shocks that affect all countries involved. Some 
examples of common external shocks include a supply shock such as a rise in world 
crude oil prices, fluctuations in interest rates particularly, LIBOR and US Interest Rates, 
or an appreciation of the reference currency such vis-à-vis other major currencies like the 
US dollar against the yen, or the dollar against the pound, and more recently the Euro 
against the dollar.  
 
Two, there may be spillover effects brought about by trade links and portfolio 
rebalancing. For example, If a neighboring country has a devaluation, the home country’s 
exports may slow down due to slackening demand from the neighbor or their countries. 
Likewise, imports from the neighbor may increase owing to price effect. The trade 
linkages may lead to the deterioration of a home country’s trade balance. They can also 
be financial links. Financial institutions in the home country may have a credit exposure 
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or equity stakes in corporations, financial institutions, or real estate in the neighboring 
country. A crisis in the neighbor could then spillover by causing weakness in the home 
country’s financial sector. 
 
Three, there may be herding effects or market sentiment behavior. Saxena (2000) 
describes the existence of herding when individuals tend to choose actions similar to 
previous actions chosen by other individuals. An arrival of a minor shock in the economy 
through the form of bad news may develop into a massive snowball because individuals 
follow the actions of others, even to the point that their own private information points to 
acting the other direction from the action of others. Krugman (1998a) suggests two 
similar reasons why herding might occur. First, is the occurrence of the ‘bandwagon 
effect” where individuals set aside their own information and thrive on the information of 
the other individuals. Second, is pointed as the principal agent problem in the context of 
money managers that are compensated based on their performance relative to other 
money managers. These agents, the managers have a strong incentive to follow the mob 
of money managers even if  he has information that suggest that the investment decision 
of the other managers are wrong. However, viewing herding as the sole cause of an 
occurrence of a currency crisis may be unlikely, and, as Flood and Marion (1998) argue, 
herding may explain part of a currency crisis, but not the whole occurrence.  
 
For the contagion part, these models suggest that aside from fundamentals and factors 
included coming from the second generation model, indicators representing the three 
classes of contagion should be taken in to account in the EWS. Some of the variables that 
may be included are LIBOR, US interest rates, growth rate of output and/or current 
account of other neighboring countries or countries that have trade and financial linkages 
and or similar characteristics, and some form of indicator that a crisis is occurring 
elsewhere and could put pressure on the home country’s currency. 
 
As for the other part of this generation of theoretical currency crisis models, this is the 
Moral Hazard Driven Investment. Agents are deemed to have invested in projects that 
have uncertain return. The main focus of these models is on ‘liquidity shocks’ as the root 
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cause of crises. Krugman (1998) considers the case of over-guaranteed and under-
regulated financial intermediaries. Before the 1997 crisis, explicit or implicit deposit 
guarantees from national governments induced banks and other financial institutions to 
gamble by making risky loans, and to finance these by issuing short-term debts 
denominated in foreign currency, largely dollar and yen. Given that these entities were 
guaranteed, these entities had more incentives to engage in overly excessive and risky 
investments. Overall, the economy’s financial system became fragile. Using indicators 
that may provide information regarding the fragility of the financial system is implied for 
the EWS.  
 
Another form of this liquidity shock is the excessive build up of debt in the balance 
sheets of entities. In Krugman 1999, the argument is that balance sheet mismatches can 
force banks or corporations to quickly generate demand for foreign exchange. With a 
large part of the financial sector or corporate sector seeking foreign exchange, however, 
pressure is put on the foreign exchange. As the rate depreciates, more financial 
institutions or corporations may seek foreign exchange to cover open positions, 
stimulating even further aggregate outflows and thereby triggering a crisis.  
2.4 The “Fourth Generation” Currency Crisis Theoretical Models; Additional 
models of Crises.   
Aside from the three generations mentioned, there seems to be a rise in additional 
approaches to the investigation of the causes of a currency crisis. Although no specific 
event may be attributed to this generation of currency crises, the occurrences of currency 
crises following the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis and their detrimental effect in 
Russia(1998), Ecuador(1999), Turkey(2000-2001), and Argentina(2001-2002) have  
sparked the interest of stakeholders in finding all possible causalities and linkages, other 
than the already known three theoretical models of currency crises, that could lead to a 
currency crisis. The proponents of these additional models of currency crises carry with 
them the philosophy that there may be other factors and situations in the economy that 
could be the spark of a full blown unanticipated and costly currency crisis. Loosely 
speaking, it may be called the Fourth Generation Theoretical Models. A common 
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characteristic that part of this group of models elicits, is their focus on the issue of 
institutions while the others may include coordination failures to name a few. The 
inclusion of these additional models implies that there may be other sources from which 
the arrival of a currency crisis may be detected. It should be noted that the cost of failing 
to detect a crisis outweighs the cost of having to develop a comprehensive EWS that may 
capture the arrival of a currency crisis.  
 
Institutions 
Institutions affect currency crises in two ways. (Li and Inclan 2001) First, Institutions 
tend to have an impact and correlate on the health of the national economy. Second, 
Institutions are informative in the sense that they can signal market agents about the 
future economic fundamentals, and thereby shape market expectations.  
 
Amongst all the literature written about institutions it is only Leblang and Satyanath 
(2004) who develop a theoretical framework linking political institutions to speculators’ 
expectations and empirically demonstrate the superiority of their approach in terms of 
forecasting. Their model implies recent turnover in government and the presence of 
divided government increase uncertainty on the part of speculators about each others’ 
beliefs which, in turn, increase the probability of a currency crisis. The major political 
variables that emerged from their initial exercise were recent turnover in government and 
divided democratic government. Adding these two variables into pre existing forecasting 
models that exclusively contained economic variables substantially increased the 
accuracy of out of sample forecasts.  
 
Calvo and Mishkin (2003) as well as Alesina and Wagner (2003) consider the quality of 
institutions and exchange rate agreements. Calvo and Mishkin (2003) believe that less 
attention should be placed on the choice of exchange rate regime, especially for emerging 
market economies. They argue that the key to macroeconomic success is the health of the 
countries fundamental macroeconomic institutions, including institutions associated with 
fiscal, financial, and monetary stability over and on top of the choice of their exchange 
rate regime. Irresponsible monetary policy puts pressure on the monetary authorities on 
 12 
  
the exchange rate, poor regulation and supervision of the financial system can result in 
large losses in bank balance sheets that make it impossible for monetary authorities to 
raise interest rates in a way that holds down inflation or to prop up the exchange rate 
because it may lead to a collapse of the financial system. Weak monetary institutions in 
which there is little commitment to the goal of price stability or the independence of the 
central bank mean that monetary authorities will not have the support or the tools to keep 
inflation under control or to prevent large depreciations of the currency. Alesina and 
Wagner (2003) find that the countries with poor institutions are more likely to abandon 
the peg. Corruption, government instability, weak law and order, as well as a defacto 
exchange rate regime are some of the strongest results found to affect the probability of 
crisis with regard to the issue of institutions (Shimaplee and Breuer 2006). These models 
suggest that weak institutions contribute to risk and uncertainty as well as to the 
misallocation of resources as was seen in the moral hazard models.  
 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) differentiate between relationship based and arms-length 
system and indicate the implications these to different systems. They point the that 
relationship based systems can survive in environments where laws are poorly drafted 
and contracts are not enforced as opposed to the market based system where the pre-
requisite is a prompt and unbiased enforcement of contracts by courts. In addition, they 
point out that the enforcement of contracts is optimal in the arm’s length system but may 
cause short term distortions in the system when the two systems actually cross over each 
other.  
 
Block (2003) demonstrates the impact of structural political conditions on the likelihood 
of a currency crises in emerging markets and finds that right wing government is less 
conducive to currency crises; strong governments defined as those with larger legislative 
majorities and those which face more fragmented legislative opposition, are also less 
vulnerable. Also he finds that democracy reduces the likelihood of a currency crises, but 
he does not find a significant impact of elections on the likelihood of a currency crises. 
Mishra (1998) Mei (1999) Leblang (2001) has found that the occurrence of elections 
create uncertainties in expectations He notes that the rationale arises form a combination 
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of Obstfeld as the archetype with the insights from partisan political business cycle 
theory (Hibbs (1977 )and Alesina (1987) ) 
 
Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) present evidence that the weakness of legal 
institutions for corporate governance, particularly the effectiveness of protection for 
minority shareholders, explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market 
decline better than do standard macroeconomic measures. Countries with weak corporate 
governance, worse economic prospects result in more expropriation by managers and 
thus fall in asset prices Corporate governance contributes to the  effectiveness of 
mechanisms that minimize agency conflicts involving managers efficiency of the legal 
system, corruption, rule of law and the strength of corporate governance  
 
Gosh and gosh(2002) examine the role of structural factors – governance and rue of law, 
corporate sector governance(creditor rights and shareholder rights), corporate financing 
structure , and find that structural vulnerabilities play an important role in the occurrence 
of deep currency crisis.  
 
Li and Inclan (2001) examine how central bank independence, coordinated wage 
bargaining, financial system maturity and structures affect both the long run frequency of 
currency crises. Central bank independence and coordinated wage bargaining reduce the 
variability of the crisis probability. Financial market maturity tends to reduce the number 
of currency crisis and market uncertainty in the stock based financial system 
 
Coordination Failures  
These models stress elements such as market failure in international capital markets, and 
distortion in domestic financial markets. These are more properly identified as 
coordination issues in the financial markets wherein an action may be taken as rational 
individually, but may be irrational collectively. Marshall describes the Asian Crisis as an 
example of coordination failure where the economic performance of a country depends 
on a large number of investors willing to provide funds. If it is generally believed that 
other investors will withhold funds, it is rational for any given investor to refrain from 
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investing. Thus, these beliefs become self fulfilling. This represents a coordination failure 
because everyone would be better off if all investors provided funds to the affected 
country. This also stresses on issues such as institutional effects such as agency issues, 
information asymmetries and possible policy intervention effects. 
 
2.5 Conclusion for the different Theoretical Models of Currency Crisis  
The ‘four’ generations of theoretical currency crises models suggests that each generation 
is grounded on an underlying mechanism that brings about a currency crisis. These four 
generations are based on these four mechanisms:  Fundamentals, Speculation, Contagion 
and Moral Hazard Driven investment, Institutions and Others. 
 
First generation models point toward weak economic fundamentals. This model identifies 
that the ultimate cause of a currency crisis is the fundamental inconsistency of the policy 
measures, expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, and thus currency crisis can be 
viewed as runs on foreign exchange reserves at the central bank. Therefore, recognizing  
the antecedents of currency attacks should be easily achieved. These indicators include: a 
growing decline in international reserves, a growing current account deficit, a growing 
budget deficit, a growing domestic credit, and an exchange rate overvaluation. All the 
recently mentioned may be tagged as possible indicators for an EWS that relate to the 
first generation theoretical model of currency crisis.  
 
Second generation models extend the notion of ‘fundamentals’ as second generation 
theoretical models suggest that a government continuously weighs the cost and benefits 
of defending the currency, adding that one possible trigger, in the event of an 
intermediate economic situation,  is people’s expectation. As a result, indicators for an 
EWS may be anything in the macro economy that may affect the government’s decision 
to maintain or abandon the  peg. These indicators may be high unemployment, inflation, 
a large fiscal deficit, and possible the stability of the financial sector. Given that Morris 
and Shin(1998) pin down a unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency 
attacks, the possibility of multiple equillibria affecting the creation of an EWS only 
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provides an ambiguity as to the timing of the attack as it should be emphasized that 
fundamentals have a certain range of vulnerability for agents to consider the possibility of 
a speculative attack. 
 
Third generation models concern themselves with the issue of contagion and moral 
hazard driven investments. Aside from fundamentals and factors included coming from 
the second generation theoretical models, indicators such as LIBOR, US Rates, growth 
rates and/or output and/or current account of other neighboring countries or countries that 
have trade and financial linkages, and/or similar characteristics, and some form of 
indicator that a currency crisis is occurring elsewhere and could put pressure on the home 
currency are additions to the known indicators from the first two generations that should 
expand the coverage and anticipation capabilities of the EWS being built. Also, the moral 
hazard driven investment mechanism points toward indicators for an EWS that may 
provide information regarding the financial fragility of the financial system of the 
economy in question such as: excessive build up of debt in the balance sheets of entities 
in the economy, balance sheet mismatches and the level of over guaranteed and under 
regulated financial intermediaries. 
 
Fourth generation theoretical models are loosely concerned with the issue of institutions 
and other mechanisms such as coordination failures that may lead to an arrival of a 
currency crisis. As institutions tend to have an impact and correlate on the health of the 
economy and are informative in the sense that they can signal market agents about the 
future of economic fundamentals, and thereby shape market expectations, they may be  
an important component that may help anticipate a currency crises. Indicators such as 
recent turnover in the government, presence of divided government, level of corruption, 
government instability, weak law and order, level of democracy, weakness of the legal 
institutions for corporate governance are some of the indicators that arise from the 
institutions mechanism that may help the EWS anticipate a possible currency crisis. 
Likewise, coordination issues in the financial markets wherein an action may be taken as 
rationally individually, but may be irrational collectively is one possible other mechanism 
that could trigger the occurrence of a currency crisis. This mechanism stresses on issues 
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such as institutional effects such as agency issues, information asymmetries and possible 
policy intervention effects. The inclusion of these additional models imply that there may 
be other sources and ultimately other indicators that may be used in an EWS in order to 
anticipate the arrival of a currency crisis.  
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3 Alternative Empirical Approaches to Predicting a Currency 
Crisis  
3.1 Existing Models 
The development of an empirical model of currency crisis, is not something that is new. 
These empirical models date back to the time when Blanco and Garber (1986) first  
estimated an empirical model of currency crises, by using a monetary approach to the 
balance of payments and exchange rate determination and to evaluate its ability to 
anticipate the onset of a crisis. The two used Mexican data from 1973 to 1981 and studied 
recurrent devaluations. Also, amongst the pioneers, Edin and Vredin (1993), attempt to 
estimate an empirical model of currency crisis. They used Scandinavian country data 
from 1979 to 1989 and evaluated devaluations based on target zones or bands. However, 
the drawbacks of their models were specificity and simplicity, in that it was unable to 
incorporate other factors that could precipitate a crisis.  
 
During the 1990’s, researchers such as Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart(1997, 1998, 
1999), Frankel and Rose (1996), Edison (2000) further pursued the development of an 
empirical currency crisis model, now known as an EWS. Two models arose as popular 
“goal standard” approaches in EWS. These are the Signaling approach and the Probit / 
Logit linear dependent model approach. (The details of these two models will be further 
discussed below.) In fact, most EWS following the development of the two were either 
modifications of the specifications or approaches that try to address the misspecifications 
of the two methodologies. Focusing on the latter, there were other researchers that chose 
to develop EWS models that did not incorporate either one of the two methodologies. An 
example of this is the Artificial Neural Networks Model of Nag and Mitra (1999). ANN’s 
are parametric multivariate statistical models. Although an advantage of their model is 
the flexible specification, and ability to capture complex interactions among variables, 
these model seem to still incorporate an a priori dating of a crisis because even ANNs 
require a specification of a threshold in order for them to “learn.” Others such as Abiad 
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(2002), Mariano, Gultekin, and Tan (2003), Brunetti  et al (2003) propose a Markov 
Regime Switching approach with time varying transition probabilities in order to avoid 
the many adhoc assumptions required in the standard models and avoid the loss of 
information that results when variables are transformed into a binary crisis variables. 
They build on earlier research from Jeanne and Masson (1998) and Fratzcher (1999) who 
had currency crisis models that suggested the use of Markov Switching Models.  
3.2 Signals Approach  
The signals approach, commonly associated with Kaminsky Lizondo and Reinhart 
(1998), Goldstien, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000), Edison (2000), Berg and Patillo 
(1999), in the literature, is the non-parametric approach in determining a possible 
currency crisis. Additional signals approach models arise from Bruggemann and Linne 
(2000), and the Asian Development Bank’s Non Parametric Early Warning System 
(released in the literature in 2005).   
 
A dummy crisis variable is constructed from an exchange market pressure, also known as 
an index of speculative pressure (ISP) with a specified threshold. Also, this approach 
constructs binary variables from each explanatory variable included. The binary variable 
takes on a value of one, known to be a signal, once the variable of interest exceeds a 
chosen threshold, and zero, otherwise. The rationale for such a specification is that only 
severely abnormal behavior should be noted. The explanatory variables come from a list 
of possible early warning indicator variables, as suggested by economic theory. Then, 
this list is trimmed down by the availability of data.  
 
Once the binary dummy crisis variables have been identified through the arbitrary 
specification, these signals are classified into four categories depending on their ability to 
call a crisis. A signal is classified as a good signal if a crisis does occur within a specified 
period, and a false signal otherwise. Likewise, a No signal is classified as a good no 
signal if a crisis does not occur within the specified period. Thresholds are chosen so as 
to strike a balance between the costs and benefits that arise from having many false 
signals and the risk of missing many crisis.   
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 Crisis occurs w/in N 
months  
No crisis occurs w/in N 
mos.  
Signal  A B 
No Signal  C D 
 
In order to assess the value of each explanatory variable, a signal to noise ratio (“SNR”) 
is calculated, although in some literature, this is known as a noise to signal ratio. A SNR 
is computed for each explanatory variable over the sample period. This is done by 
classifying each observation into one of the four categories as well. The thresholds are 
chosen to maximize the SNR = [A/(A+C)]/[B/(B+D)]. 
This is the proportion of a crisis detected over the proportion of a false positive signals. 
The indicators are ranked according to their own SNR. These signals are then used in a 
non parametric setting by simply monitoring their behavior and counting the number of 
indicators that is signaling a crisis. These signals may be aggregated into a composite 
indicator by constructing a weighted average of the signals, where the weights depend on 
the relative accuracy of the signals or the rankings of their own SNR (Kaminsky 1998)  
 
Zhang (2001) points out the advantages of the signaling approach. This approach 
provides its user a quick and easy interpretable picture of the problems through the clear 
indication of variables behaving abnormally. Also, its user can get a feel for the breadth 
problem, and how widespread they are, by simply noting the number of variables that are 
behaving abnormally.  
 
On the other hand, Abiad (2003) provides a set of shortcomings that signaling approach 
entails. The signaling approach does not look at marginal contributions and there can be a 
potentially high degree of common information contained in different indicators. i.e. 
multicollinearity across indicators. Also, the signaling approach does not lend itself to 
statistical testing and it is difficult to asses how well this approach works compared to 
other approaches due to its non parametric approach. Furthermore, this approach requires 
an a priori dating of the crisis episodes. As a by product of a priori dating, classification 
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errors may result when constructing the crisis dummy variables. Misclassification of the 
dummy variables into the four categories is a result of the arbitrarily chosen threshold 
used to delineate a crisis periods from tranquil periods. The use of sample dependent 
threshold also introduces the phenomenon of disappearing crises, documented by Edison 
(2000). Adding to the list, there is a loss of information whenever a variable is 
transformed into a binary variable. An indicator variable may be behaving abnormally 
but is just below the threshold value, it is not recognized because no signal is sent.  
3.3 Probit Logit Approach  
The Probit/ Logit approach, which covers roughly more than 40% of the empirical 
models surveyed in this paper, are linear dependent models and is the other, this time 
parametric, popular approach to determining a currency crisis. This approach requires the 
construction of a crisis dummy variable, just like that in the signals approach, known as 
an index of speculative pressure, (“ISP”) or an exchange market pressure, that serves as 
the endogenous variable in the probit/logit regression. The ISP is often based on a 
weighted average on the following variables percentage changes in nominal interest rates, 
percentage changes in gross international reserves, and difference in local and foreign 
interest rates. The rational for using a weighted average of these three variables is that a 
successful speculative attack on the currency will show up in a change in the exchange 
rate, but that monetary authorities have the option of fending off these attacks either by 
raising interest rates or by selling of foreign exchange reserves. The classification of each 
time series observation as being in crisis or not depends on the whether or not the index 
exceeds an arbitrarily chosen threshold. In the literature, the values of a threshold have 
ranged between 1.5 to 3 standard deviations above the mean of the ISP  
 
Most of the studies focus on anticipating a crisis at the onset of a crisis, and so the above 
definition of is modified via the use of an exclusion window. In other words, even if the 
ISP exceeds the threshold months after the occurrence of a crisis, as long as that month 
falls within the pre-specified exclusion window, the occurrence will not be recorded.  
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Once the endogenous variable, ISP, has been specified, the dummy crisis variable is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables known as early warning indicators. The 
explanatory variables are derived form the real financial external and fiscal sectors of the 
economy and typically comes from a list suggested by the various theoretical models 
described in chapter 2. The specification of calculating a probability of a crisis is given 
by the following: 
Pr(CtI Ωt-k) = F(Xt-k’β) 
 
where F is a cumulative distribution function, typically the normal or the logistic c.d.f, Xt-
k is a vector of early warning indicators. The output of the model is a k step ahead 
probability of a crisis occurring given values for the EWS.  
 
The beauty of the probit/logit approach is that it summarizes all the information gathered 
in one easily interpretable number, the probability of a crisis occurring. It considers all 
variables together and reflects at the marginal contributions of each indicator; it 
disregards variables that do not contribute information that is not already captured in the 
other variables. It is easy to run in statistical software packages, and lends itself easily to 
statistical testing. However, the downside of this approach is given by the following: 1) 
its indicator variables do not lend themselves to be ranked on the basis of forecasting 
accuracy. The indicator variables either enter the regression significantly, or do not. Also, 
the measures of statistical significance cannot distinguish whether an indicator is good at 
correctly calling crises, or merely sends false signals. 2) This approach, like the signaling 
approach, requires an a priori dating of the crisis episodes. Neither the probit/ logit 
approach nor the signaling gives information about the dynamics of a currency crisis. The 
transformation of the exchange rate into a binary variable eliminates the information 
regarding exchange rate dynamics during crises. Many previous studies focus primarily 
on predicting the first period where speculative attacks occur. As a result, artificial 
correlations may be introduced inadvertently through the explicit manner in which the 
crisis dummy variable is constructed. In order to achieve such, they make use of 
exclusion windows which remove any crisis signals that closely follow previous crisis 
signals. Finally, Probit/ Logit approaches have found widespread use primarily because 
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they are the standard econometric approaches to problems involving the estimation of the 
probability of an event occurring. 
 
3.4 Markov Regime Switching Approach  
The Markov Regime Switching approach, is one of the approaches that seeks to address 
the misspecifications of the two standard methodologies and at the same time seeks to 
outperform the other two in terms of anticipating a currency crisis.  
 
The Markov Regime Switching Approach was first suggested by Jeanne and Masson 
(1998), which was later on used by Cerra and Saxena (2000) for modeling contagion in 
the context of Indonesia. Moreover, the use of a Markov regime switching approach was 
also used by Martinez Peria (1999) except that it was not used as an EWS, but for dating 
crisis periods in the European Region. It was only when Abiad (2002) and Mariano, 
Gultekin, Abiad, Shabbir and Tan (2003) that the Markov Regime Switching approach 
was used as Early Warning System for Currency Crisis and introduced as an alternative 
approach to predicting a currency crisis wherein it particularly addresses numerous issues 
involved in the two previous models aforementioned.  
 
In the case of Abiad (2002) and Mariano et al (2003), their Markov Regime Switching 
Early Warning System consists of two parts:    
  
1) a Markov chain of the unobservable financial vulnerability of the country, this 
is the latent variable. They argue that what are observable are the indicators of 
this latent variable which assumes two states wherein a state of zero indicates 
a normal state and a value of one which corresponds to a vulnerable state. 
They further assume that that Markov chain is of order one with transition 
probabilities that is time varying through dependence on observable indicator 
variables.  
Pr(St =0 I St-1=0) = F(z t’γ)= pt
Pr(St =1 I St-1=1) = F(zt’δ)= qt
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In the study done by Mariano,Gultekin, Shabbir, Tan and Abiad (2003), they  
proposed to use three indicatory variables that the  , deviations form the real 
effective exchange rate, month on month percentage changes in the ratio of M2 to 
international reserves, month on month percentage in real domestic credit. 
 
2) a Markov regime switching time series model of percentage changes in 
nominal interest rates. In this model, it uses an autoregressive process. 
yt=αs +x’tβs +σsεt 
The model allows intercepts, lag coefficients and error variances to stochastically    
switch over time according to a value taken by a latent Markov chain describing 
the vulnerability of the country’s currency to speculative attacks. This model 
differs from the standard time series models in that it includes the unobservable 
variable as an additional endogenous variable.  
 
Martinez-Peria (1999), also applies a Markov switching model to speculative attacks on 
the European monetary system using data from 1979 to 1993., but the primary purpose in 
that paper was 1) to evaluate the ability of the model in dating crisis periods and 2) to see 
whether fundamentals and market expectations affected crisis probabilities. Martinez-
Peria assumes that the parameters of the model are uniform across countries, and pools 
the data to get parameter estimates. This assumption for developing countries may not 
hold as economies have different characteristics.  
 
Cerra and Saxena (2000), uses a Markov switching model to look at the 1997 Indonesian 
crisis, and investigates whether the crisis was due to domestic factors, monsoonal factors 
or pure contagion from neighboring countries. Their model is different from the model 
estimated by Mariano Abiad et al in that their time varying transition probability is a 
measure of contagion, based on the exchange market pressure in neighboring countries. 
Fundamentals only affect the mean of the exchange rate.  
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This Markov switching framework has its advantages. 1) This approach can be directly 
derived from theoretical currency crises models. (for proof please see Abiad 2002) 2)The 
determination of a crisis period is endogenously determined by the model, thereby 
addressing the requirement by other approaches of an apriori dating of a crisis. This 
avoids the potential misclassification in the construction of crisis dummy variables which 
other approaches require. 3) One step ahead forecast and multi step ahead of crisis 
occurrence can be calculated from. 4)The inclusion of the latent variable introduces the 
notion that the exchange rate dynamics behave in a different fashion depending on 
whether conditions are normal or vulnerable to currency pressures. 5)The model 
determines how long crisis periods may last and does not require exclusion windows. 
Other advantages include: it identifies a set of reliable and observable variables of 
impending currency difficulties, delivers forecast probabilities of future crisis over multi-
period forecasting horizons, and offers an empirical framework for analyzing contagion 
effects of crisis for improving short-run forecasts of key macroeconomic variables 
 
One major particular drawback is the difficulty in the creation of the model. This 
approach is not part of the standard econometric software packages and one has to 
program an estimation algorithm. It may also be difficult to this model. Against the null 
of constant transition probabilities, one can test the various parameter estimates that enter 
into the time varying probability specification by just using a simple likelihood ratio test. 
But against testing a null of no switching is more difficult, as one encounters problems 
with unidentified nuisance parameters. However, once created, this may prove to be a 
formidable model for predicting currency crisis. 
3.5 Other Approaches: Particularly Artificial Neural Networks  
In the literature, there are other approaches that have been applied to the development of 
an EWS. This section discusses the some of the details of the other approaches, 
particularly the ANN model of Franck and Schmeid in order to set the tone that the three 
approaches are not the only approaches that have been used. The other approaches are 
briefly discussed, most of which have been presented by Abiad (2003) in his survey of 
EWS, whom which is acknowledged. Nevertheless, these models have been reviewed 
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once more and included. In fact in the next section, the EWS models using alternative 
approaches make up a third of the total number of EWS surveyed.  
 
Artificial Neural Networks are capable of learning through a process of trial and error 
that can be approximately viewed as statistical estimation of model parameters. Nag and 
Mitra (1999) use an artificial neural network (ANN) to construct an early-warning system 
for currency crises, and compare its performance to the indicators approach using 
monthly data for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand from 1980-1998. Similarly, Franck 
and Schmied (2004) suggest an Artificial Neural Network Approach to predicting 
speculative attacks and test the EWS whether the 1998 and the 1999 speculative attacks 
in Russia and Brazil were in fact predictable. The properties of the multilayer ANN are 
used to develop a method for predicting currency crises.  
Ψ 
Y 
X1 
Xp 
 
ANN’s are parametric non-linear dynamic models. An ANN may be viewed as a 
collection of transfer functions that relate input variables X, located on an input layer, to 
an output variable Y, located on an output layer, so that Y=f(X) where f is a function that 
stands for the architecture of the network. The input units, called “neurons”, send signals 
towards Y over connections that either attenuate or amplify the signals, depending on the 
transfer function ψ. The non linear response of ANNs is introduced from the fact that 
these neurons tend to be quiescent in the presence of modest levels of input activity, and 
to become active themselves only after input activity passes through a particular 
threshold. Beyond that threshold, increases in input activity have little further effect. The 
mere fact that these ANN’s elicit feedback warrants them to be considered as dynamic. 
 
Many transfer functions have been employed in ANN research. The most popular are:  
1) logistic function ψ: is the real valued function, 
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Ψ(x) = 1/ (1+e-x) 
2) hyperbolic tangent function ψ: R -> R , 
Ψ(x) =tanh(x) with tanh(x) = ex -e-x/ (ex +e-x) 
ANNs are more efficient when one or several layers of intermediate units are integrated 
in the network. Input units send signals to these intermediate units located on one or 
several layers which are said to be “hidden”. Intermediate layers of this sort are often 
called hidden layers to distinguish them from the input and output layers. Networks with 
one or several hidden layers are referred to as multi layer ANNs. The most common 
multilayer ANN is the Multi layer Perceptron  
Ψ1 
Y 
X1 
Xp 
11 
First Hidden LayerInput Layer Output Layer
 
As was given an example by Franck and Schmied (2004) where they define the 
multilayer perceptron with one hidden layer. There are p X T input units {X1t, X1t-1,.. X1t-T 
X2t ….Xpt-T}with p the number of parameters and T as the number of lags. In the context 
of EWS, these p input units represent the indicators in the macro economy that help 
identify a currency crisis. It has n neurons on its single hidden layer, and one output unit 
Y which is scalar. The Y variable takes on the following values and represents the 
following:  if Y=1,then, there are speculative pressures in the foreign exchange market 
and, if Y=0, then there are no speculative pressures on the foreign exchange market.  A 
threshold neuron which has a constant input that is equal to 1, is also defined. It is meant 
to help the ANN resist “abnormal” input data. The multilayer perceptron with one hidden 
layer had the following form: Yt=ψ3(Σnk=1 βk ψ1(Σpl=1  Σ Ti=1ηlikX1t-i +η0kj)+β0j ) where 
ηlik, η0kj are the coefficients of the input layer and βk, β0j are the coefficients of the hidden 
layer where all of these are real numbers. The transfer functions are defined ψ1and ψ2 
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where ψ1 is the logistic function and ψ2 is a linear transfer function ψ3 used to obtain the 
scalar Y such that ψ3(x) = x.  
 
Hornik et al (1989) and Hornik (1991) show that the multilayer perceptron is a “universal 
approximator”, that is, as a flexible functional form that, provided with sufficiently many 
hidden units and properly adjusted parameters, is able to provide a linear (non linear) 
estimator if the relationships between variables are linear (non linear). The multi layer 
perception should theoretically perform better than the traditional models of currency 
crisis prediction. However, there seem to be a problem with convergence to local versus 
global optima. As such there is no guarantee that such a multi layer perceptron avoids 
data mining. Due to such concern, an ANN approach to currency crisis prediction 
requires repeated estimation and comparison or results in order to determine whether 
these results converge or not to various local optima. Another reason for repeated 
estimation relates to the problem of over-fitting. The occurrence of such over-fitting may 
be due to too few training data for too many neurons. In such a situation where the ANN 
is large, it is completely adapted to the data set and does a poor job of generalization 
when tested on out-of sample data. On the other hand, if the ANN is too “small” having 
too few neurons, it provides irrelevant results on out of sample data. Hence repeated 
estimations are needed in order to obtain a good estimator. The possibility of 
overestimation must be taken into consideration when dealing with currency crisis 
estimators, which must be estimated on small and updated data samples. The usage of 
two hidden layers theoretically captures non linear relationships between variables than a 
multilayer perceptron with one hidden layer.  
 
The primary advantage of ANNs is their flexible specification, and their ability to capture 
complex interactions among variables. However, this flexibility can also be a potential 
drawback, as the danger of over fitting is much greater than in other methodologies, 
given the large number of variables and the ability of the neuron layers to fit the data. 
Another drawback is the "black box" nature of ANNs. Because there are no coefficient 
estimates, and the interactions is among the variables can be very complicated, it is 
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difficult to determine which indicators are behaving abnormally and driving the forecast 
probabilities. 
 
The following are the rest of the approaches that appear as well in the tabular form.  
 
Collins (2001) uses a latent variable threshold model to study the timing of currency 
crises. She assumes that a crisis occurs when some unobservable process crosses a 
threshold, where the latent variable is assumed to follow Brownian motion with drift. 
Conditional on the drift factor, the distance to the threshold and the variance of the 
Brownian motion, the probability of crisis occurrence has an inverse Gaussian 
distribution. The distance and drift factors are modeled as linear functions of five 
standard indicators, with overvaluation, the CA/GDP ratio and short-term debt to reserves 
affecting distance to the threshold, and export and reserves growth affecting the drift 
factor.  
 
Vlaar (2000) also takes a different methodological approach to early-warning systems. 
First, he uses the continuous crisis index itself instead of a binary crisis dummy. This 
continuous crisis index is similar to the Index of speculative pressure which this study 
uses in that this index is based on depreciation and reserve loses. He argues that not only 
crisis episodes are considered, but all available observations where it is assumed that 
tranquil periods also provide useful information regarding the vulnerability of currencies. 
Second, he models the crisis index as being drawn from a mixture of two normal 
distributions. The fact that vulnerabilities materialize primarily during crises is modeled 
by means of a model of two regimes, one for normal and another for unexpectedly 
volatile times. The mean and volatility of each distribution is modeled as a function of 
various indicators, as is the relative weighting of the two distributions.  
 
Zhang (2001) proposes using the autoregressive conditional hazard (ACH) model 
developed by Hamilton and Jorda(2002) which they used to model changes in the federal 
funds rate. In essence, it is simply an addition of a new explanatory variable-the duration 
of the last tranquil period-and an alternative functional form for the crisis probability 
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duration or length of the last tranquil period along with a vector of standard indicator 
variables that comprise of the possible significant macro economic variables. They also 
define the hazard rate as the conditional probability that the index used breaks the 
threshold in a particular month given the most recent information observed. For further 
reference on the details of this model see Zhang (2001) 
 
Adopting a more standard econometric approach, Krkoska (2001) estimates a restricted 
VAR to analyze vulnerability in four transition countries. An index of speculative 
pressure is constructed, and the continuous index enters the VAR along with four other 
endogenous variables-the real exchange rate, industrial production, FDI, and the current 
account. Five exogenous variables also enter the specification-the CA-FDI gap, growth in 
real domestic credit, inflation, the DM-US$ exchange rate, and industrial production in 
the EU.  
 
Burkart and Coudert (2000) utilize Fisher discriminant analysis in their analysis of 
currency crises. Discriminant analysis aims to classify a dependent variable into one of K 
given states, based on information from a set of predictor variables. The principle 
underlying the analysis is to determine whether the K states differ with regard to the 
mean of a variable, and then to use that variable to construct predictions for the states.17 
In this study, the sample is divided into K=2 states, where the four quarters that precede 
each crisis are one state ("crisis"), and all other periods are the other state ("tranquil").  
 
In contrast to the other studies surveyed here, Hawkins and Klau (2000) are not interested 
in the estimation of a model. Rather, their objective is to present vulnerabilities in a 
simple, transparent manner. They do this by transforming various indicators of external 
and banking sector vulnerability into discrete scores, where higher scores indicate 
increased vulnerability. For example, four continuous indicators for external vulnerability 
are individually transformed into discrete measures, taking on five possible values: -2, -
1,0, 1 and 2. These scores are then summed, using weights of 1.25 so that the score falls 
within an interpretable range of -10 to 10. A similar transformation is also done to 
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compute speculative pressure itself, using reserve changes, real interest rate changes, and 
exchange rate changes at both the 3-month and 12-month horizons.  
 
In addition to addressing the issue of interactions in their study, Ghosh and Ghosh (2002) 
introduce several additional innovations. They focus exclusively on "deep" currency 
crises, defined as currency crises-identified using a standard speculative pressure index 
and threshold-which result in an appreciable decline in GDP growth of at least 3 or 5 
percentage points. They also expand the range of indicators by supplementing five 
standard macroeconomic variables with two corporate leverage ratios and, more 
uniquely, a slew of institutional quality variables, including six measures of rule of law, 
eight of shareholders' rights, and five of creditors' rights, each of which is aggregated 
using principal components analysis. Most importantly, they explore interactions among 
these variables using a methodology called binary recursive tree, which works as follows. 
First, thresholds for each indicator are identified that minimize (the sum of) Type I and 
Type I1 errors. The sample is then split into two "branches" using the threshold of the 
best indicator. These two steps are then repeated to construct sub-branches, and the 
process is continued until some stopping rule (which penalizes over fitting via too many 
branches) is satisfied.  
 
The final study that emphasizes interactions among indicators is Apoteker and 
Barthelemy(2001). Their model is based on the evaluation of five "fundamental balance" 
charts. These are scatter plots that illustrate certain aspects of a country's economy; for 
example, the growth balance scatter plot combines a domestic growth indicator (GDP per 
capita growth) with an external balance indicator (current account balance). A genetic 
algorithm is used to identify quadrants in the fundamental balance charts which are most 
associated with four types of crises: transfer crises, liquidity crises, exchange rate crises 
and cyclical development crises.  
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3.6 Summary of Recent Empirical Findings  
 
This section is a consolidation of the following: a survey on Early Warning Systems by 
Abiad (2003), the Early Warning Systems that the Asian Development Bank created 
(both Parametric and Non-Parametric, along with the Developing Country Studies 
Division (“DCSD”) type and the DCSD constructed model), the empirical survey by 
Gultekin, Mariano, and Tan, the Goldman Sachs GS watch, Citibank model, partial 
details of the CSFB credit Watch and the Deutsche bank Alarm Clock, and a recent 
nested logit model by Lau and Yan(2005) 
 
Out of 51 EWS surveyed, there are 22 models that use the linear dependent Probit/ Logit 
approach whereas there are six EWS that incorporate the Non parametric Signaling 
Approach. Also, there are three EWS that use a Markov Switching approach. It is also 
interesting to note that 33% of the EWS compiled use other alternative approaches. Six 
(Tornell (1999), Brussiere and Mulder(1999a), Brussiere and Mulder(1999b), 
Nitihanprapas and Willett(2000), Kwack (2000), Grier and Grier (2001))  use an 
Ordinary Least Squares Approach, OLS, considering the dependent variable, the crisis 
index, as a continuous variable. The rest include EWS like those of Nag and 
Mitra’s(1999) Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Collin’s latent variable threshold 
model, Gosh and Gosh’s(2003) Binary recursive tree, Bukart and Coudert’s Fisher 
discriminant analysis, and Zhang’s(2001)  Autoregressive Conditional Hazard Model.  
 
First and foremost, the linear dependent models; Probit and Logit, are discussed since 
they take up a huge chunk of the EWS consolidated in this paper. In terms of the data 
used roughly half use monthly data; and the rest use either annual or quarterly data. Also, 
roughly have used the 1970’s as their starting period all the way to the period before the 
Asian Crisis. In addition, Most of the EWS focus on emerging economies; probably 
except for Eichengreen, Rose and Wyploz, who focus on 20 industrial countries and 
whose data set dates as far back as 1959. In terms of crisis definition, there seem to be 
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numerous definitions, Frankel and Rose uses only Exchange rate changes but also 
incorporates another criteria such as at least 10% bigger than the last exchange rate 
change because their model considers the determination of hyperinflation economies. 
Most use exchange rate changes along with either reserve changes or interest changes or 
a combination of the two. Also, the thresholds range from 1.5 standard deviations to 3 
standard deviations above the mean. Exclusion windows range form 0 to 36 months or 3 
years. The set of indicators that perform well are the following: 1)deviation from trend of 
the US dollar/local currency real exchange rate 2)deviation from trend of the US 
dollar/yen real exchange rate for Asian Economies due to a bulk of loans and liabilities of 
corporates and governments are denominated in Yen 3) ratio of current account balance 
to gross domestic investment. As for the results, the recent comparison done by the 
ADB(2005)  compared the performance of the representative model that included seven 
variables as compared to the five variables that the DCSD EWS used which were 
Overvaluation, Current account to GDP ratio, Reserve Losses, Export Growth, ST Debt/ 
reserves. The study created an DCSD Type model which used the five variables, and 
found that the representative model outperformed the DCSD-type model in terms of 
goodness of fit. Also, based on the results of the two, the ADB representative model 
seems to provide a lower Noise to Signal Ratio.  
  
Moving to the Signals Approach, the EWS surveyed all use monthly data and all except 
Bruggemann and Linne (2000) focuses emerging economies as they focus on the EU 
accession candidates and Russia and Turkey. All except the ADB Non parametric model 
use an Exchange Market Pressure or an Index of Speculative Pressure and an exclusion 
window. The ADB model has an exclusion window of 24 months and defines a currency 
crisis as a month to month percentage change in a country's nominal exchange rate 
against the US dollar exceeds its sample mean by two standard deviations. The ADB 
model uses 40 indicators whereas the other models use the fifteen indicators used in 
Kaminsky Lizondo and Reinhart plus some additional indicators. For the five 
comprehensive models, they all find that the real exchange rate appreciation relative to 
the trend have the lowest Noise to Signal Ratio, as low as 0.5. In terms of the results, the 
signals model of Goldstein Kaminsky and Reinhart were able to provide a rise in a 
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probability of a crisis in Malaysia, South Korea, and the Philippines, but failed to capture 
Indonesia. Likewise, the ADB non parametric model was able to the provide persistent 
signals in Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, but again failed to provide a signal for 
Indonesia. In comparison to other models, Berg and Patillo (2004) note that using the 
same 15 indicators that the KLR model uses, the probit model slightly outperforms the 
signals approach.  
 
As for the Markov Switching EWS models, all use transition probabilities that are time 
varying. Mariano(2003), Abiad(2003), and Cerra and Saxena(2000) focus on the Asian 
financial crisis, however, Cerra and Saxena (2000) use the approach in order to detect the 
possibility of contagion effects affecting the likelihood of a crisis. Mariano(2003) and 
Abiad(2003) determine that that there seems to be two regimes. One regime called a 
normal state that is associated with zero mean and low volatility sate and another regime 
that is associated with a crisis period where the mean is positive, indicating a period of 
depreciation, and high volatility. They also note that country specificity is preferred to 
pooling occurrences of a crises from different economies or countries as each country 
contains its own specific set of vulnerabilities that have either built up in the past or 
recently occurred. In predicting the Asian Financial Crisis, Mariano et al. note that 
Malaysia and Thailand have been successfully predicted prior to the occurrences of the 
crisis, but have also indicated that their mode do not send strong signals for Indonesia and 
the Philippines. They indicate the possibility of searching for other indicators, modeling 
contagion, and the possibility of modeling the dynamic interactions of the components of 
the index of speculative pressure.  
 
Finally, the rest of the other approaches which comprise of a considerable amount of 
EWS from the survey. These other approaches try to improve on the shortcomings of the 
two standard methodologies. However, as Abiad points out and a re-examination of these 
approaches, there are but a few, if any, of the proposed alternatives that are able to 
address all the other two approaches shortcomings. A good number still rely on the crisis 
dating methodology of the standard approaches. In addition, other approaches are more 
successful at addressing the weaknesses of the standard models, but have problems of 
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their own. Each approach has its own strengths. In this manner, we build on Abiad’s 
findings and reassess these models all over again.   
 
In their country-by-country replication of the KLR approach using sixteen indicators, 
Nag and Mitra(1999) find that different indicators are useful for different countries; 
somewhat surprisingly, they rarely find real overvaluation to be a significant indicator. 
They then estimate a different ANN model for each country, using a genetic algorithm to 
train the models. Because lags of anywhere from zero to four quarters are also allowed, 
the final models for each country have a large number of variables, from 13 in Indonesia 
to 23 in Malaysia. Inadequate information is given regarding the construction of the 
ANN, such as the number of hidden layers and hidden neurons, the transformation 
function used, or the parameters of the genetic algorithm used to train the ANN. They do 
not report the in-sample model forecasts, which are estimated up to end-1996, but their 
out-of-sample results show very high crisis probabilities-in the vicinity of 80 percent-for 
all three countries in the 14.  
 
Estimating the model using monthly data for 25 emerging markets from 1985-1988, she 
finds that short-term debt influences distance, while reserve growth influences the drift 
factor. Interestingly, the drift factor is always negative, indicating that the process is 
moving away from the crisis threshold over time. Collins also tests the model against two 
alternative specifications-a probit model and a Poisson model-and finds that the threshold 
model is found to fit better than either alternative. He finds that inflation, overvaluation 
and reserve losses are the most significant determinants of vulnerability, but in addition, 
he finds a substantial degree of dynamics-past exchange rate and reserve deterioration 
and volatility are themselves significant predictors of future vulnerability. Regional 
exchange rate volatility also affects vulnerability, suggesting the possibility of contagion. 
Both in-sample and out-of sample, the model is able to predict about 7 of 8 crises, but at 
the expense of sending false alarms through approximately a third of tranquil periods. 
 
Using monthly data for Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand from 1993-1997, 
Zhang(2001) estimates both a probit model and the ACH model and asserts that the ACH 
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model fits the data better, based on a comparison of log likelihoods; however, such a 
comparison is invalid since the models are not nested. Further, he finds that none of the 
standard vulnerability indicators is significant, but that the duration variable is highly 
significant. A contagion measure is also constructed, based on the duration of the most 
recent tranquil period in any of the four countries, and not only is it significant, but it also 
drives out the effect of the domestic duration variable. It is difficult to assess the 
generality of Zhang's findings, since the model is estimated on a very short sample. Not 
surprisingly, the fitted model is able to predict the crises in Korea, Indonesia and the 
Philippines on the basis of the onset of the crisis in Thailand. Zhang identifies May 1997 
as the starting date of Thailand's crisis, since he adopts a different crisis dating 
methodology, treating exchange rate and reserve changes separately and using a three 
year moving window for computing the standard deviation threshold. 
 
Given the limited data (quarterly data from 1994-1999) and the large number of 
parameters, many ad hoc restrictions were imposed for the VAR to be tractable. Krkoska 
finds that the gap between the current account and FDI is the most significant predictor of 
crisis vulnerability; in all instances that this gap exceeded 5 percent of GDP, a crisis 
ensued. Overvaluation and a slowdown in the EU are also found to be significant 
predictors of vulnerability. 
 
Burkart and Coudert(2000) start with a set of 34 potential indicators and reduce this set to 
six indicators-the ratio of reserves to both M2 and debt, the ratio of short-term debt to 
total debt, real overvaluation, inflation, and a regional contagion indicator-based on 
performance. They find that the discriminant model based on these indicators yields 
relatively good performance: four out of five crises are predicted correctly and only one 
out of five non-crises result in false alarms.  
 
The Hawkins and Klau(2000) proposal is just a variant of the KLR approach. The only 
differences are that 1) they classify indicators into five categories, as opposed to the 
binary 0-1 categories of KLR; 2) for the speculative pressure index, they categorize and 
then sum, whereas KLR sum first and then categorize into a 0-1 crisis dummy; and 3) 
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Hawkins and Klau(2000) sum their indicators using equal weights, while KLR weight 
their indicators based on predictive performance. Finally, although a five-category 
variable is more informative than the binary transformation done in the signals approach 
of KLR, the thresholds used to create the five categories are arbitrary, unlike the 
threshold used in KLR which is chosen to maximize the signal-to-noise ratio. 
 
Several of the studies surveyed emphasize the importance of potential interactions among 
various indicator variables. Nitithanprapas and Willett (2000) are critical of other 
empirical studies for failing to account for these interactions. They note, for example, that 
current accounts which due to overvaluation are worrisome, while those that are due to 
inflows of FDI are probably less dangerous. Using a slope dummies regression approach, 
they test the Lawson dogma that current account deficits are worrisome only if caused by 
a fiscal deficit, as well as other hypotheses linking current account deficits to real 
overvaluation and to FDI" The idea is to find a linear combination of the indicators that 
exhibits the largest difference in the group means relative to the within-group variance. 
This linear combination is known as Fisher's discriminant function, or the first canonical 
variate. A cut-off point can then be used to generate predictions inflows. They also test 
whether lending booms increase vulnerability to a crisis, and whether adequate reserves 
mitigate these risks. They also find the effect of lending booms significant, and that 
adequate reserves lessen crisis vulnerability. In their sample, countries with poor public 
sector governance are much more likely to have a crisis; and of those with poor public 
sector governance, those which also have current account deficits greater than 2.6 percent 
of GDP are more vulnerable than others, and so on. These interactions are not easily 
captured in the linear structure of standard probit models.  
 
Another study that uses classification rules is Osband and Van Rijckeghem (2000), who 
identify values for indicators which keep a country safe from currency crises. Using18 
monthly vulnerability indicators for 3 1 emerging markets over the period 1985-1998, 
their objective is the identification of safe or near-safe regions by the use of three types of 
filters: simple filters ("X>glU), intersection filters ("X>gl AND Y>g2"), and linear 
combination filters ("aX+bY>g3"). Filters are assessed based on their ability to separate 
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or extract tranquil periods from crisis periods in sample, as well as their "marginal 
extraction" rate, i.e. their ability to extract tranquil periods which are not extracted by 
other filters. They find that a set of nine filters-three simple, five intersection and one 
linear combination-are able to identify 47 percent of tranquil periods as being safe or 
near-safe. External debt and reserve adequacy feature heavily in these filters. This model, 
as well as the binary recursive tree model of Ghosh and Ghosh(2002), is useful 
complements to the standard models. Osband and Van Rijckeghem suggest that their 
model can be used as the first part of a two-stage early warning system: to initially 
identify which countries are safe or near-safe based on these filters, and then to identify 
the degree of vulnerability using more standard predictive early warning systems. 
 
Apoteker and Barthelemy(2001) define exchange rate crises as movements of the real 
exchange rate by at least 20 percent in one quarter, 30 percent in two quarters, or 40 
percent between three and six quarters. The genetic algorithm provides a set of conditions 
which are associated with crises, and vulnerability is measured by how many of these 
conditions are satisfied at a given point in time. Precise definitions of the indicators used 
are absent, and there is no formal testing of the model. Instead, charts are presented 
indicating Mexico's vulnerability to a cyclical crisis, but not to an exchange rate crisis-
from the second quarter of 1994 onwards. A similar result is found for Thailand in 1997. 
 
 
  
TABLE 1: MARKOV SWITCHING MODELS 
Study 
Mariano, Abiad Gultekin, Shabbir and Tan (2003) Martinez-Peria (1999) Brunetti, Scotti, Mariano, Tan (2003) Cerra and Saxena (2000) 
Data Set 4 Countries: Indonesia Malaysia Philippines 
and Thailand using monthly data from 1974 
to 1998 
1979-1993 uses monthly data 
covering seven European 
Rate Mechanism Member 
t i
Novemb3r 1984 to Decmeber 2001, 
uses monthly data on Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Phlippines
1985 - 1997 uses monthly data 
for Indonesia 
Crisis Definition Determined endogenously by the markov 
switching model 
Determined endogenously by 
the markov swtiching model 
Determined endogenously by the 
markov swtiching model 
Determined endogenously by 
the markov swtiching model 
Exclusion Window None None None None
Indicator 3 indicator variables: deviations of the real 
effective exchange rate from the trend, YoY 
percentage changes in the ratio of M2 to 
international reserves, YoY percentage 
changes in real domestic credit
6 indicators ( domestic credit 
growth, trade balance, real 
exchange rate, interest rate 
differentials, unempoyment 
rate and government surplus 
Real effective exchange rate, money 
supply relative to reserves, stock index 
retuerns and bank stock index returns 
and volatiliy are major indicators
8 variables  in three categories 
5 financial 2 non financial and 1 
political 
Approach A Markov Switching autoregressive model tha 
allows intercepts, lag coeffcients, and error 
variances to stochastically switch over time 
according to the value taken by a latent 
Markov chain describing the vulnerability of 
country's currency to speculative 
Markov Switching model Markov Swithcing Garch Model Markov Switching with 
contagion variables entering the 
transition probabilities 
Results Moderately sucessful in identifying currency 
crisis episodes. For all 4 countries, exchange 
rate behavior is categorized into two regimes: 
one regime is a normal period with zero 
mean and low volatilty in exchange rate 
percentage changes and the other reg
the regime swithcing 
framework improves the 
ability to identify speculative 
attacks. Budget deficits and 
expectations affect crisis 
probabilties 
Real effective exchange rate dispalys an 
enormous explanantory and predicting 
power in all countries, In addition, M2 
ratio, banklisted stock market returns 
and volatility as well as stock market 
returns provide valuable inforamtion 
which imporves the performance of the 
models , all selected models for each 
country are parsimonous,
Crises in Korea and Thailand 
significantly increased the 
likelihood of a crisis in 
indonesia 
Asian Crises Result Forecast probabilities rise substantially for 
malaysia and thailand but do not send strong 
signals for Indonesia and the Philippines 
None Performs well for Malaysia June 1997, 
Singapore as early as Feb 1997, 
Thailand June 97, as early as Jan 97, 
Philipppines , provides a relatively high 
probability compared to tranquil period 
probs
same as results
Notes not applicable to countries pegging their
exchange rate, turbulence does not
always coincide with currnecy crises,
only one major currency crisis captured
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TABLE 2: PROBIT / LOGIT MODELS 
Study 
Goldman Sachs GS Watch (1998) 
IMF World Economic Outlook (1998) Koo, Oh, Joo, Lee, Tan ADB PARAMETRIC ADB DCSD TYPE MODEL 
Data Set Uses Monthly data beginning 1983 
for a sample of 27 emerging 
economies, but predictions are 
updated weekly for inclusion in 
analyst reports
1975-1997 uses monthly data for 22 
industrial and 31 developing 
economies 
January 1979 to December 1995, Monthly Data of  
Six East Asian Countries: Malaysia J79, Thailand 
J79, Korea A81, Singapore J91, Philippines J79, 
Indonesia M87; starting dates vary for country 
specific 
January 1974 to December 1995, 
Monthly Data of  Six East Asian 
Countries: Malaysia J74, Thailand J75, 
Korea J76, Singapore J85, Philippines 
J77, Indonesia J81; starting dates vary 
for country specificCrisis Definition Weighted average of three month 
changes in exchange rate and 
reserves above country specific 
threshold 
Weighted average of de-trended 
exchange rates changes and reserve 
changes whose threshold is 1.5 std 
devs above its mean; separate 
treatment for high inflation situations 
Exchange Rate Component accounts 
for 75% of crises
Month to Month percentage change in a country's 
nominal exchange rate against the US dollar exceeds 
its sample mean by two standard deviations;  
country specific valuation
Month to Month percentage change in a 
country's nominal exchange rate against 
the US dollar exceeds its sample mean 
by two standard deviations;  country 
specific valuation
Exclusion Window 3 months 18 Months 24 Months 24 Months 
Indicator Overvaluation, Export Growth, 
Reserves/M2 (level) Financing 
Requirement, stock Market, Political 
Event, Global Liquidity, Contagion
Numerous vairbales but can be 
classified into five categories: Macro 
policies, weak financial structure, 
global conditions, ER misalignments, 
and political instability
Representative model has seven explanatory 
variables: 1)deviation from trend of the US 
dollar/local currency real exchange rate 2)deviation 
from trend of the US dollar/yen real exchange rate 3) 
ratio of current account balance to gross domestic 
investment
Overvaluation, Current account to GDP 
ratio, Reserve Losses, Export Growth,ST 
Debt/ reserves 
Approach Logit regression with RHS variables 
measured as 0/1 indicators based on 
thresholds found in autoregression 
with dummy (SETAR)
Comparison of behavior in tranquil 
crisis periods also probit regression on 
moth lagged averages 
Probit/Logit regression for fixed and random effects 
(fixed effects mean country specific term is treated 
as constant whereas random effects is treated as a 
random variable with mean 0 and variance σ^2
Probit Regression with RHS variables 
measured in country specific percentile 
terms 
Results Based on the crisis dates put out by 
the model, the model a good 
predictor for indonesia, thailand and 
the philippines. As a whole, the 
model was good at predicitng a crisis 
in the asian block, but not in Latin 
america. However, It was 
significantly good 
Real Exchange Rate detrendedn by 
country mean , growth in M2/reserves, 
growth in real domestic credit, rise in 
world interest rates significant, 
inflation, money growth, stock price 
changes are somewhat significant; 
reserve changes, M, Trade balance 
not significant
Random effects probit and logit each has R^2 of 
about 39% whereas the fixed logit probit is about 
50% , Hausman spec.test finds the random as a 
more appropriate representation. NSRs range from 
0.062-0.152. At the 30% cutoff probability the 
probability of the specification by the researcher
All coefficients are correctly signed and 
are siginificant at either the 1% or the 5% 
level, except for 12 month growth rate of 
foreign reserves, which is insignificant in 
all specifications. R^2 for the random 
effects are about 15% whereas the R^2 
for the fixed effects
Asian Crises Result The model predicted 5 out 6 south 
east asian countries wit singapore 
being the country that the model 
failed to send out a statistically 
significant result for crisis prediction; 
also it is interesting to note that its 
crisis dates are quite a bit late.
Thailand, Malaysia are deemed 
vulnerable, Indonesia and Korea are 
somewhat vulnerable; but interestingly 
the Philippines is not 
At the 30% cutoff probability, the random effects 
specifications are able to capture the 1997 crisis in 
all crisis affected countries while the fixed effects 
misses indonesia. All specifications are unable to 
predict the crisis episode in Singapore.
Not specified 
Notes Crisis dates are lagged August 1997 
for singapore sep 97 korea jan 1998 
Probably due to reserve changes 
being not so significant that 
Philippines is not captured
This was used to compare the IMF's 
DCSD, to the ADB's representative 
model. They find that the ADB model 
outperforms the DCSD model 
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Study Caramezza, Ricci, and Salgado (2000) Glick and Moreno (1999) Eliasson and Kreuter (2001) Esquievel and Larrain (1998) 
Data Set 1990-1998 covers 41 emerging markets and 20 
industrial economies covers (Mexican, Asian and 
Russian Crises) 
1972:01 - 1997:10 uses monthly data 
from East Asian and Latin American 
Countries 
1990-2000 uses monthly data for 10 
emerging markets 
1975-1998 uses annual data for 15 high 
income and 15 middle income countires 
Crisis Definition Index of Speculative Pressure = weighted average of 
detrended monthly exchange rate changes and reserve 
changes. The weights are chosen so that the 
conditional variance of the two components of the 
index are equal, and trends are country specific. 
Crisis= percentage change in the 
exchange rate exceeds the mean plus 
two standard deviations. Differnet 
definition for economies with 
hyperinflation (inflation rate greater than 
150% in the previous 6 months) 
Continuous index contructed in a five step 
procedure, fitting a Gaussian followed by 
an extreme value distribution 
change in the real exchange rate is 
greater than 15% or greater than 2.54 
standard deviations away that is also 
greater than 4% 
Exclusion Window 12 Months 5 months 
Indicator Real GDP growth, average 3 year real GDP growth, 12 
month inflation rate, real interest rate, 3 yer log change 
of the 12month average of foreign reserves, short term 
share of debt to BIS banks, Meaxican, Asian, Russian 
crises dummy
Focus on Money, Credit (Nominal and 
real M2, M2/reserve money multiplier, 
M2/foreignreserves, and nominal and 
real domestic credit, all in growth rates), 
trade and competitiveness(deviations in 
trend in the real trade weighted 
exchange rate,export revenue
12 Variables return on equity market (real, 
local currency), domestic credit to GDP, 
private credit (% change mom), M2 to 
bank reserves, M2 to foreign exchange 
reserves, industrial production (% change 
yoy), exports (deviation from 12-month 
trend), …..
annual change in reserve money as a 
percent of GDP,Real Exchange Rate 
Misalignment,Current Account 
Balance,M2/Reserves,Terms of Trade 
Shock,Per Capita Income 
Growth,Contagion Effects
Approach Panel Probit event study graphs and multivariate 
probit
Multinomial Logit model with continuous 
dependent variable with separate panels 
for Latin America and Asia 
Panel Probit with random effects
Results Indicators of vulnerability to international financial 
spillover and of financial fragility are highly significant 
after controlling the role of domestic and external 
fundamentals and trade spillovers. Exchange rate 
regimes and capital control does not seem significant
Reductions in real domestic credit and in 
foreign reserves and appreciation in the 
real exchange rate imply increases in the 
probability of a crisis 
the continuous crisis variable is more 
informative and better describes crisis 
periods 
All seven indicators including a regional 
contgion variable are significant in 
explaining occurrence of crisis 
Asian Crises Result Indicators of vulnerability to international financial 
spillover and of financial fragility are highly significant 
after controlling the role of domestic and external 
fundamentals and trade spillovers. Exchange rate 
regimes and capital control does not seem significant
There are subsequent distinct upturns in 
preditced probabilities, notably in 
Thailand, but also in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. 
The increase is gradual and then 
steepens toward the middle of 1997. 
Asian Crisis included in the sample 
Notes the pattern of crises in emerging market economies 
does not appear to be different across crises episodes. 
Financial linkages  through a common creditor appear 
to explain the commonality amongst the occurences
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Study Hawkins and Klau (2000) Kamin Schindler and Samuel (2001) Kumar Moorthy and Perraudin (2002) Mulder Perelli and Rocha (2002)
Data Set 1993-1998 uses quarterly data 
from 24 emerging markets 
1981-1999 uses annual data for 26 
emerging market economies
1985-1999 uses monthly data from 
32 emerging market economies 
1991-1999 uses monthly data from 19 emerging 
market economies 
Crisis Definition Scores from -2 to 2 are assigned 
based on reserve changes, real 
interest rate changes, and 
exchange rate changes at both the 
3 month and the 12 month 
horizons
Weighted average of two month 
changes real exchange rate and 
reserves; threshold is 1.75 country 
specific standard deviations above 
the mean; no separate calculations 
for high inflation countries 
5% to 10% depreciation after 
adjusting for the interest rate 
differential or which is a doubling of 
the previous depreciation 
Weighted average of exchange rate and reserve 
changes; the threshold is three country specific 
standard deviations above the mean; also there are 
separate calculations for high inflation countries 
where> 150% six month inflation; Weighted 
average of exchange and reserve changes 
continuous index is used as dependent variable 
Exclusion Window 24 months 1 Year 24 months 
Indicator Six external vulnerability indicators 
and five banking system indicators 
scored from 0 to 10 
6 domestic variables 4 external 
balance variables and 3 external 
shock variables 
17 variables covering standard 
macroeconomic variables, financial 
flow  variables, contagion, and other 
external factors 
Corporate and Macroeconomic balance sheet 
variables, legal indicators in addition to the 
standard Ews variables 
Approach Summary tables which present 
vulnerability scores; assesment of 
the score is done via panel probit 
with fixed effects
Probit estimate relative 
contributions of domestic, external 
balance and external shock variables 
Panel Logit Panel Probit and cross sectional regression 
Results Objective is to present 
vulnerabilities in a simple 
transparent manner by scoring 
variables on a 0-10 scale
overall domestic factors have a 
larger contribution to crisis 
probabilities, but when looking at 
crisis years only; contribution of 
external shocks is large; 
interpretation is that external shocks 
push vulnerable countries
Good performance both in and out 
of sample; evaluation based on the 
probability timeplots; goodness of fit 
tables, accuracy scores, and 
profitability of trading strategy 
high leverage and short maturity structures 
increase both the likelihood and depth of crisis 
Shareholder rights also have a large impact on 
crisis probabilities 
Asian Crises Result that the Asian crisis economies 
were becoming more vulnerable 
from the beginning of 1996. In mid-
1996,Thailand and Korea were at 
the top of the list with high scores. 
However, the index did not 
highlight Russia because its 
troubles did not primarily stem 
In sample After 1996, the number of 
unanticipated depreciations rise 
Notes ,  
 
 
 
 
 42 
  
 
 
 
Study Weller (2001) Lau , Yan (2005) Nested Logit Geochoco Bautista  (2000) Cartapanis, Dropsy and Mametz (1998)
Data Set 1973 -1998 uses monthly 
data from 26 emerging 
economies 
1982Q1-1999Q4 uses quarterly data form 16 
emerging economies 
1980-1997 Monthly Philippine data 1976Q2-1997Q2 uses quarterly data from 
six Asian countries (India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, 
Thailand)  
Crisis Definition Weighted average of 
exchange rate and reserve 
changes threshold is 3 
country standard 
deviations above the mean 
An unsucessful defence of a speculative attack 
is an event in which the quarterly exchange 
rate depreciates by more than the threshold 
which is 2 std devs away compared with the 
mean quarterly depreciation of the country 
preceeding in the past 5 years.  
Uses Exchange Rate changes,then reserve 
changes, then interest rate changes; threshold 
Mean plus/minus 1.5 std devs for each, follows 
Moreno 1995-96
Weighted average of Real Exchange rate 
changes and reserve changes where the 
threshold is 2 standard devaition away 
away from the mean over the last five years 
Exclusion Window 4 Quarters 5 Months None
Indicator 16 variables one quarter lag of the lending rate differential, 
the ratio of fiscal deficists to GDP, the ratio of 
short term external liquefiable liabilities to 
foreign exchange reserves, the ratio of quasi 
money to foreign exchange reserves, the ratio 
of domestic credit
Change in Nominal exchnage rate, M3 
Multiplier, change in M3 multiplier, growth in 
total domestic credit, growth in credit to private 
sector, growth in total bank deposits, M3 
growth, real savings deposit rate, inflation, 
M3/GIR. M3/GIR growth, 
Variables capture unsustainability ( 
accumulation of disequillibria), 
vulnerability(current disequillibria) and 
contagion
Approach Separate logit regressions 
for the pre and post 
liberalization samples 
Nested Logit Model that captures unsucessful 
and sucessful attacks, sucessful and 
unsecessful defences. 
Probit Logit; includes also lagged endogenous 
variable to account for autocorrelation
Results Finds significant 
differences between the 
pre and post liberalization 
regressions chance of a 
currency crisis in response 
to overvaluation, short 
term loans is greater post 
liberalization
The nested logit model estimates indicate that 
a high ratio of short term external liabililities to 
foreign exchange reserves, large fiscal deficits 
and large real exchange rate appreciation are 
significant predictors of speculative attacks. 
coefficient of the ST interestrate differential is 
always significant. Change in international 
reserves and real exchange rate, growth of 
domestic credit to public sector and of the 
monthly sales to NPC are quite informative. 
Real Exchange Rate, LIBOR are 
significant, Deficit is significant but small 
coeffcient. CA and Monetary factors  are 
not significiant 
Asian Crises Result The model uses the asian crisis as a n in 
sample. It was able to predict unsuccessful 
attacks in Korea and thailand in the third 
quarter
the predicted probability exchange market 
pressures increases in February 1997. Other 
peaks occur in August and November 1997. 
Indonesia was in an unsustainable position, 
the five other asian countries were 
vulnerable to a crisis after taking into 
account long term imbalances
Notes This model uses quarterly data Finds that auto correlation of a crisis 
variable in probit regression is highly  
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Study 
Frankel and Rose (1996) Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) Eichengreen Rose Wyplosz (1996) 
Data Set Annual data from 1971 -1992 for 105 
countries
41970-1996, 48 African, 26 Asian and 26 Latin America and 
Caribbean and 5 European economies
1959-1993 uses quarterly data for 20 
industrial countries
Crisis Definition Exchange rate changes greater than 25% and 
are at least 10% bigger than the last 
Exchange Rate change ( to allow for higher 
inflation countries) 
4 similar definitons similar to Frankel and Rose  Exchange rate 
changes greater than 25% and are at least 10% bigger than the last 
Exchange Rate change ( to allow for higher inflation countries) ; at 
least doubling in the rate of depreciation in the previous period
Weighted average of Exchange Rate changes 
reserve changes and interest rate changes 
where the threshold is two standard deviations 
away from the mean of the  exchange market 
pressure index
Exclusion Window 36 Months or 3Years 3 Years 3 Months or 1 Quarter
Indicator 3 Macroeconomic, 4external balance, 2 
foreign and 7 composition of capital flows 
Macroeconomic Variables ( ecnomic growth, real consumption growth 
etc) Financial Variables (ratio of M2 to GDP) external Variables ( CA, 
real effective exchange rate, etc) dbet variables ( ratio of external debt 
to output etc) Foreign Variables (real inte
Monetary, fiscal and external balance 
variables, equity prices, labor market variables 
and contagion variables 
Approach Probit Regression Extension of Frankel and rose longer sample and alternative definiton 
of currency crises) multivariate probit 
Probit Regression
Results Output growth, Domestic Credit Growth, 
Foreign Interest Rates, Foreign Direct 
investments/ Total Debt were significant 
Reserves and Real Exchange Rate were 
somewhat significant 
The importance of the degree of overvaluation, the lvel of reserves 
growth and interest rate in industrial countries and the terms of trade. 
Similar to Frankel and Rose,
As Contagion was the primary focus of their 
study they found that it is significant 
Asian Crises Result From the evaluation of Berg and Patillo, 
Frankel and Rose's model was not good 
None
Notes 
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Study 
Developing Country Studies Division 
CSFB's Emerging Markets Risk Indicator Deutsche Bank Alarm Clock 
Data Set January 1970 to April 1995. Uses monthly datafrom 23 emerging 
economies  but some quarterly data or for some countries annual data. 
The latter series are interpolated or extrapolated to genrate monthly 
crisis predictions
Crisis Definition Weighted average of one month changes in exchange rate and reserves 
more than 3 std. deviations above country average 
Depreciation > 5% and at least double preeceding 
month's depreciation
Various "trigger points" Depreciation > 10% 
and interest Rate increase > 25% typical
Exclusion Window 24 months 1 month 1 month 
Indicator Overvaluation, Current account to GDP ratio, Reserve Losses, Export 
Growth,ST Debt/ reserves 
Overvaluation, Debt/Exports, Growth of credit to 
private sector, reserves/imports(level) oil prices, stoc 
price growth GDP growth, Regional contagion 
Overvaluation, Industrial Prodcution, domestic 
Credit growth, stock market, devaluation 
contagion, Market pressure contagion regional 
dummies interest rate "event"
Approach Probit Regression with RHS variables measured in country specific 
percentile terms 
Logit Regression with RHS variables measured in 
logs, then deviation from mean and standardized 
Logit two equation simultaneous systems on 
exchange rate and interest rate "events" of 
different magnitude: jointly estimates the 
porbability of these two types of events 
Results The DCSD model correctly called 78% of the observations, correctly 
called 48% of precrisis periods, and correclty called 84% of tranquil 
periods. Its Noise to Signal Ratio is 0.333 and its conditional probability 
is 37% 
Asian Crises Result
Notes  
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TABLE 3: SIGNALS APPROACH 
Study ADB NON PARAMETRIC MODEL Kaminsky Lizondo Reinhart (1998) Berg and Patillo 1999b
Data Set January 1970 to April 1995. Uses monthly data from
6 east asian countries Indonesia Korea Malaysia
Thailand Singapore Philippines 
Monthly data spanning from 1970 -1995
for 20 countries 
20 developing and industrial countries
monthly data from 1975 to 1995 
Crisis Definition Month to Month percentage change in a country's
nominal exchange rate against the US dollar exceeds
its sample mean by two standard deviations;  country 
specific valuation
Exchange market pressure index :
W eighted average of month to month
changes the nominal exchange rate and
reserve changes, where the threshold is
plus 3 standard deviations away from its
mean; A sharp depreciation of the
currency, a large decline in international
reserves
W eighted average of exchange rate and
reserve changes; the threshold is three
country specific standard deviations
above the mean; also there are separate
calculations for high inflation countries
where> 150% six month inflation
Exclusion Window 24 Months None None 
Indicator 40 indicators are selected from an original sample of
more than 60. 9 have an NSR smaller than 0.5. but
the two most significant is the deviation of the real
exchange rate against the us dollar from its trend
and 2) ratio of short term external debt to foreign
reserves 
15 indicators: The first seven are 1)
international reserves; 2) imports 3)
exports 4) the terms of trade 5) deviations 
of the real exchange rate from the trend
6) the differential between foreign and
domestic interest rates on deposits 7)
excess real M1 balances 
15 variables used in Kaminsky Lizondo
and Reinhart , plus the level of
M2/reserves, and the current account to
GDP ratio.
Approach Signals approach Signals approach where the thresholds
are set by minimizing its noise to signal
ratio otherwise known as NSR 
Signaling and Probit Model 
Results The Model identified 28 currency crisis episodes in
the six counntries during the sample period. The
wieghted genral composite index issues early
warning signals priori to 18 of the 24 crisis episodes
included in the in sample evaluation with a cutoff
probability of 30%
indicators that have proven to be useful in 
anticipating currency crisis include the
behavior of international reserves, the
real exchange rate, domestic credit, credit 
to the public sector, and domestic
inflation. Other indicators that have found
support
Signaling approach produces similar
results compared to KLR (1998). The
two indicators provide additional
information . Also, the Probit model
shows that the probability of a crisis
increases when real exchange rate
deviations, the current account, reserves
Asian Crises Result The wieghted general composite index predicts the
1997 currency crisis in at least four of the five crisis
affected countries with early warning signals
persistent and starting as early as 24 months prior to
the crisis in Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand
None The signals and the probit approach
perform better than pure guessing. Also,
the Probit model slightly outperforms the
signals model in predicting the asian
crisis
Notes A separate current account index is the index that
anticipates the 1997 crisis in all crisis affected
countires with the exception of indonesia and the
capital account index predicts episodes in Indonesia
Malaysia and Thailand.  
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Study Edison (2000) Goldstein Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) Citibank model (2004) Bruggemann and Linne (2000)
Data Set 1970 - 1995 uses monthly data where the 20
countries used in Kaminsky Lizondo and
Reinhart were used along with 8 emergin
economies that have experienced any
currency crisis in the given in sample period
1970 -1995 uses monthly data over a
sample of 25 emerging economies and
smaller industrial countries covering
over 87 currency crises 
January 1980 to Sep 2001 Includes
three regions Latin America( Brazil,
Argentina Chile Columbia, Peru,
Venezuela, and Uruguay), Asia
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Korea, Thailand) Developed Europe(
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, and
Sweden)
1993-2001 Uses monthly data
from six EU accession
candidates plus Russia and
Turkey
Crisis Definition Uses an index which should exceed 2.5 std
devs away from the mean of the index where
the index is equal to percentage changes in
USD or DM/ unit currency - weight X
percentage change in reserves. The weight
is the ratio of the std dev of the usd or DM /
1 unit
Exchange market pressure index :
Weighted average of month to month
changes the nominal exchange rate
and reserve changes, where the
threshold is plus 3 standard deviations
away from its mean; A sharp
depreciation of the currency, a large
decline in international reserves
Weighted average of the monthly
percent change in the real effective
exchange rate and the monthly
percentage change in foreign exchnage
reserves, with weight such that the two
have equal volatility and the threshold is
3 standard deviations away from its
mean 
20% depreciation against US
dollar within ten trading days 
Exclusion Window None 18 months 
Indicator 14 Variables covering the current account
capital account real sector and financial
sector. KLR variables plus seven new
indicators US output; G-7 output, US interest
rates oil prices, the level of M2/ foreign
exchange reserves and the level of short
term debt
15 indicators in Kaminsky and Reinhart
plus nine additonal indicators Current
account as a share of GDP, Foreign
Direct investment, overall budget
defcit, the growth rates in general
government consumption, central bank
credit to public sector, net credit
Real Effective Exchange Rate, Short
Term capital Inflows percent of GDP,
CA deficit percent of GDP, ST
debt/Reserves, Equity prices, Industrial
Production, Exports, M2/Reserves
16 variables including capital
flight as measured by BIS
deposits ST debt; ratio of lending
to deposit rates and bank
deposits to gdp 
Approach Signaling Approach Signaling Approach Signaling approach but minimizes the
probability of a type I error (mising a
crisis) Composite Risk index
Signaling composite indicator
approach 
Results The NSR as an indicator of a variable's
predictive capacity found real exchange rate,
ratio of short term debt to reserves, M2/
reserve, loss in FX reserve, and sharp
decline in stock price provide useful
information. In terms of the share of a crisis
correctly called
For the monthly model, real exhange
rate appreciation relative to the trend ,
a banking crisis, a decline in stock
prices, a fall in exports, a high ratio of
M2 to international reserves, and a
recession are significant variables;
Real exchange rate has the lowest
Nosie to Signal Ratio followed by ST
capital inflows/GDP, 79% correctly
called observations 
In addition to weak exports and
falling reserves, banking sector
indicators were also useful
Asian Crises Result The results of the Asian crisis are mixed Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea and
the Philippines were signalled by a rise
in the probabilties of a crisis. However,
Indonesia was not captured by the
model 
Indonesia Dec 97, Korea Nov 97,
Malaysia Jul 97, Philippines Jan 98,
Thailand Jul 97
None
Notes 
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TABLE 4: OTHER APPROACHES 
Study Nag and Mitra (1999) Collins (2001) Tornell (1999) Brussiere and Mulder 1999a
Data Set 1980-1998 uses monthly
data for indonesia
Malaysia and Thailand
1985 -1998 uses monthy
data from 1985-1998 from
25 developing and
industrial countries 
22 developing ocuntries plus Hong Kong
listed in the emerging stock markets fact
book of IFC except for Greece, Portugal,
Nigeria and China. Focus is on the Tequila
Crisis and Asian Crisis 
23 countries (22 emerging plus
hong Kong ) Mexican and Asian
Crises (46 observations) 
Crisis Definition Weighted average of
exchange rate and
reserve changes:
threshold is 2 country
specific standard
deviations above the
mean 
weighted average of
exchange rate and reserve
changes; threshold is 2.5
country std devs above
the mean; separate
calculations for high
inflation >150% six month
inflation countries
Crisis Index: weighted average of the
percentage depreciation of the nominal
exchange rate w.r.t the US $ and the
percentage decrease in reserves . The
initial point for the Tequila crisis is
November 1994, and the Asian Crisis is
May 1997. 
Weighted average of exchange
rate and reserve changes
continuous index is used as
dependent variable 
Exclusion Window None None None
Indicator 16 variables in
indicators approach 10-
12 indicators plus lags
(13-23 total variables
per country) for the ANN
models
5 Indicators; real
overvaluation, current
acount/GDP, ST
debt/reserves, reserve
growth and export growth 
Real percent increase in loans provided by
the banking system to the private sector
and state owned enterprises over the
previous four years, real exchange rate
(weighted average w.r.t the US dollar, DM,
and Yen) and the ratio of M2 to reserves in
the month
4 political instability measures
added to economic variables
(RER, lending boom,
M2/Reserves and Dummies)
used in Tornell (1999)
Approach Artificial Neural
networks: comparison to
country to country
indicators approach
Threshold model with
latent variable following
brownian motion distance
and drift are functions of
indicators
OLS regression of Crisis index on above
indicators 
OLS of a crisis index on
indicators 
Results Out of sample crisis
forecasts around 80%
before the asian crisis
Estimates a threshold
model, a Posson model
and a probit model and
finds that the threshold
model fits better than the
two alternatives 
Crisis index increases in the extent of the
lending boom and the severity of the real
appreciation 
Political instability affects crisis
depth; post electoral periods
even more than pre election
periods
Asian Crises Result The same model explained the psread of a
crisis in 1995 also explains the cross
country variation in the 1997 crisis 
Notes  
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Study Brussiere and Mulder 1999b Nitihanprapas and Willett(2000) Kwack (2000) Grier and Grier (2001) 
Data Set 23 countries (22 emerging plus
hong Kong ) Mexican and
Asian Crises (46 observations) 
26 Emerging markets for both the
Mexican and Asian Crises 
1997-1997 annual data
from seven asian countries,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Thailand
1997 cross sectional data
of 25 develping countries 
Crisis Definition Weighted average of exchange
rate and reserve changes
continuous index is used as
dependent variable 
Weighted average of exchange rate
and reserve changes; continuous
index is used as dependent variable 
Weighted average of
exchange rate and reserve
changes continuous index
is used as dependent
variable
Exchange rate
depreciation and stock
market returns 
Exclusion Window None None None None
Indicator Variables in Berg and Patillo,
plus an IMF program dummy
also many alternative indicators 
Interactions between fiscal deficit and
real exchange rate, FDI and the
current account; controls include
private sector credit, M2 and ST debt
to reserves
LIBOR, NPL ratio; Current
Account/ GDP, Short Term
debt/total debt and credit
to the private sector
Exchange rate regime
controls include 1996
depreciation, current
account, external debt/
GDP, M2/Reserves,
lending boom, and real
appreciation 
Approach OLS of crisis index on
indicators; also some nonlinear
interactions robustness checks
p(.17) 
OLS slope dummies regression OLS of crisis index on
indicators; aslo OLS of NPL
ratio on its determinants 
OLS regression to
investigate whether
exchange rate regime
affects the degree of
depreciation, and stock
market returns
Results IMF programs significantly
reduce crisis depth; liquidity
measured by reserves/short
term debt csn offset weak
fundamentals 
Interactions between the real
exchange rate, foreign direct
investments , and the current account
are significant as are lending booms
adequate reserves reduce risks 
Libor and the NPL ratio
(and the ratio of firms which 
explains the NPL ratio)
were the main factors
behind the Asian Crisis
Countries with a peg
depreciated more and
had lower stock returns 
Asian Crises Result fundamentals from the best model
only explains 22% of the Asian crisis 
Notes  
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Study Krkoska (2001) 
Kaufmann, Mehrez, and 
Schmukler (2000) Herrera and Garcia (1999) Gosh and Gosh (2002) 
Data Set 1994-1999 uses quarterly
data from four transition
countries 
1996-1998 annual survey
results from 58 countries 
1980-1998 uses monthly data
from 8 Latin American countries 
1987-1999 annual data from 42
industrial countries 
Crisis Definition Unweighted average of
exchange rate, reserve
and interest rate
changes; two alternative
thresholds , 5% and
0.5% times the times the
standard deviation over
the past 36 months
standard deviation of
monthly exchange rate
changes 
Unweighted sum of exchange
rate, reserve and interest rate
changes; threshold is 1.5
standard deviations above the
mean; separate calculations for
hyperinflation episodes
Deep currency crisis those
where the weighted average of
exchnage rate and reserve
changes is more than 2 country
standard deviations above the
mean AND the GDP growth rate
declines by at least 3 or 5
percentage points
Exclusion Window None None
Indicator 10 variables, most
standard; one less
conventional variable is
CA-FDI gap 
Private information of
managers; 12 other
variables used as controls 
5 indicators, normalized and
then summed up into a single
indicator from which signals are
extracted, Real effective
exchange rate, domestic credit
growth in real terms,
M2/international reserves,
inflation
6 rule of law, 8 shareholders
rights and 5 creditor rights
variables (aggregated by
principal componets) along with
5 standard indicators and 2
corporate leverage ratios
Approach VAR with the ISP as one
component, with many
ad hoc restrictions 
Private information of
managers is extracted using
ordered probit and used with
twelve other variables in
OLS regression to explain
ER volatility
Indicators are normalized and
summed into a single indicator,
from which signals are
extracted, detrending via HP
filter MA and ARIMA also
considered 
binary Recursive Tree, which
identifies thresholds, splits
samples into branches based
on best indicator and continues
branching until stopping rule is
reached 
Results The most significant
predictor of crisis
vulnerability is the CA-
FDI gap; when this
exceeded 5% of GDP a
crisis always followed 
Private Information is a
significant predictor of
exchange rate volatility
The aggregate indicator signals
periods of vulnerability Type I
and Type II errors are still
high,although lower than in
other studies 
Macroeconomic imbalances are
often the trigger for crises but
interactions with institutional
variables are important 
Asian Crises Result
Notes  
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Study Bukart and Coudert (2000) Vlaar (2000) Zhang (2001)
Osband and Van Rijckeghem 
(2000) 
Apoteker and Barthelemy (2001) 
Apoteker(2001)
Data Set 1980-1998uses quarterly
data from 15 emerging
market economies 
1987-1996 uses monthly data
from 31 emerging market
economies 
1993-1997 uses monthly
data from Indonesia, Korea,
Philippines, Thailand
1985-1998 uses monthly
data from 31 emerging
markets 
1970-2001 uses monthly and
quarterly data from 40
developing counries 
Crisis Definition Combination of
Exchange Market
Pressure index threshodl,
Milesi-Ferretti and
Razin(1998) threshold
and amendments "in
light of expert judgement"
Weighted average of
exchange rate and reserve
changes; continuous index is
used as dependent variable,
but in model evaluation, a
threshold of 10 is used to
define crisis periods
Seprate thresholds for
exchange rate and reserve
changes; threshold is three
standard deviations above
the mean where the
standad deviation is
calculated using a 3 year
moving window
Exchange Rate change of
more than 10% AND
greater than mean plus two
standard deviations (mean
calculated iver the past
year s.d. over thwe past
two years) 
Exchange rate crisis defined as
20% change in real exchange
rate in one uqarter, 30% in two
quarters, or 40% in 3-6 quarters
Exclusion Window 
Indicator An initial set of 34
indicators pared down to
just six reserves/M2,
reserves/debt,short
term/total debt,
overvaluation, contagion
indicator and inflation
14 variables, some of which
affect the crisis index directly,
others affecting the volatility,
and still others the weighting
between crisis and tranquil
distributions
4 variables (real exchange
rate, inflation, level, and
growth rate of M2/reserves)
as well as contagion
measure 
18 variables Eleven Variables combined to
measure "growth balance,
financing balance, foreign
exchange balance, cyclical
balance and banking system
balance"
Approach Fisher discriminant
analysis 
Crisis index is drawn from a
mixture of normal
distributions, where means,
volatilities and relative weights
are functions of the indicators 
Autoregrssive Conditional
Hazard Model 
Identifies indicator ranges
(half planes or quadrants)
where crises have not
occurred 
Variables are interacted, and
quadrants which increase
vulnerability are identified using
a gentic algorithm 
Results Four out of five crises
are correctly called an
only one out of five
tranquil periods are
misclassified as false
alarms 
The standard indicators,as
well as contagion and past
exchange rate and reserves
behavior increase
vulnerability. In and out of
sample 7 out of 8 crises are
called but 1 of 3 tranquil
periods are false alarms 
The ACH model is found to
fit better than a probit
model, based on a
comparison of log
likelihoods. None of the
Indicators is significant,
save for the duration and
contagion measure 
Various filyers especially
those for external debt and
reserve adequacy, help
identify 47% of tranquil
periods as being safe or
near safe
No formal testing charts
indicate anticipation of cyclical
crises (but not exchange rate
crises) in Mexico in 1994, and
Thailand in 1997
Asian Crises Result The porbability of a crises in
Thailand in july 97 was 1.3%
and is detected if its threshold
is lowered to 1% where 87.5 of
the crises out of sample are
detected instead of that of 10%
Korea October 97 Indonesia
July 97, Philippines July 97,
Thailand July 97 
Notes  
  
4.  Application to the Philippines VAR Models and Beyond  
4.1 Preliminary to VAR Modeling  
 
4.1.1 Data and historical events.  
The table below depicts some of the occurrences that may appear to be significant be it 
monetary, economic or political. The 0ccurrences include periods or months where reserves 
declined as well as months where exchange rates declined or when the interest rate differential 
was significantly high. Some months or periods display the economic or political events.  
YEAR/MONTH Significant Occurrence / Monetary / Political / Economic
Jan-80 Interest Rate Ceiling was abolished 
Oct-82 Reserves decline by 13%
Nov-82 Reserves decline by 28%
Feb-83 Reserves decline by 20%
Sep-83 Reserves decline by 50%
Oct-83 Peso Depreciates by 27% and Reserves by 11%
Jun-84 Peso Depreciates by 28.5%
Oct-84 Reserves Decline by 20% and IRD up by 400bps
Nov-84 IRD up by 300bps
Dec-84 IRD still up at 34%
Feb-85 Reserves decline by 41%
Mar-85 Reserves decline by another 20%
Jul-85 IRD at 22% 
Nov-85 Marcos Announces Presidential election
Dec-85 Reserves decline for the second straight month by around 11%
Jan-86 Reserves decline by 18%
Feb-86 Political turmoil EDSA Revolution Peso declines by 15% IRD up at 20%
Mar-86 Period of uncertainty 
Aug-87 Coup Attempts 
Jun-89 Pressure on the currency begins 
Dec-89 Coup Attempts 
Apr-90 Reserves decline by 19% oil, and bases were the issue 
Jun-90 Peso declines by 1.28% and Reserves drop by 7%
Oct-90 Reserves decline by 10% IRD to 20% second straight month 
Nov-90 Peso depreciates by 8% and Reserves decline another 10%
Dec-90 IRD still up 
Jan-91 Reserves decline by 18% and IRD moves by 200 bps to 22%
Aug-91 Inflation peaks at 19%
May-92 Presidential Elections
Sep-92 US departs from Naval Base 
Jul-97 Asian Financial Crisis begins for the Philippines as Peso declines 5%
May-98 Presidential Elections
Oct-00 Peso depreciates by 11% Jose Pidal Estrada Scandal 
Dec-00 Peso declines by 1.2%
Jun-01 Peso declines by 3.5%  
 
The table below depicts the Crisis months identified by some of the significant models. 
For instance Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart( have identified 3 periods of Crisis 
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namely October 1983 where the exchange rate plummeted 28% and reserves dropping by 
11%, June 1984 where the peso depreciated 27%, and July 1997 as the beginning of the 
Asian Financial Crisis in South East Asia. Likewise, Kaminsky and Reinhart(1998) and 
Edison(2000) identify October 1983 and June 1984 as Crisis Periods. Edison Identifies 
February 1986 as a Crisis period where the Philippine Peso declined by 15% and the 
interest rate differential shot up to 20%. This month was also the month of the EDSA 
Revolution and the Presidential elections between Marcos and Aquino. As for Abiad 
(2003) and Mariano (2003), they identified additional periods of speculative pressure 
which were two additional periods; the first being a period beginning August 1982 up to 
April 1986 and the second a period of speculative pressure beginning Jun 1988 until Nov 
1990 for Abiad(2003) and July 1990 up to June 1995 for Mariano et al(2003). 
 
GKR K & R Edison Abiad 2003 Mariano et al 2K3 ADB 
Crisis Definition ER&RSV 3 ER&RSV 3 ER&RSV 2.5 MSMTVTP MSMTVTP ER 2 
Crisis Date 
Jan-82
Aug-82
Sep-82
Jan-83
Jun-83 X
Oct-83 X X X X X
Jun-84 X X X X XF
Oct-84 X
Feb-86 X X
Apr-86
Dec-87
Jun-88
Jul-90 XX
Nov-90 XX X
Jun-95
May-97
Jul-97 X X X XA
XX-speculative episode 
X-Crisis Date RSV-Reserve Changes 
K&R Kaminsky and Reinhart MSMTVTP-Markov Swicthing Model with Time Varying Transition probabilities
ER-Excahne Rate Number represents - the number of standard deviations away from the mean for the threshold  
4.1.2 Components of the ISP – the baseline using Vector Auto Regression  
The components of the Index of Speculative Pressure (“ISP”) include three variables: 1) 
Month TO Month changes in Nominal Exchange Rates (“ERC”) line rf. In IFS, 2) 
Interest Rate Differential (“IRD”), the difference between each country’s short term 
domestic interest rate, line 60c for the Philippines line 60c for US in IFS, Month TO 
Month changes in Foreign Reserves net of GOLD (“RSVC”) line 1l in IFS.  
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4.1.3 Testing the components of the ISP for Unit Roots  
 
The three components were subject to unit root tests as one of the primary conditions for 
a VAR and not an Error correction model is for the endogenous variables included to be 
stationary. The chart, Correlogram, and Augmented Dickey Fuller test for a Unit Root for 
each of the three components are below.  All three components rejected the null 
hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% level. Furthermore, the ADF test for ERC and RSVC 
were significant to the 1% critical level. All three components are stationary based on the 
tests and satisfy the condition of stationarity for the VAR model. Changes in Nominal 
exchange rate are stationary. However, we note that the level of the exchange rate has a 
unit root. For purposes of this study we focus on the changes of the exchange rate which 
are stationary.  
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Month to Month changes in Exchange Rate PHP/USD (1976M02-2005M11) 
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Interest Rate Differential PHP T-bill – US T-bill (1976M02-2005M11) 
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Month to Month Changes in Reserves net of Gold (1976M02-2005M11) 
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4.2 VAR Modeling for the Components of the ISP for the Philippines 
4.2.1 Estimating the order of the VAR (Lag Length and Coefficients)  
Based on the lag order selection criteria, the Likelihood Ratio and the AIC indicate that 
the lag structure should include 10 lags. On the other hand the Schwarz Criterion and the 
Hannan Quinn criterion point to a lag structure of order 2. A lag order of two is deemed 
to be much more feasible than having to estimate 93 coefficients, the SC criterion as we 
know is used for large samples rather than small samples. In this time series, we have 249 
data points. 
 
Based on the theoretical literature of a currency crisis, the arrival of a crisis can be found 
by symptoms of such a crisis, months before the actual occurrence. The obvious concern 
here is whether the VAR of order two will be enough to capture the arrival of a crisis. 
Both have their merits. However, as the SC and the HQ point to 2 lags, then the baseline 
will first study the VAR of order 2. The rationale behind choosing to examine the 
VAR(10) is not only of a technical choice but that of a practical and empirical choice as 
well. A VAR(10) is massive given the circumstances. The cost entails losing one 10 
month interval in an in sample data point which is in 1976 for this given data set. 
Besides, the inclusion of 10 lags suggests that the mean of each of the components is still 
affected by a change in either nominal exchange rates, interest rate differentials, or 
reserve changes 10 months prior to the month being considered. Using a VAR of order 2 
will capture the necessary dynamic interactions amongst the components of the ISP. The 
study of the VAR (2) warrants scrutiny as this may be a much more parsimonious than 
the VAR(10) and may be a lot feasible to become a baseline model for the Multivariate 
GARCH model and the MSVAR due to issues such as convergence and estimation of the 
number of coefficients. 
 
The table below shows the estimated coefficients for a VAR (2) specification. Looking at 
the estimated coefficients, the signs seem to manifest the correct signs. The coefficients 
of the interest rate differentials to the exchange rate changes are positive indicating a rise 
in differentials should lead to an expectation of a depreciated currency whereas the 
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coefficients of the reserve changes are negatively signed in determining changes in the 
nominal exchange rate. The negative coefficients are indicative of an expected stronger 
currency one month ahead because reserves have increased in previous periods indicating 
a better cover ratios and stronger fundamentals. For the lags of ERC, the first lag shows a 
negative coefficient followed by a positive coefficient in the second month. As we know 
foreign exchange rates are known to be unpredictable, they are non-stationary at the 
level, but are stationary at the percentage changes. Based on such phenomena, it is safe to 
say that the signs are correct as the next period expects a correction of the currency.  
 
 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
1  1180.153 NA   1.11e-08 -9.800440 -9.669528 -9.747686 
2  1211.418  60.96167  9.23e-09 -9.986765  -9.724939*  -9.881256* 
3  1223.865  23.95509  8.97e-09 -10.01560 -9.622865 -9.857341 
4  1233.464  18.23394  8.93e-09 -10.02062 -9.496964 -9.809598 
5  1246.153  23.78609  8.66e-09 -10.05149 -9.396925 -9.787718 
6  1265.019  34.89062  7.98e-09 -10.13405 -9.348575 -9.817526 
7  1273.855  16.11908  7.99e-09 -10.13268 -9.216289 -9.763399 
8  1289.296  27.78085  7.58e-09 -10.18658 -9.139275 -9.764544 
9  1303.945  25.98855  7.23e-09 -10.23385 -9.055636 -9.759063 
10  1317.958   24.50762*   6.94e-09*  -10.27580* -8.966671 -9.748257 
11  1319.423  2.524552  7.41e-09 -10.21274 -8.772699 -9.632444 
12  1329.038  16.33477  7.38e-09 -10.21789 -8.646939 -9.584842 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
 
Moving to determining the interest rate differential, the estimated coefficients for ERC 
are positive and correctly signed likewise the signs of RSVC are negative and correctly 
signed. These signs are consistent with the literature indicating that higher exchange rates 
may impact the interest rate differential of the country against the benchmark due to 
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interest rate parity. Furthermore, increase reserves again helps strengthen the 
fundamentals in terms of coverage ratio and helps provide protection to investors. Thus, 
we see a lowering of the risk premium manifested in the interest rate differentials.  
 
The coefficients of lagged exchange rates are positive for RSVC, indicating that the 
revaluation of reserves do have a positive impact on RSVC as these are captured as 
foreign exchange revaluations in the books. Increases in both IRD and RSVC are 
negative at the first lag and then shifts into a positive coefficient in the second lag.  
VAR(2) ERC IRD RSVC
ERC(-1) -0.080701 0.005322 1.232287
ERC(-2) 0.064259 0.029158 0.353311
IRD(-1) 0.016241 1.221584 1.735773
IRD(-2) 0.042866 -0.22759 -1.358365
RSVC(-1) -0.036727 -0.009118 0.041622
RSVC(-2) -0.018575 -0.027914 -0.031355  
 
4.2.3 Granger Causality tests  
The results of the Granger causality tests are given in the table below. For changes in the 
nominal exchange rate, the results indicate that interest rate differentials and reserve 
changes do provide useful information in predicting changes in the nominal exchange 
rate as the null that interest rate differentials / reserve changes does not Granger cause 
changes in the nominal exchange rate has been rejected with significant results. Likewise, 
the Granger test of joint significance of the two other endogenous variables, IRD and 
RSV, did in fact result in rejecting the null that the two other endogenous variables do not 
Granger cause the changes in the nominal exchange rate.  
 
In theory and practice, once an alteration of the interest rate differential occurs, in this 
case, a thinning of the spread, investors begin to exchange their domestic assets, 
particularly, securities, for the more stable benchmark type of securities, foreign 
securities, which will signal a capital flight and a stronger demand for US dollars in 
exchange for the domestic currency. The results indicate that the interest rate differential 
may provide useful information in determining exchange rate changes but not as strong 
as the information that reserve changes provide. Looking at the other results may also 
provide useful information. Interest rate differentials provide useful information in 
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predicting reserve changes. In turn, RSVC is useful in providing information in 
predicting the changes in the nominal exchange rate. An insight gained from this is that 
IRD does affect the nominal exchange rate changes but affects it both indirectly and 
somewhat directly. Because intervention is not directly observed, the monetary 
authorities in the Philippines may have been using its foreign reserves in order to 
suppress the impact of interest rate differentials.   
 
It is interesting to note that ERC does not Granger cause IRD where RSVC does Granger 
cause IRD. In the long run it has been found that ERC does provide useful information in 
predicting IRD, but in possibly two months it may not. The rational behind such results 
may be attributed to microstructure factors that come into play in the short term.  
 
Nonetheless, nominal exchange rate changes and interest rate differentials do provide 
information in predicting reserve changes. For both of the variables, IRD and RSVC, the 
Granger causality test of joint significance for the endogenous variables other than the 
variable in the left hand side of the equation yielded result that rejected the null 
hypothesis and provide information for the variables on the left hand side of the equation.  
 
All in all, the Granger causality tests provide information on the dynamics of the three 
components of the ISP and that they provide useful information for predicting the other 
endogenous variables.  
 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Dependent variable: ERC  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
IRD  8.181788 2  0.0167 
RSVC  14.03980 2  0.0009 
All  17.59403 4  0.0015 
Dependent variable: IRD  
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Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
ERC  0.665342 2  0.7170 
RSVC  26.52794 2  0.0000 
All  29.37580 4  0.0000 
Dependent variable: RSVC  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
ERC  9.655700 2  0.0080 
IRD  14.01242 2  0.0009 
All  40.00907 4  0.0000 
 
4.2.4 Impulse Response  
Response of ERC 
The response of ERC to a shock in the percentage change in nominal exchange rates is 
large and eventually reverts back on the second month. As for a positive shock of interest 
rate differentials and reserve changes, the response of ERC kicks in only in the second 
month. There is a lag response to percentage changes in nominal exchange rates. RSVC 
provides a negative effect to ERC at the 2nd month after a shock. A positive surprise in 
reserves lasts as long as 4 months for the nominal exchange rate. This means an 
unexpected increase in reserves helps the nominal exchange rate appreciate for the next 
six months. As for interest rate differentials, the response of changes in nominal 
exchange rates is felt by a slight increase in ERC in the second month. The increase in 
IRD makes ERC respond due to interest parity where the two should revert to the 
equilibrium.  
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Response of IRD  
A shock from Interest Rate 
Differential (IRD) to itself is quite 
large and, in fact, only begins to 
gradually decline in the third month. 
This movement may be explained by 
the reaction of the market wherein it 
slowly begins to realize that the 
differential is open to trading 
opportunities and arbitrage. In the 
early part of the shock, which is a 
surprise in expectations, the market 
is cautious and puts a premium on 
the unforeseen shock, however, as 
the third  month kicks in, 
information is slowly being 
scrutinized and analyzed to the point 
that the market realizes that the 
shock was in fact an opportunity to 
take advantage of.  
 
On the other hand, a shock in the 
changes in nominal exchange rates 
creates the same reaction. A 
depreciation in the exchange rate 
does increase the interest rate 
differential amongst the short term 
rates of the Philippines and the US 
benchmark. A shock from reserve 
changes does help the interest rate 
differential between the Philippines 
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and the US short term rates because IRD does gradually decline in the next six months. A 
shock in reserve changes is helpful to lowering the risk premium for short term interest 
rates.  
 
A shock from Interest Rate Differential (IRD) to itself is quite large and, in fact, only 
begins to gradually decline in the second month. This movement may be explained by the 
reaction of the market wherein it slowly begins to realize that the differential is open to 
trading opportunities and arbitrage. In the early part of the shock, which is a surprise in 
expectations, the market is cautious and puts a premium on the unforeseen shock, 
however, as the second month kicks in, information is slowly being scrutinized and 
analyzed to the point that the market realizes that the shock was in fact an opportunity to 
take advantage of.  
 
On the other hand, a shock in the changes in nominal exchange rates creates a different 
reaction. There seems to be lasting effect in the interest rate differential. A depreciation in 
the exchange rate does increase the interest rate differential amongst the short term rates 
of the Philippines and the US benchmark. The rationale for such an occurrence is that 
once authorities see the currency has depreciated they would want to either defend or 
revert back the level of the currency by responding through an increase in interest rate 
differentials so that capital flight may be suppressed.  
Response of RSVC  
A shock from reserve changes to itself raises a large response to reserve changes in the 
first month but eventually drops in the second month and requires some time for 
correction. A surprise in expectations does spillover to the next month but eventually 
does not have any positive effect. As for a shock in changes in the nominal exchange rate, 
the immediate effect is a decline in the country’s reserves due to depreciation of the 
exchange rate. Finally, a shock in the interest rate differential provides a negative effect 
in reserve changes, but only lasts for a month. Increases in interest rates is in line with the 
theoretical literature of krugman’s first generation model where, reserves decline because 
there has to be an equilibrium in the interest rate parity amongst the two country’s, and 
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the only way to do such thing is to unload its reserves in order to achieve such 
equilibrium.  
 
4.2.5 Predicting a probability of a crisis – Methodology for calculating the 
Probability 
 
Shown below is the specification for calculating the probability of a crisis conditional on 
information on the most recent information. 
 
The  three components of the ISP: the ERC, IRD, and RSVC are used in order to estimate 
the vector auto regression. Once the order of the VAR has been estimated, the 
distribution of the ISP can now be derived from the VAR model. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )ˆˆ, , ( ) , , ,ERC IRD RSVC VAR n ERC IRD RSVC N μ⇒ Σ     
 Since we assume that the three components are normally distributed, the ISP as a linear 
combination of the three components is assumed to be normally distributed as well with a 
mean and variance that can be derived from the VAR.  
 
( )
1 2 3
1 2 3
2 2 2
1 , ,
,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 2 2
ISP ERC IRD RSVC
ERC IRD RSVC ERC IRD ERC RSVC IRD RSVC
ISP ERC IRD RSVC
N
Var ISP ,
α α α
μ α μ α μ α μ
α σ α σ α σ σ σ σ
= + +
= + +⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= + + + + +⎝ ⎠
 
 
 
Now what we want to get is the distribution of the ISP conditional on information at time 
t-1. In order to get the distribution, we must estimate the mean and variance of the ISP 
,which are derived from the estimated means, one step ahead, at each time period, of each 
of the components of the VAR and these mean values are joined with the weights of each 
component in order to get the mean of the ISP.  
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The ISP given the most recent information can be derived via the estimated VAR model. 
Using the estimated model, we use the most recent information, the lags, and estimate the 
mean of the components, which will later on be used with the weights to ultimately 
determine the mean of the ISP given the most recent information. This is done on a 
monthly basis.  
1t tISP I −  
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The variance is of the ISP is derived from the variance covariance matrix of the residuals 
of the components from the VAR.  
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Where the weights are derived from the variance covariance matrix of the residuals of the 
estimated VAR model:  
 
   α1 =1/ σ2ERC I [1/σ2ERC +1/ σ2IRD +1/ σ2RSVC] 
   α2 =1/ σ2IRD I [1/σ2ERC +1/ σ2IRD +1/ σ2RSVC] 
   α 3=1/σ2RSVC I [1/σ2ERC +1/ σ2IRD +1/ σ2RSVC] 
 
Given a Predetermined threshold, the probability of a crisis may be estimated.  
( ) ( )* *1 1Pr Prt t t tCrisis I ISP T I− −= >  
The predetermined threshold is taken from Goldstein Kaminsky and Reinhart where the 
values of the components are the values corresponding to the percentile of each 
component that minimizes its noise to signal ratio. For ERC and IRD, they are the 90 
Percentile and for the reserve change, it is the 10 percentile. They used the 10 percentile 
level for the reserve changes because these are the levels at which the decline in reserves 
provided the best noise to signal ratio in determining a currency crisis. The method they 
used for determining these thresholds were through using the historical crises months and 
matching the rate at which these three components would indicate or signal an arrival of a 
crisis. Using the given values and the weights, the predetermined threshold of the ISP is 
derived.  
 
4.2.6 The Results for calculating the Probability of a Crisis for the Philippines 
 
Historically, on the actual month to month percent changes in the peso dollar nominal 
exchange rate, there were four major depreciation episodes since 1976: 1) 1983-1984 ( a 
cumulative depreciation of 56% percent) 2) 1990 ( a cumulative depreciation of 20% 
over the rest of 1990 beginning June) 3) 1997-1998 ( a cumulative depreciation of 50% 
for one year beginning July 1997) 4) 2000 (a cumulative depreciation of 22% for the rest 
of the year beginning February).  
However, we note that the definition of a currency crisis used in this study is when the 
index of speculative pressure, which is composed of three variables, is exceeded. The 
three components are the changes in the nominal exchange rate, changes in interest rates 
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given by interest rate differentials, and changes in international reserves.  
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In the graph depicted above, a Probability of a Crisis conditional on information up to the 
most recent month is calculated given the model specification in the previous section. 
The model began to provide a crisis probability during the month of June 1984, the first 
0.14% form a long period of probabilities less than .00%. The month to month there was 
a crisis probability and it lasted until May 1986. The cumulative loss of the currency for 
the period was at 43.5%. Surprisingly the model failed to provide a crisis probability for 
October 1983. The probabilities of above 85% began in August 1984 and lasted until 
August 1985. However, the months following up to 1986 still provided probabilities that 
indicated that there was still an amount of probability that a crisis would ensue. 
 
In the months of August 1986, December 1987, April 1988 to November 1988, the model 
exhibited small amounts of Crisis Probabilities. All low crisis probabilities were reported 
in these months but for these periods, the decline in reserves was mostly felt. The 
speculation may have originated from stability concerns in the Aquino government.  
 
The next speculative pressure interval that the model identified began in May 1989 and 
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ended April 1993. During this period the Peso depreciated by 21.6% The crisis 
probabilities began rising up to December 1989 where a second coup attempt occurred, 
but a high of 35% was signaled in may 1990 a month before the gulf war. The crisis 
probability rose to around 75% in the month of October in 1990 where months before the 
peso had already depreciated by 11% and the Interest rate differential was at 20% for the 
second consecutive month. This month of October experienced a 10% decline in 
Reserves. At the same time, pressure on the whether the American would continue to 
operate the US Naval Bases was mounting during this period. Ultimately in 1992, they 
abandoned they left Subic, but had to leave Clark due to the Eruption of Mount Pinatubo.  
There were also a couple of periods beginning September 1993 up to August 1994 where 
the model exhibited crisis probabilities that warranted a bit of caution regarding an 
impending crisis. In September 1993, the currency depreciated by 6%, but the months 
after that just saw months of increased interest rate differentials. In fact, reserves 
increased by 40% cumulative and the currency recovered by 8% for the period up to 
august.  
 
Finally, we note the crisis probabilities that the model provided during the Asian 
Financial Crisis. The model results were disappointing where it sent crisis probabilities 
only as early as September 1997. In fact the crisis probabilities were low. The highest 
probability at 4.6% was given during the month of February 1998. Perhaps further 
investigation of possible contagion variables may help anticipate a crisis. Likewise, given 
the circumstances, it would seem appropriate to look into VAR GARCH models. 
Modeling the volatility of the components of the ISP may provide information that could 
help anticipate the arrival of a Crisis.  
4.3 VARX Specification for the Philippines  
Picking up from the baseline VAR model, we proceed further into a VARX model which 
will include exogenous variables in the model specification. The rationale behind such 
specification is taken form the idea that there are other indicators, macro economic 
variables, in the economy that may contribute to determining a looming currency crisis. 
The fact that the ISP is composed of three components and they act as endogenous to one 
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another does not consider other factors in the economy that may help determine the three 
expected values components. There are numerous, but we hope to use those that are 
important in determining these three components in order to calculate a probability of a 
currency crisis.  
 
First, we estimated a VAR model with exogenous variables using the variables that Abiad 
and Mariano(2003) found useful in their previous study. Namely, the money supply 
relative to reserve changes (“M2RSVCH”), the deviations from the real effective 
exchange rate via Hodrick Prescott Filter (“ZSHPREER”), and changes in real domestic 
credit (“RDC”). From the estimated model, all three variables were correctly signed, all 
three had positive signs in the nominal exchange rate changes and interest rate 
differential equations whereas the equation for the real effective exchange rates exhibited 
negative signs. All three were found to be significant.  
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 ERC IRD RSVC 
ERC(-1) -0.105936 -0.003244  1.405215 
  (0.06883)  (0.03683)  (0.39820) 
 [-1.53904] [-0.08810] [ 3.52890] 
    
ERC(-2)  0.022607  0.011989  0.644452 
  (0.06833)  (0.03655)  (0.39527) 
 [ 0.33087] [ 0.32798] [ 1.63041] 
    
IRD(-1) -0.040101  1.192255  2.139596 
  (0.11521)  (0.06164)  (0.66648) 
 [-0.34808] [ 19.3432] [ 3.21029] 
    
IRD(-2) -0.027938 -0.263297 -0.846016 
  (0.11518)  (0.06162)  (0.66631) 
 [-0.24256] [-4.27284] [-1.26970] 
    
RSVC(-1) -0.021878 -0.001532 -0.065732 
  (0.01096)  (0.00586)  (0.06341) 
 [-1.99597] [-0.26120] [-1.03660] 
    
RSVC(-2) -0.010601 -0.023723 -0.089152 
  (0.01034)  (0.00553)  (0.05981) 
 [-1.02536] [-4.28892] [-1.49060] 
    
ZSHPREER  0.000252  0.000188 -0.001944 
  (0.00031)  (0.00017)  (0.00181) 
 [ 0.80598] [ 1.12283] [-1.07430] 
    
M2RSVCH  0.001654  0.000802 -0.011957 
  (0.00034)  (0.00018)  (0.00195) 
 [ 4.91283] [ 4.45305] [-6.13847] 
    
RDC  0.003712  0.003358 -0.023943 
  (0.00521)  (0.00279)  (0.03014) 
 [ 0.71242] [ 1.20469] [-0.79442] 
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VARX(2) ZSHPREER M2RSVCH RDC 
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The inclusion of three other variables, 1)the deviation from the real effective exchange 
rate via Hodrick Prescott filter,2) the changes in money supply relative to reserves, and 
3)the changes in real domestic credit, have improved the ability of the model to anticipate 
currency crisis.  
 
The first improvement is the ability of the VARX specification to provide a probability of 
a crisis, although deemed speculative due to its probability size, as early as November 
1982 up until June 1983. This probability provided an anticipation of and additional 22% 
in the depreciation of the Peso. In addition, the VARX model was able to capture the 
October 1983 depreciation of 27%. This is on top of the Crisis period anticipated by the 
model in March 1984, two months earlier than the VAR baseline model.  
 
The model provided the next speculative period early as November 1987 until April 
1993. The cumulative depreciation for the period was 25%. In addition, the VARX 
provided crisis probabilities that warranted significant attention for the gulf war in June 
1990 as early as April. The baseline model anticipated the gulf war in May.  
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Similar to the baseline model, the VARX model did not anticipate the Financial Crisis in 
July 1997, although it captured a period of 30% deprecation. This warrants a further 
investigation of contagion variables or modeling of volatility as mentioned in the baseline 
model.  
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Contagion 
 
 
The search for a contagion variable is known to be a difficult task. In some instances, 
researchers use dummy variables. The dummy variable takes on a value of one if there is 
a crisis occurring elsewhere in the region and zero if no crisis is present in the region. In 
this, study a contagion variable representing the changes of the monthly equity index of 
the Pacific excluding Japan will be used. This is taken from the Pacific Index of the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International Index for the Pacific Excluding Japan.  
 
The estimated considers the changes in the pacific index to be correctly signed in all three 
equations. Moreover, the coefficients are considered to be significant in two out of three 
equations. Both ERC and IRD specified that the contagion variable representing changes 
in the Month to Month changes in the MSCI Pacific Index was significant. However, that 
same variable was not significant to the reserve changes equation. Nonetheless, it was 
correctly signed and we use this index in order to capture common shocks to the region 
brought about by the equity index changes in the Pacific excluding that of Japan.  
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 ERC IRD RSVC 
ERC(-1) -0.105387 -0.002595  1.391353 
  (0.06899)  (0.03689)  (0.39797) 
 [-1.52750] [-0.07035] [ 3.49615] 
    
ERC(-2)  0.022927  0.012368  0.636368 
  (0.06847)  (0.03661)  (0.39493) 
 [ 0.33486] [ 0.33785] [ 1.61134] 
    
IRD(-1) -0.038944  1.193626  2.110332 
  (0.11550)  (0.06176)  (0.66625) 
 [-0.33717] [ 19.3278] [ 3.16749] 
    
IRD(-2) -0.028553 -0.264026 -0.830454 
  (0.11542)  (0.06171)  (0.66577) 
 [-0.24739] [-4.27833] [-1.24736] 
    
RSVC(-1) -0.021588 -0.001188 -0.073074 
  (0.01103)  (0.00590)  (0.06363) 
 [-1.95684] [-0.20137] [-1.14834] 
    
RSVC(-2) -0.010517 -0.023624 -0.091261 
  (0.01036)  (0.00554)  (0.05977) 
 [-1.01490] [-4.26373] [-1.52676] 
    
ZSHPREER  0.000248  0.000183 -0.001838 
  (0.00031)  (0.00017)  (0.00181) 
 [ 0.79024] [ 1.09069] [-1.01597] 
    
M2RSVCH  0.001653  0.000801 -0.011927 
  (0.00034)  (0.00018)  (0.00195) 
 [ 4.89938] [ 4.43897] [-6.12840] 
    
RDC  0.003787  0.003448 -0.025862 
  (0.00523)  (0.00279)  (0.03015) 
 [ 0.72459] [ 1.23364] [-0.85776] 
    
ASIAEXJ -0.008467 -0.010028  0.214068 
  (0.03050)  (0.01631)  (0.17592) 
 [-0.27760] [-0.61498] [ 1.21682] 
The VARX included the macroeconomic variables and the changes to the MSCI Pacific 
Equity Index. The inclusion of the macroeconomic variables was used as control 
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variables in order to determine the impact of the contagion variable to the improvement 
of the model’s capability to predict a currency crisis. 
VARX (2) ZSHPREER M@RSVCH RDC PACIFICEXJAPAN
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Given the changes in the MSCI Pacific index excluding Japan, we focus on whether the 
contagion variable was able to improve in its objective which is to anticipate the arrival 
of a currency crisis in 1997. In the run to the Asian financial Crisis in the Philippines in 
July 1997, the model provided probabilities around 4% to 5% in the months of March and 
April and a mere 8 and 7 percent in the months of June and July. However, we note that 
the crisis probabilities began doubling in June and then doubled again in August, and 
doubling in September. However, the crisis probabilities, although anticipated better than 
the VARX model not having the contagion variable, were not that all convincing except 
probably the fact that in April the probability had doubled and then doubled again in 
June. Nevertheless, this occurrence points towards searching for more variables that may 
provide useful information in determining the arrival of a crisis. In addition, the use of a 
VAR-GARCH model or a MS-VAR model with time varying transition probabilities may 
be of use. In fairness, had the probabilities been tracked, there would have been an 
anticipation of a 45% depreciation of the Peso back in 1997. During this period, the 
global index lost 35% of its value, indicating a flight of funds from the region.  
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Furthermore, there was another period of speculative pressure which began in November 
1999 and ended in May 2001. The peso plummeted by another 24% for this period. This 
period was brought about by a cumulative loss of 9% in the MSCI index. Throughout the 
region the index continued to drop on expectations that the semiconductor industry was 
slowing down due to the burst of the tech bubble in 2000. Because the Philippines is such 
a small market relative to the other players in the market, the vulnerability of the country 
to a crisis due to the changes in the capital flows in the region is quite significant.  
 
 77
  
5. CONCLUSION  
The creation of an EWS does have two important components. One the precise definition 
of a currency crisis and two, the mechanism for determining such a currency crisis. 
Modeling the dynamics of the components of the Index of Speculative pressure via VAR 
does provide a mechanism for predicting the probability of a currency crisis. The baseline 
VAR model for predicting a currency crisis predicts an impending currency crisis. 
Moreover, the VARX models, the baseline models with exogenous variables, both with 
and without the contagion variable, performed better than the baseline VAR. In addition, 
the VARX model with a contagion variable provided probabilities that predicted a 
currency crisis more convincing than the VARX without. As a result, the addition of 
other macroeconomic variables and contagion variables do help to improve the prediction 
of a currency crisis in terms of the probabilities and the number of months in anticipation 
of a currency crisis. The probability of correctly calling a currency crisis is positively 
affected when other exogenous variables are included.  Interestingly, adding exogenous 
variables capture most of the episodes that lead to a deterioration of a currency crisis, but 
not all. The search and use for other significant macroeconomic variables in the economy 
as well as contagion variables is a must in order to possibly anticipate an impending 
crisis.  
 
5.1 Directions for future Research 
The dynamic interactions of an index of speculative pressure warrants further scrutiny. A 
search for an indicator that considers flight of short term capital and matters that relate to 
the third and fourth generation currency crisis models should be considered. Indicators 
such as other MSCI indices, variables that indicate that there is a crisis elsewhere, 
variables such as the type and quality of institutions are only some which may provide 
useful information. Using the VAR model for a Multivariate GARCH where the 
conditional variance is changing may address the concern mentioned. Relaxing the 
normality assumption of the components of the ISP is another avenue that may be of 
interest. Looking into Extreme Values is a future direction. Also, a Markov Switching 
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VAR with time varying transition probabilities may provide results that will be able to 
capture depreciations of the exchange rate. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: SIGNIFICANT MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES  
Exchange Rate PHP/USD (1976M02-2005M11) 
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Interest Rate Differential PHP T-bill – US T-bill (1976M02-2005M11) 
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Reserves (1976M02-2005M11) 
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Appendix VAR (2) Estimation 
 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates  
 Date: 03/17/06   Time: 18:39  
 Sample (adjusted): 1976M04 1996M12 
 Included observations: 249 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 ERC IRD RSVC 
ERC(-1) -0.080701  0.005322  1.232287 
  (0.06815)  (0.03628)  (0.40472) 
 [-1.18418] [ 0.14672] [ 3.04479] 
    
ERC(-2)  0.064259  0.029158  0.353311 
  (0.06746)  (0.03591)  (0.40060) 
 [ 0.95260] [ 0.81208] [ 0.88195] 
    
IRD(-1)  0.016241  1.221584  1.735773 
  (0.11982)  (0.06378)  (0.71159) 
 [ 0.13554] [ 19.1530] [ 2.43927] 
    
IRD(-2)  0.042866 -0.227590 -1.358365 
  (0.11952)  (0.06362)  (0.70981) 
 [ 0.35864] [-3.57733] [-1.91371] 
    
RSVC(-1) -0.036727 -0.009118  0.041622 
  (0.01103)  (0.00587)  (0.06548) 
 [-3.33075] [-1.55347] [ 0.63560] 
    
RSVC(-2) -0.018575 -0.027914 -0.031355 
  (0.01065)  (0.00567)  (0.06326) 
 [-1.74392] [-4.92338] [-0.49568] 
 R-squared  0.041996  0.938308  0.132972 
 Adj. R-squared  0.022284  0.937039  0.115132 
 Sum sq. resids  0.240033  0.068008  8.465550 
 S.E. equation  0.031429  0.016729  0.186648 
 F-statistic  2.130467  739.1844  7.453582 
 Log likelihood  511.2662  668.2789  67.67458 
 Akaike AIC -4.058363 -5.319509 -0.495378 
 Schwarz SC -3.973606 -5.234751 -0.410620 
 Mean dependent  0.005526  0.082852  0.023972 
 S.D. dependent  0.031785  0.066672  0.198420 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  7.61E-09  
 Determinant resid covariance  7.07E-09  
 Log likelihood  1276.575  
 Akaike information criterion -10.10904  
 Schwarz criterion -9.854762  
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APPENDIX: PROBABILITY OF A CRISIS THE BASELINE MODEL 
obs EC IRD RSVC 
Pr of a 
Crisis 
1976M02 -0.000602 0.05529 0.003539   
1976M03 -0.00241 0.05084 0.054775   
1976M04 -0.002617 0.05162 0.090294 0.00% 
1976M05 6.73E-05 0.04954 0.049378 0.00% 
1976M06 6.73E-05 0.04686 -0.043133 0.00% 
1976M07 -0.000336 0.04792 -0.087949 0.00% 
1976M08 0.000135 0.04882 0.010755 0.00% 
1976M09 -0.000202 0.04875 0.048825 0.00% 
1976M10 -6.73E-05 0.0497 0.001238 0.00% 
1976M11 6.73E-05 0.05729 -0.011414 0.00% 
1976M12 -6.73E-05 0.06221 0.019134 0.00% 
1977M01 -0.000135 0.06255 -0.062544 0.00% 
1977M02 0.000135 0.06143 -0.114187 0.00% 
1977M03 -0.001279 0.06163 0.016772 0.00% 
1977M04 -0.001348 0.06073 0.053766 0.00% 
1977M05 -0.001147 0.05719 -0.026254 0.00% 
1977M06 -0.000541 0.05889 0.075515 0.00% 
1977M07 -0.000135 0.05616 0.002715 0.00% 
1977M08 -0.000203 0.05181 -0.002587 0.00% 
1977M09 -0.000338 0.04912 -0.012748 0.00% 
1977M10 -0.000338 0.04933 0.015179 0.00% 
1977M11 -0.000203 0.05219 -0.010567 0.00% 
1977M12 -0.002301 0.0534 0.002514 0.00% 
1978M01 0.000271 0.04973 0.070193 0.00% 
1978M02 6.78E-05 0.04012 0.009992 0.00% 
1978M03 0.000136 0.04748 0.110149 0.00% 
1978M04 -0.001153 0.0471 0.002935 0.00% 
1978M05 -0.000136 0.0432 0.032375 0.00% 
1978M06 -0.000543 0.03877 0.006045 0.00% 
1978M07 0.000136 0.03529 -0.028884 0.00% 
1978M08 0.000204 0.03162 -0.000897 0.00% 
1978M09 -0.000679 0.02494 0.01418 0.00% 
1978M10 0.000476 0.03022 -0.050947 0.00% 
1978M11 0.001087 0.02543 -0.026615 0.00% 
1978M12 0.000814 0.02503 0.048885 0.00% 
1979M01 0.000271 0.0287 -0.010295 0.00% 
1979M02 -6.78E-05 0.02933 -0.0058 0.00% 
1979M03 0.000474 0.02602 0.047228 0.00% 
1979M04 -0.000136 0.02487 0.032009 0.00% 
1979M05 -0.000271 0.02638 0.062848 0.00% 
1979M06 -0.00366 0.03308 0.000989 0.00% 
1979M07 0.002993 0.03199 0.038573 0.00% 
1979M08 -6.78E-05 0.02957 -0.006155 0.00% 
1979M09 -6.78E-05 0.02342 -0.030493 0.00% 
1979M10 0 0.00751 0.050665 0.00% 
1979M11 0.002578 0.00374 0.002513 0.00% 
1979M12 0.003383 0.00092 0.070032 0.00% 
1980M01 0.000135 0.00141 0.010975 0.00% 
1980M02 0.000742 -0.00867 0.008939 0.00% 
1980M03 0.000943 -0.03581 0.016904 0.00% 
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1980M04 0.008279 -0.02056 0.089098 0.00% 
1980M05 0.004005 0.02793 -0.034394 0.00% 
1980M06 0.001064 0.04961 0.013117 0.00% 
1980M07 0.002922 0.03996 0.078517 0.00% 
1980M08 0.001325 0.03082 -0.114194 0.00% 
1980M09 -6.61E-05 0.01973 0.039529 0.00% 
1980M10 0.001587 0.00723 0.026528 0.00% 
1980M11 0.002443 -0.0156 0.040574 0.00% 
1980M12 0.001318 -0.03351 0.07913 0.00% 
1981M01 0.006579 -0.02465 -0.102535 0.00% 
1981M02 0.006863 -0.02644 -0.019011 0.00% 
1981M03 0.008114 -0.0117 0.005164 0.00% 
1981M04 0.007083 -0.0126 0.003041 0.00% 
1981M05 0.008951 -0.0388 -0.030483 0.00% 
1981M06 0.007478 -0.02111 -0.074351 0.00% 
1981M07 0.000126 -0.0162 -0.015248 0.00% 
1981M08 0.000881 -0.02914 0.022305 0.00% 
1981M09 0.008169 -0.02421 -0.119165 0.00% 
1981M10 0.007604 -0.01318 -0.007431 0.00% 
1981M11 0.003711 0.01572 0.124553 0.00% 
1981M12 0.010724 0.01867 -0.020115 0.00% 
1982M01 0.009146 0.00626 -0.298562 0.00% 
1982M02 0.00423 -0.00402 -0.009907 0.00% 
1982M03 0.004934 0.01089 0.049733 0.00% 
1982M04 0.005868 0.00771 -0.11403 0.00% 
1982M05 0.003571 0.0183 0.0419 0.00% 
1982M06 0.004745 0.01904 0.041884 0.00% 
1982M07 0.003542 0.02268 -0.053678 0.00% 
1982M08 0.010235 0.04695 -0.084283 0.00% 
1982M09 0.011878 0.05722 0.048651 0.00% 
1982M10 0.016458 0.06185 -0.133471 0.00% 
1982M11 0.01087 0.05964 -0.285286 0.00% 
1982M12 0.027218 0.06007 0.023117 0.00% 
1983M01 0.023989 0.06233 -0.142985 0.00% 
1983M02 0.01363 0.05917 -0.208651 0.00% 
1983M03 0.023322 0.05743 0.04475 0.00% 
1983M04 0.0193 0.05784 -0.125915 0.00% 
1983M05 0.01551 0.05798 -0.050822 0.00% 
1983M06 0.091094 0.04741 0.039011 0.00% 
1983M07 4.54E-05 0.04584 -0.039623 0.00% 
1983M08 0 0.04671 0.051958 0.00% 
1983M09 0 0.05249 -0.512939 0.00% 
1983M10 0.272678 0.05867 -0.119926 0.00% 
1983M11 0 0.06328 1.043877 0.00% 
1983M12 0 0.06422 0.556319 0.00% 
1984M01 0 0.08493 -0.14737 0.00% 
1984M02 0 0.0729 0.230069 0.00% 
1984M03 0 0.07462 -0.087543 0.00% 
1984M04 0 0.07173 -0.219734 0.00% 
1984M05 0 0.09876 0.063437 0.00% 
1984M06 0.285673 0.16688 -0.276542 0.14% 
1984M07 0 0.20641 -0.207204 2.86% 
1984M08 0 0.23806 0.081509 95.27% 
1984M09 0 0.28057 -0.316761 97.90% 
1984M10 0.110432 0.31523 -0.079715 99.99% 
1984M11 -0.003652 0.34602 1.088383 100.00% 
1984M12 -0.007883 0.34009 0.24626 100.00% 
 91
  
1985M01 -0.068826 0.25009 0.005556 99.99% 
1985M02 -0.002228 0.22753 -0.409971 97.58% 
1985M03 0.005883 0.25718 -0.202282 95.81% 
1985M04 0.001408 0.26221 0.786237 99.95% 
1985M05 -0.000162 0.27764 0.20103 97.65% 
1985M06 -0.001352 0.26417 0.095018 97.77% 
1985M07 0.010885 0.22544 -0.038914 98.96% 
1985M08 -0.003268 0.14424 0.771013 85.51% 
1985M09 0.001881 0.10929 -0.095338 0.34% 
1985M10 0.00617 0.09963 -0.21857 0.01% 
1985M11 0.00016 0.09645 -0.133262 0.17% 
1985M12 0.014607 0.09491 -0.11925 0.17% 
1986M01 0.003731 0.09561 -0.18535 0.07% 
1986M02 0.150552 0.20818 -0.122975 0.13% 
1986M03 -0.062742 0.17638 0.694318 72.58% 
1986M04 -0.004854 0.13752 0.231675 23.82% 
1986M05 9.76E-05 0.09429 0.162662 0.07% 
1986M06 0.003805 0.08524 -0.010179 0.00% 
1986M07 -0.007507 0.09065 0.057967 0.00% 
1986M08 0.002179 0.08065 -0.048699 0.02% 
1986M09 -0.001075 0.07053 0.034194 0.00% 
1986M10 -0.000587 0.07367 0.150648 0.00% 
1986M11 0 0.05969 -0.03452 0.00% 
1986M12 0.0046 0.04057 0.416529 0.00% 
1987M01 -0.002557 0.03617 0.051667 0.00% 
1987M02 0.002466 0.02116 -0.021134 0.00% 
1987M03 0.001072 0.06198 -0.062364 0.00% 
1987M04 -0.003212 0.06037 0.003315 0.00% 
1987M05 -0.000879 0.05901 -0.12281 0.00% 
1987M06 -0.000489 0.0551 -0.015442 0.00% 
1987M07 -0.000782 0.05133 0.006607 0.00% 
1987M08 0.000636 0.05671 0.03154 0.00% 
1987M09 0.007187 0.06279 -0.266219 0.00% 
1987M10 0.006068 0.06569 -0.145337 0.00% 
1987M11 0.007334 0.07373 -0.172883 0.00% 
1987M12 -0.003688 0.07789 0.243728 0.01% 
1988M01 0.003365 0.07616 -0.205586 0.00% 
1988M02 0.006708 0.05885 -0.11213 0.00% 
1988M03 0.000286 0.08185 0.078999 0.00% 
1988M04 9.52E-05 0.09021 -0.005182 0.01% 
1988M05 -0.005376 0.08828 -0.083032 0.01% 
1988M06 0.00751 0.07863 -0.082736 0.02% 
1988M07 -0.001139 0.08007 -0.225138 0.01% 
1988M08 0.001949 0.0753 0.004971 0.02% 
1988M09 0.012192 0.07427 -0.097697 0.01% 
1988M10 0.002625 0.08249 0.109055 0.00% 
1988M11 -0.000608 0.08678 0.330277 0.01% 
1988M12 -0.002058 0.0865 0.569776 0.00% 
1989M01 0.000703 0.08706 -0.137705 0.00% 
1989M02 0 0.07145 -0.098034 0.00% 
1989M03 -0.000937 0.06667 -0.134728 0.00% 
1989M04 0.01097 0.06997 -0.262286 0.00% 
1989M05 0.00204 0.08136 0.125188 0.01% 
1989M06 0.00921 0.08886 -0.080068 0.01% 
1989M07 0.003348 0.09636 -0.165332 0.01% 
1989M08 0 0.11287 0.29261 0.11% 
1989M09 0.002971 0.14963 0.08146 0.22% 
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1989M10 0.007063 0.15526 0.451976 3.53% 
1989M11 0.006063 0.15599 -0.064818 2.96% 
1989M12 0.009265 0.12812 0.734496 4.21% 
1990M01 0.00459 0.12045 -0.44208 0.09% 
1990M02 0.00967 0.12548 -0.141285 0.16% 
1990M03 -0.000483 0.15061 0.162564 5.40% 
1990M04 0.002418 0.17468 -0.196347 9.35% 
1990M05 0.007542 0.14892 0.608596 32.91% 
1990M06 0.012752 0.15335 -0.070739 2.05% 
1990M07 0.025355 0.13269 -0.012695 2.07% 
1990M08 0.047779 0.14008 0.150727 1.67% 
1990M09 0.03 0.20521 -0.06844 1.59% 
1990M10 0 0.20185 -0.104073 71.16% 
1990M11 0.087379 0.18908 -0.10398 75.57% 
1990M12 0 0.19707 0.147531 39.73% 
1991M01 0 0.22269 -0.180599 64.36% 
1991M02 0 0.18013 0.752619 90.57% 
1991M03 0 0.17254 -0.023278 13.18% 
1991M04 -0.005643 0.16268 0.434897 5.93% 
1991M05 -0.001293 0.13342 0.162382 7.42% 
1991M06 -0.002014 0.11966 0.116951 0.21% 
1991M07 0 0.11682 -0.098479 0.19% 
1991M08 -0.027027 0.1493 0.038993 0.38% 
1991M09 0 0.16712 0.072164 13.11% 
1991M10 0 0.16527 0.082012 18.07% 
1991M11 -0.011111 0.16879 0.120083 14.41% 
1991M12 -0.001873 0.16985 0.104113 17.99% 
1992M01 -0.004615 0.16348 0.107303 16.42% 
1992M02 -0.01817 0.14904 0.09866 11.73% 
1992M03 -0.025418 0.12904 0.109761 4.85% 
1992M04 0.016586 0.11584 -0.140586 0.87% 
1992M05 0.017284 0.1172 -0.18426 0.26% 
1992M06 -0.025371 0.10731 0.035352 1.13% 
1992M07 -0.026345 0.1221 0.010283 0.41% 
1992M08 -0.064874 0.12066 -0.05324 0.99% 
1992M09 0.078389 0.1317 0.24934 1.71% 
1992M10 -0.019268 0.12392 0.100045 0.28% 
1992M11 0.034746 0.11439 0.05315 0.43% 
1992M12 -0.015534 0.1123 -7.72E-05 0.08% 
1993M01 0.010041 0.10939 0.086568 0.31% 
1993M02 -0.002683 0.10365 0.074107 0.11% 
1993M03 0.009217 0.09704 0.125587 0.05% 
1993M04 0.034179 0.08708 0.01267 0.01% 
1993M05 0.026871 0.07804 -0.142058 0.00% 
1993M06 0.00657 0.07133 -0.024871 0.00% 
1993M07 0.01551 0.07005 -0.046952 0.00% 
1993M08 0.012565 0.08138 -0.087195 0.00% 
1993M09 0.063117 0.08488 -0.030217 0.01% 
1993M10 -0.032939 0.09611 0.063433 0.00% 
1993M11 -0.03028 0.12393 0.010847 0.09% 
1993M12 -0.009264 0.12856 0.05205 1.23% 
1994M01 -0.00083 0.12261 0.00321 1.25% 
1994M02 0.000903 0.11863 0.024252 0.61% 
1994M03 -0.00491 0.1138 0.176623 0.46% 
1994M04 -0.010448 0.11032 0.070042 0.15% 
1994M05 -0.014774 0.10606 -0.017482 0.09% 
1994M06 0.00134 0.10528 0.101394 0.12% 
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1994M07 -0.025307 0.09533 0.040887 0.08% 
1994M08 0.009722 0.06384 -0.019979 0.03% 
1994M09 -0.018275 0.04311 -0.010076 0.00% 
1994M10 -0.041231 0.0381 -0.053816 0.00% 
1994M11 -0.042081 0.04584 -0.031794 0.00% 
1994M12 0.022572 0.05032 -0.002888 0.00% 
1995M01 0.006348 0.04365 0.005078 0.00% 
1995M02 0.047166 0.05311 -0.059379 0.00% 
1995M03 0.00991 0.08071 -0.020736 0.00% 
1995M04 0.001308 0.09188 0.036058 0.01% 
1995M05 -0.008608 0.0854 0.027962 0.02% 
1995M06 -0.008606 0.08114 0.041089 0.01% 
1995M07 0.000391 0.05926 0.13547 0.00% 
1995M08 0.012546 0.03869 -0.010228 0.00% 
1995M09 0.006138 0.04365 -0.037598 0.00% 
1995M10 -0.002801 0.0468 -0.067003 0.00% 
1995M11 0.007348 0.05675 -0.017414 0.00% 
1995M12 0.001184 0.06872 0.040771 0.00% 
1996M01 -0.001106 0.07503 0.042632 0.00% 
1996M02 -0.000306 0.07922 0.04689 0.00% 
1996M03 0.000764 0.07991 0.007124 0.00% 
1996M04 -0.000916 0.07933 0.076172 0.00% 
1996M05 0.001872 0.07933 0.066244 0.00% 
1996M06 -0.000725 0.07735 0.04962 0.00% 
1996M07 0.000954 0.0748 0.066721 0.00% 
1996M08 -0.000991 0.07069 0.107286 0.00% 
1996M09 0.002099 0.06333 -0.019873 0.00% 
1996M10 0.001066 0.06545 -0.014428 0.00% 
1996M11 7.61E-05 0.06646 0.009897 0.00% 
1996M12 3.80E-05 0.06676 0.030734 0.00% 
1997M01 0.00213 0.0578 -0.036442 0.00% 
1997M02 -0.000418 0.05658 0.066102 0.00% 
1997M03 0.001291 0.04923 0.010143 0.00% 
1997M04 7.59E-05 0.04824 -0.023215 0.00% 
1997M05 0.00019 0.05744 -0.017264 0.00% 
1997M06 0.000379 0.05569 -0.020797 0.00% 
1997M07 0.097938 0.07114 -0.146525 0.00% 
1997M08 0.041321 0.09032 0.064289 0.00% 
1997M09 0.122924 0.10376 0.060648 0.02% 
1997M10 0.031441 0.11575 -0.090735 0.01% 
1997M11 -0.0081 0.10739 -0.015272 0.44% 
1997M12 0.153513 0.12539 -0.137705 0.28% 
1998M01 0.060913 0.14008 -0.02131 0.18% 
1998M02 -0.048243 0.12679 0.093271 4.60% 
1998M03 -0.081335 0.11567 0.007116 2.01% 
1998M04 0.078153 0.10202 0.183807 0.73% 
1998M05 -0.027039 0.09347 0.00427 0.00% 
1998M06 0.082086 0.09014 -0.031184 0.02% 
1998M07 -0.001782 0.09707 -0.021163 0.00% 
1998M08 0.044221 0.09145 -0.043045 0.08% 
1998M09 -0.001482 0.09082 0.065415 0.01% 
1998M10 -0.067977 0.09448 -0.008969 0.02% 
1998M11 -0.033528 0.09011 -0.002155 0.09% 
1998M12 -0.010212 0.0901 0.037539 0.02% 
1999M01 -0.008756 0.08899 0.094526 0.02% 
1999M02 0.009841 0.08281 0.054055 0.01% 
1999M03 -0.008491 0.07656 0.067517 0.00% 
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1999M04 -0.019295 0.0657 0.073333 0.00% 
1999M05 0.002025 0.0545 -0.002977 0.00% 
1999M06 -0.001995 0.04668 0.009507 0.00% 
1999M07 0.005944 0.03829 0.008793 0.00% 
1999M08 0.037286 0.03687 0.019241 0.00% 
1999M09 0.036324 0.03844 0.007291 0.00% 
1999M10 -0.023205 0.03697 0.006291 0.00% 
1999M11 0.015663 0.03788 0.008709 0.00% 
1999M12 -0.011621 0.03665 0.022942 0.00% 
2000M01 0.00191 0.03574 -0.025012 0.00% 
2000M02 0.011265 0.03279 -0.016324 0.00% 
2000M03 0.005337 0.03223 0.119231 0.00% 
2000M04 0.005236 0.03089 -0.015445 0.00% 
2000M05 0.037574 0.0288 -0.029022 0.00% 
2000M06 0.007588 0.03166 -0.012352 0.00% 
2000M07 0.04141 0.02968 -0.036553 0.00% 
2000M08 0.003026 0.02816 0.050042 0.00% 
2000M09 0.026754 0.03152 -0.043225 0.00% 
2000M10 0.111142 0.03309 -0.0344 0.00% 
2000M11 -0.039551 0.09613 0.002347 0.00% 
2000M12 0.012249 0.07776 0.038971 0.26% 
2001M01 -0.01172 0.06963 -0.047134 0.00% 
2001M02 -0.023253 0.05686 -0.019185 0.00% 
2001M03 0.023103 0.05234 0.046469 0.00% 
2001M04 0.037264 0.05985 -0.021269 0.00% 
2001M05 -0.012378 0.05826 -0.002426 0.00% 
2001M06 0.035229 0.052785 0.009392 0.00% 
2001M07 0.022839 0.053355 -0.020131 0.00% 
2001M08 -0.043912 0.0612 -0.01384 0.00% 
2001M09 0.002831 0.06635 0.011991 0.00% 
2001M10 0.011294 0.075555 -0.01022 0.00% 
2001M11 0.001714 0.07613 0.036013 0.00% 
2001M12 -0.011918 0.07167 0.06516 0.00% 
2002M01 -0.003949 0.06228 0.045176 0.00% 
2002M02 0.002988 0.054563 -0.013227 0.00% 
2002M03 -0.004011 0.045598 0.077474 0.00% 
2002M04 -0.007899 0.029745 -0.022597 0.00% 
2002M05 -0.015332 0.02671 -0.010009 0.00% 
2002M06 0.009046 0.03073 -0.011235 0.00% 
2002M07 0.017236 0.030888 -0.048821 0.00% 
2002M08 0.010178 0.03294 -0.004615 0.00% 
2002M09 0.012314 0.03582 -0.015473 0.00% 
2002M10 0.010868 0.03688 -0.006739 0.00% 
2002M11 0.010789 0.04004 -0.015092 0.00% 
2002M12 -0.0092 0.03967 0.020198 0.00% 
2003M01 0.01324 0.04011 0.015357 0.00% 
2003M02 0.010149 0.04512 -0.012428 0.00% 
2003M03 -0.01496 0.05044 -0.012659 0.00% 
2003M04 -0.013356 0.06206 0.014246 0.00% 
2003M05 -0.010129 0.05492 -0.025753 0.00% 
2003M06 0.027237 0.04642 -0.002147 0.00% 
2003M07 0.018303 0.04344 0.012612 0.00% 
2003M08 0.007753 0.042725 -0.007757 0.00% 
2003M09 -0.003103 0.04384 0.002547 0.00% 
2003M10 0.005515 0.047408 0.049797 0.00% 
2003M11 0.009449 0.05504 -0.011839 0.00% 
2003M12 -0.00355 0.05407 0.004266 0.00% 
 95
  
2004M01 0.009286 0.053143 -0.044643 0.00% 
2004M02 0.003388 0.054048 -0.01642 0.00% 
2004M03 0.001457 0.06678 0.030083 0.00% 
2004M04 -0.008854 0.064725 0.025482 0.00% 
2004M05 -0.000376 0.060503 0.003977 0.00% 
2004M06 0.006161 0.0611 -0.029424 0.00% 
2004M07 -0.003062 0.062085 -0.020549 0.00% 
2004M08 0.003696 0.05651 -0.003734 0.00% 
2004M09 0.002135 0.059465 -0.011538 0.00% 
2004M10 0.000266 0.060785 0.009043 0.00% 
2004M11 -0.00213 0.05788 -0.001735 0.00% 
2004M12 0.00064 0.055863 0.022164 0.00% 
2005M01 -0.020527 0.05303 -0.018039 0.00% 
2005M02 -0.007167 0.041915 0.059621 0.00% 
2005M03 0.001389 0.038588 0.013094 0.00% 
2005M04 -0.008012 0.038455 0.018024 0.00% 
2005M05 0.000239 0.03233 0.050428 0.00% 
2005M06 0.028547 0.028078 0.024098 0.00% 
2005M07 0.003326 0.025058 -0.004253 0.00% 
2005M08 0.00098 0.02161 0.022133 0.00% 
2005M09 -0.00187 0.02342 0.036559 0.00% 
2005M10 -0.01775 0.02123 -0.021134 0.00% 
2005M11 -0.01927 0.01484 -0.008454 0.00% 
     
 
APPENDIX: VARX PROBABILITIES  
 
obs ERC IRD RSVC PR (ISP>T) 
1976M02 -0.000602 0.05529 0.003539   
1976M03 -0.00241 0.05084 0.054775   
1976M04 -0.002617 0.05162 0.090294 0.00% 
1976M05 6.73E-05 0.04954 0.049378 0.00% 
1976M06 6.73E-05 0.04686 -0.043133 0.00% 
1976M07 -0.000336 0.04792 -0.087949 0.00% 
1976M08 0.000135 0.04882 0.010755 0.00% 
1976M09 -0.000202 0.04875 0.048825 0.00% 
1976M10 -6.73E-05 0.0497 0.001238 0.00% 
1976M11 6.73E-05 0.05729 -0.011414 0.00% 
1976M12 -6.73E-05 0.06221 0.019134 0.00% 
1977M01 -0.000135 0.06255 -0.062544 0.00% 
1977M02 0.000135 0.06143 -0.114187 0.00% 
1977M03 -0.001279 0.06163 0.016772 0.00% 
1977M04 -0.001348 0.06073 0.053766 0.00% 
1977M05 -0.001147 0.05719 -0.026254 0.00% 
1977M06 -0.000541 0.05889 0.075515 0.00% 
1977M07 -0.000135 0.05616 0.002715 0.00% 
1977M08 -0.000203 0.05181 -0.002587 0.00% 
1977M09 -0.000338 0.04912 -0.012748 0.00% 
1977M10 -0.000338 0.04933 0.015179 0.00% 
1977M11 -0.000203 0.05219 -0.010567 0.00% 
1977M12 -0.002301 0.0534 0.002514 0.00% 
1978M01 0.000271 0.04973 0.070193 0.00% 
1978M02 6.78E-05 0.04012 0.009992 0.00% 
1978M03 0.000136 0.04748 0.110149 0.00% 
1978M04 -0.001153 0.0471 0.002935 0.00% 
1978M05 -0.000136 0.0432 0.032375 0.00% 
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1978M06 -0.000543 0.03877 0.006045 0.00% 
1978M07 0.000136 0.03529 -0.028884 0.00% 
1978M08 0.000204 0.03162 -0.000897 0.00% 
1978M09 -0.000679 0.02494 0.01418 0.00% 
1978M10 0.000476 0.03022 -0.050947 0.00% 
1978M11 0.001087 0.02543 -0.026615 0.00% 
1978M12 0.000814 0.02503 0.048885 0.00% 
1979M01 0.000271 0.0287 -0.010295 0.00% 
1979M02 -6.78E-05 0.02933 -0.0058 0.00% 
1979M03 0.000474 0.02602 0.047228 0.00% 
1979M04 -0.000136 0.02487 0.032009 0.00% 
1979M05 -0.000271 0.02638 0.062848 0.00% 
1979M06 -0.00366 0.03308 0.000989 0.00% 
1979M07 0.002993 0.03199 0.038573 0.00% 
1979M08 -6.78E-05 0.02957 -0.006155 0.00% 
1979M09 -6.78E-05 0.02342 -0.030493 0.00% 
1979M10 0 0.00751 0.050665 0.00% 
1979M11 0.002578 0.00374 0.002513 0.00% 
1979M12 0.003383 0.00092 0.070032 0.00% 
1980M01 0.000135 0.00141 0.010975 0.00% 
1980M02 0.000742 -0.00867 0.008939 0.00% 
1980M03 0.000943 -0.03581 0.016904 0.00% 
1980M04 0.008279 -0.02056 0.089098 0.00% 
1980M05 0.004005 0.02793 -0.034394 0.00% 
1980M06 0.001064 0.04961 0.013117 0.00% 
1980M07 0.002922 0.03996 0.078517 0.00% 
1980M08 0.001325 0.03082 -0.114194 0.00% 
1980M09 -6.61E-05 0.01973 0.039529 0.00% 
1980M10 0.001587 0.00723 0.026528 0.00% 
1980M11 0.002443 -0.0156 0.040574 0.00% 
1980M12 0.001318 -0.03351 0.07913 0.00% 
1981M01 0.006579 -0.02465 -0.102535 0.00% 
1981M02 0.006863 -0.02644 -0.019011 0.00% 
1981M03 0.008114 -0.0117 0.005164 0.00% 
1981M04 0.007083 -0.0126 0.003041 0.00% 
1981M05 0.008951 -0.0388 -0.030483 0.00% 
1981M06 0.007478 -0.02111 -0.074351 0.00% 
1981M07 0.000126 -0.0162 -0.015248 0.00% 
1981M08 0.000881 -0.02914 0.022305 0.00% 
1981M09 0.008169 -0.02421 -0.119165 0.00% 
1981M10 0.007604 -0.01318 -0.007431 0.00% 
1981M11 0.003711 0.01572 0.124553 0.00% 
1981M12 0.010724 0.01867 -0.020115 0.00% 
1982M01 0.009146 0.00626 -0.298562 0.00% 
1982M02 0.00423 -0.00402 -0.009907 0.00% 
1982M03 0.004934 0.01089 0.049733 0.00% 
1982M04 0.005868 0.00771 -0.11403 0.00% 
1982M05 0.003571 0.0183 0.0419 0.00% 
1982M06 0.004745 0.01904 0.041884 0.00% 
1982M07 0.003542 0.02268 -0.053678 0.00% 
1982M08 0.010235 0.04695 -0.084283 0.00% 
1982M09 0.011878 0.05722 0.048651 0.00% 
1982M10 0.016458 0.06185 -0.133471 0.00% 
1982M11 0.01087 0.05964 -0.285286 0.01% 
1982M12 0.027218 0.06007 0.023117 0.01% 
1983M01 0.023989 0.06233 -0.142985 0.01% 
1983M02 0.01363 0.05917 -0.208651 0.01% 
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1983M03 0.023322 0.05743 0.04475 0.01% 
1983M04 0.0193 0.05784 -0.125915 0.01% 
1983M05 0.01551 0.05798 -0.050822 0.01% 
1983M06 0.091094 0.04741 0.039011 0.01% 
1983M07 4.54E-05 0.04584 -0.039623 0.00% 
1983M08 0 0.04671 0.051958 0.00% 
1983M09 0 0.05249 -0.512939 0.50% 
1983M10 0.272678 0.05867 -0.119926 0.78% 
1983M11 0 0.06328 1.043877 0.00% 
1983M12 0 0.06422 0.556319 0.00% 
1984M01 0 0.08493 -0.14737 0.00% 
1984M02 0 0.0729 0.230069 0.00% 
1984M03 0 0.07462 -0.087543 0.01% 
1984M04 0 0.07173 -0.219734 0.02% 
1984M05 0 0.09876 0.063437 0.03% 
1984M06 0.285673 0.16688 -0.276542 1.21% 
1984M07 0 0.20641 -0.207204 1.44% 
1984M08 0 0.23806 0.081509 71.72% 
1984M09 0 0.28057 -0.316761 99.10% 
1984M10 0.110432 0.31523 -0.079715 99.99% 
1984M11 -0.003652 0.34602 1.088383 99.74% 
1984M12 -0.007883 0.34009 0.24626 100.00% 
1985M01 -0.068826 0.25009 0.005556 99.76% 
1985M02 -0.002228 0.22753 -0.409971 96.13% 
1985M03 0.005883 0.25718 -0.202282 98.13% 
1985M04 0.001408 0.26221 0.786237 99.33% 
1985M05 -0.000162 0.27764 0.20103 96.33% 
1985M06 -0.001352 0.26417 0.095018 95.10% 
1985M07 0.010885 0.22544 -0.038914 94.11% 
1985M08 -0.003268 0.14424 0.771013 45.19% 
1985M09 0.001881 0.10929 -0.095338 0.38% 
1985M10 0.00617 0.09963 -0.21857 0.02% 
1985M11 0.00016 0.09645 -0.133262 0.15% 
1985M12 0.014607 0.09491 -0.11925 0.90% 
1986M01 0.003731 0.09561 -0.18535 0.31% 
1986M02 0.150552 0.20818 -0.122975 0.51% 
1986M03 -0.062742 0.17638 0.694318 37.58% 
1986M04 -0.004854 0.13752 0.231675 7.55% 
1986M05 9.76E-05 0.09429 0.162662 0.05% 
1986M06 0.003805 0.08524 -0.010179 0.00% 
1986M07 -0.007507 0.09065 0.057967 0.00% 
1986M08 0.002179 0.08065 -0.048699 0.01% 
1986M09 -0.001075 0.07053 0.034194 0.00% 
1986M10 -0.000587 0.07367 0.150648 0.00% 
1986M11 0 0.05969 -0.03452 0.00% 
1986M12 0.0046 0.04057 0.416529 0.00% 
1987M01 -0.002557 0.03617 0.051667 0.00% 
1987M02 0.002466 0.02116 -0.021134 0.00% 
1987M03 0.001072 0.06198 -0.062364 0.00% 
1987M04 -0.003212 0.06037 0.003315 0.00% 
1987M05 -0.000879 0.05901 -0.12281 0.00% 
1987M06 -0.000489 0.0551 -0.015442 0.00% 
1987M07 -0.000782 0.05133 0.006607 0.00% 
1987M08 0.000636 0.05671 0.03154 0.00% 
1987M09 0.007187 0.06279 -0.266219 0.00% 
1987M10 0.006068 0.06569 -0.145337 0.00% 
1987M11 0.007334 0.07373 -0.172883 0.01% 
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1987M12 -0.003688 0.07789 0.243728 0.01% 
1988M01 0.003365 0.07616 -0.205586 0.02% 
1988M02 0.006708 0.05885 -0.11213 0.01% 
1988M03 0.000286 0.08185 0.078999 0.00% 
1988M04 9.52E-05 0.09021 -0.005182 0.09% 
1988M05 -0.005376 0.08828 -0.083032 0.16% 
1988M06 0.00751 0.07863 -0.082736 0.28% 
1988M07 -0.001139 0.08007 -0.225138 0.39% 
1988M08 0.001949 0.0753 0.004971 0.84% 
1988M09 0.012192 0.07427 -0.097697 1.24% 
1988M10 0.002625 0.08249 0.109055 0.31% 
1988M11 -0.000608 0.08678 0.330277 0.22% 
1988M12 -0.002058 0.0865 0.569776 0.03% 
1989M01 0.000703 0.08706 -0.137705 0.02% 
1989M02 0 0.07145 -0.098034 0.05% 
1989M03 -0.000937 0.06667 -0.134728 0.13% 
1989M04 0.01097 0.06997 -0.262286 0.70% 
1989M05 0.00204 0.08136 0.125188 0.53% 
1989M06 0.00921 0.08886 -0.080068 3.15% 
1989M07 0.003348 0.09636 -0.165332 7.47% 
1989M08 0 0.11287 0.29261 4.80% 
1989M09 0.002971 0.14963 0.08146 9.51% 
1989M10 0.007063 0.15526 0.451976 15.47% 
1989M11 0.006063 0.15599 -0.064818 19.33% 
0.009265 0.12812 1989M12 0.734496 5.15% 
1990M01 0.00459 0.12045 -0.44208 4.20% 
1990M02 0.00967 0.12548 -0.141285 2.56% 
1990M03 -0.000483 0.15061 0.162564 11.14% 
1990M04 0.002418 0.17468 -0.196347 43.95% 
1990M05 0.007542 0.14892 0.608596 34.95% 
1990M06 0.012752 0.15335 -0.070739 9.44% 
1990M07 0.025355 0.13269 -0.012695 7.47% 
1990M08 0.047779 0.14008 0.150727 1.99% 
1990M09 0.03 0.20521 -0.06844 3.04% 
1990M10 0 0.20185 -0.104073 69.23% 
1990M11 0.087379 0.18908 -0.10398 63.88% 
1990M12 0 0.19707 0.147531 18.88% 
1991M01 0 0.22269 -0.180599 61.15% 
1991M02 0 0.18013 0.752619 66.90% 
1991M03 0 0.17254 -0.023278 11.72% 
1991M04 -0.005643 0.16268 0.434897 2.85% 
1991M05 -0.001293 0.13342 0.162382 4.01% 
1991M06 -0.002014 0.11966 0.116951 0.11% 
1991M07 0 0.11682 -0.098479 0.12% 
1991M08 -0.027027 0.1493 0.038993 0.14% 
1991M09 0 0.16712 0.072164 5.98% 
1991M10 0 0.16527 0.082012 7.12% 
1991M11 -0.011111 0.16879 0.120083 3.58% 
1991M12 -0.001873 0.16985 0.104113 5.55% 
1992M01 -0.004615 0.16348 0.107303 3.84% 
1992M02 -0.01817 0.14904 0.09866 2.13% 
1992M03 -0.025418 0.12904 0.109761 0.85% 
1992M04 0.016586 0.11584 -0.140586 0.28% 
1992M05 0.017284 0.1172 -0.18426 0.08% 
1992M06 -0.025371 0.10731 0.035352 0.17% 
1992M07 -0.026345 0.1221 0.010283 0.11% 
1992M08 -0.064874 0.12066 -0.05324 0.64% 
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1992M09 0.078389 0.1317 0.24934 0.84% 
1992M10 -0.019268 0.12392 0.100045 0.13% 
1992M11 0.034746 0.11439 0.05315 0.12% 
1992M12 -0.015534 0.1123 -7.72E-05 0.04% 
1993M01 0.010041 0.10939 0.086568 0.09% 
1993M02 -0.002683 0.10365 0.074107 0.05% 
1993M03 0.009217 0.09704 0.125587 0.02% 
1993M04 0.034179 0.08708 0.01267 0.01% 
1993M05 0.026871 0.07804 -0.142058 0.00% 
1993M06 0.00657 0.07133 -0.024871 0.00% 
1993M07 0.01551 0.07005 -0.046952 0.00% 
1993M08 0.012565 0.08138 -0.087195 0.00% 
1993M09 0.063117 0.08488 -0.030217 0.01% 
1993M10 -0.032939 0.09611 0.063433 0.00% 
1993M11 -0.03028 0.12393 0.010847 0.09% 
1993M12 -0.009264 0.12856 0.05205 1.49% 
1994M01 -0.00083 0.12261 0.00321 1.15% 
1994M02 0.000903 0.11863 0.024252 0.46% 
1994M03 -0.00491 0.1138 0.176623 0.31% 
1994M04 -0.010448 0.11032 0.070042 0.14% 
1994M05 -0.014774 0.10606 -0.017482 0.09% 
1994M06 0.00134 0.10528 0.101394 0.10% 
1994M07 -0.025307 0.09533 0.040887 0.02% 
1994M08 0.009722 0.06384 -0.019979 0.01% 
1994M09 -0.018275 0.04311 -0.010076 0.00% 
1994M10 -0.041231 0.0381 -0.053816 0.00% 
1994M11 -0.042081 0.04584 -0.031794 0.00% 
1994M12 0.022572 0.05032 -0.002888 0.00% 
1995M01 0.006348 0.04365 0.005078 0.00% 
1995M02 0.047166 0.05311 -0.059379 0.00% 
1995M03 0.00991 0.08071 -0.020736 0.00% 
1995M04 0.001308 0.09188 0.036058 0.01% 
1995M05 -0.008608 0.0854 0.027962 0.01% 
1995M06 -0.008606 0.08114 0.041089 0.00% 
1995M07 0.000391 0.05926 0.13547 0.00% 
1995M08 0.012546 0.03869 -0.010228 0.00% 
1995M09 0.006138 0.04365 -0.037598 0.00% 
1995M10 -0.002801 0.0468 -0.067003 0.00% 
1995M11 0.007348 0.05675 -0.017414 0.00% 
1995M12 0.001184 0.06872 0.040771 0.00% 
1996M01 -0.001106 0.07503 0.042632 0.00% 
1996M02 -0.000306 0.07922 0.04689 0.00% 
1996M03 0.000764 0.07991 0.007124 0.00% 
1996M04 -0.000916 0.07933 0.076172 0.00% 
1996M05 0.001872 0.07933 0.066244 0.00% 
1996M06 -0.000725 0.07735 0.04962 0.00% 
1996M07 0.000954 0.0748 0.066721 0.00% 
1996M08 -0.000991 0.07069 0.107286 0.00% 
1996M09 0.002099 0.06333 -0.019873 0.00% 
1996M10 0.001066 0.06545 -0.014428 0.00% 
1996M11 7.61E-05 0.06646 0.009897 0.00% 
1996M12 3.80E-05 0.06676 0.030734 0.00% 
1997M01 0.00213 0.0578 -0.036442 0.00% 
1997M02 -0.000418 0.05658 0.066102 0.00% 
1997M03 0.001291 0.04923 0.010143 0.00% 
1997M04 7.59E-05 0.04824 -0.023215 0.00% 
1997M05 0.00019 0.05744 -0.017264 0.00% 
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1997M06 0.000379 0.05569 -0.020797 0.00% 
1997M07 0.097938 0.07114 -0.146525 0.00% 
1997M08 0.041321 0.09032 0.064289 0.00% 
1997M09 0.122924 0.10376 0.060648 0.01% 
1997M10 0.031441 0.11575 -0.090735 0.00% 
1997M11 -0.0081 0.10739 -0.015272 0.02% 
1997M12 0.153513 0.12539 -0.137705 0.06% 
1998M01 0.060913 0.14008 -0.02131 0.01% 
1998M02 -0.048243 0.12679 0.093271 0.09% 
1998M03 -0.081335 0.11567 0.007116 0.23% 
1998M04 0.078153 0.10202 0.183807 0.24% 
1998M05 -0.027039 0.09347 0.00427 0.00% 
1998M06 0.082086 0.09014 -0.031184 0.00% 
1998M07 -0.001782 0.09707 -0.021163 0.00% 
1998M08 0.044221 0.09145 -0.043045 0.01% 
1998M09 -0.001482 0.09082 0.065415 0.00% 
1998M10 -0.067977 0.09448 -0.008969 0.00% 
1998M11 -0.033528 0.09011 -0.002155 0.02% 
1998M12 -0.010212 0.0901 0.037539 0.01% 
1999M01 -0.008756 0.08899 0.094526 0.01% 
1999M02 0.009841 0.08281 0.054055 0.00% 
1999M03 -0.008491 0.07656 0.067517 0.00% 
1999M04 -0.019295 0.0657 0.073333 0.00% 
1999M05 0.002025 0.0545 -0.002977 0.00% 
1999M06 -0.001995 0.04668 0.009507 0.00% 
1999M07 0.005944 0.03829 0.008793 0.00% 
1999M08 0.037286 0.03687 0.019241 0.00% 
1999M09 0.036324 0.03844 0.007291 0.00% 
1999M10 -0.023205 0.03697 0.006291 0.00% 
1999M11 0.015663 0.03788 0.008709 0.00% 
1999M12 -0.011621 0.03665 0.022942 0.00% 
2000M01 0.00191 0.03574 -0.025012 0.00% 
2000M02 0.011265 0.03279 -0.016324 0.00% 
2000M03 0.005337 0.03223 0.119231 0.00% 
2000M04 0.005236 0.03089 -0.015445 0.00% 
2000M05 0.037574 0.0288 -0.029022 0.00% 
2000M06 0.007588 0.03166 -0.012352 0.00% 
2000M07 0.04141 0.02968 -0.036553 0.00% 
2000M08 0.003026 0.02816 0.050042 0.00% 
2000M09 0.026754 0.03152 -0.043225 0.00% 
2000M10 0.111142 0.03309 -0.0344 0.00% 
2000M11 -0.039551 0.09613 0.002347 0.00% 
2000M12 0.012249 0.07776 0.038971 0.05% 
2001M01 -0.01172 0.06963 -0.047134 0.00% 
2001M02 -0.023253 0.05686 -0.019185 0.00% 
2001M03 0.023103 0.05234 0.046469 0.00% 
2001M04 0.037264 0.05985 -0.021269 0.00% 
2001M05 -0.012378 0.05826 -0.002426 0.00% 
2001M06 0.035229 0.052785 0.009392 0.00% 
2001M07 0.022839 0.053355 -0.020131 0.00% 
2001M08 -0.043912 0.0612 -0.01384 0.00% 
2001M09 0.002831 0.06635 0.011991 0.00% 
2001M10 0.011294 0.075555 -0.01022 0.00% 
2001M11 0.001714 0.07613 0.036013 0.00% 
2001M12 -0.011918 0.07167 0.06516 0.00% 
2002M01 -0.003949 0.06228 0.045176 0.00% 
2002M02 0.002988 0.054563 -0.013227 0.00% 
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2002M03 -0.004011 0.045598 0.077474 0.00% 
2002M04 -0.007899 0.029745 -0.022597 0.00% 
2002M05 -0.015332 0.02671 -0.010009 0.00% 
2002M06 0.009046 0.03073 -0.011235 0.00% 
2002M07 0.017236 0.030888 -0.048821 0.00% 
2002M08 0.010178 0.03294 -0.004615 0.00% 
2002M09 0.012314 0.03582 -0.015473 0.00% 
2002M10 0.010868 0.03688 -0.006739 0.00% 
2002M11 0.010789 0.04004 -0.015092 0.00% 
2002M12 -0.0092 0.03967 0.020198 0.00% 
2003M01 0.01324 0.04011 0.015357 0.00% 
2003M02 0.010149 0.04512 -0.012428 0.00% 
2003M03 -0.01496 0.05044 -0.012659 0.00% 
2003M04 -0.013356 0.06206 0.014246 0.00% 
2003M05 -0.010129 0.05492 -0.025753 0.00% 
2003M06 0.027237 0.04642 -0.002147 0.00% 
2003M07 0.018303 0.04344 0.012612 0.00% 
2003M08 0.007753 0.042725 -0.007757 0.00% 
2003M09 -0.003103 0.04384 0.002547 0.00% 
2003M10 0.005515 0.047408 0.049797 0.00% 
2003M11 0.009449 0.05504 -0.011839 0.00% 
2003M12 -0.00355 0.05407 0.004266 0.00% 
2004M01 0.009286 0.053143 -0.044643 0.00% 
2004M02 0.003388 0.054048 -0.01642 0.00% 
2004M03 0.001457 0.06678 0.030083 0.00% 
2004M04 -0.008854 0.064725 0.025482 0.00% 
2004M05 -0.000376 0.060503 0.003977 0.00% 
2004M06 0.006161 0.0611 -0.029424 0.00% 
2004M07 -0.003062 0.062085 -0.020549 0.00% 
2004M08 0.003696 0.05651 -0.003734 0.00% 
2004M09 0.002135 0.059465 -0.011538 0.00% 
2004M10 0.000266 0.060785 0.009043 0.00% 
2004M11 -0.00213 0.05788 -0.001735 0.00% 
2004M12 0.00064 0.055863 0.022164 0.00% 
2005M01 -0.020527 0.05303 -0.018039 0.00% 
2005M02 -0.007167 0.041915 0.059621 0.00% 
2005M03 0.001389 0.038588 0.013094 0.00% 
2005M04 -0.008012 0.038455 0.018024 0.00% 
2005M05 0.000239 0.03233 0.050428 0.00% 
2005M06 0.028547 0.028078 0.024098 0.00% 
2005M07 0.003326 0.025058 -0.004253 0.00% 
2005M08 0.00098 0.02161 0.022133 0.00% 
2005M09 -0.00187 0.02342 0.036559 0.00% 
2005M10 -0.01775 0.02123 -0.021134 0.00% 
2005M11 -0.01927 0.01484 -0.008454 0.00% 
 
APPENDIX: Probability of a Crisis given VARX with contagion 
obs   ERC   IRD   RSVC   ZSHPREER  M2RSVCH  RDC   Contagion  Probability 
 1976M02    (0.00)    0.06       0.00             (3.28)              1.98    0.34               0.02  
 1976M03    (0.00)    0.05       0.05             (2.41)              2.00    0.36             (0.01)  
 1976M04    (0.00)    0.05       0.09             (0.53)              1.89    0.49             (0.00) 0% 
 1976M05     0.00     0.05       0.05               0.26              1.83    0.49             (0.02) 96% 
 1976M06     0.00     0.05     (0.04)              1.51              1.95    0.44               0.02 95% 
 1976M07    (0.00)    0.05     (0.09)              2.49              2.18    0.36               0.05 94% 
 1976M08     0.00     0.05       0.01               2.11              2.18    0.33               0.01 96% 
 1976M09    (0.00)    0.05       0.05               1.47              2.13    0.33             (0.05) 8% 
 1976M10    (0.00)    0.05       0.00               1.25              2.11    0.29             (0.06) 10% 
 1976M11     0.00     0.06     (0.01)              2.27              2.18    0.28             (0.12) 12% 
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 1976M12    (0.00)    0.06       0.02               3.18              2.28    0.26               0.11 15% 
 1977M01    (0.00)    0.06     (0.06)              3.49              2.45    0.23             (0.01) 28% 
 1977M02     0.00     0.06     (0.11)              3.72              2.76    0.20             (0.03) 26% 
 1977M03    (0.00)    0.06       0.02               2.16              2.85    0.16               0.02 23% 
 1977M04    (0.00)    0.06       0.05               2.35              2.77    0.15               0.01 24% 
 1977M05    (0.00)    0.06     (0.03)              2.00              2.88    0.14               0.01 19% 
 1977M06    (0.00)    0.06       0.08               3.06              2.77    0.13               0.00 7% 
 1977M07    (0.00)    0.06       0.00               3.24              2.72    0.16             (0.04) 6% 
 1977M08    (0.00)    0.05     (0.00)              2.74              2.75    0.17             (0.02) 4% 
 1977M09    (0.00)    0.05     (0.01)              4.10              2.86    0.18             (0.02) 4% 
 1977M10    (0.00)    0.05       0.02               4.94              2.81    0.20               0.04 3% 
 1977M11    (0.00)    0.05     (0.01)              3.44              2.95    0.19             (0.01) 4% 
 1977M12    (0.00)    0.05       0.00               1.78              3.18    0.20               0.04 6% 
 1978M01     0.00     0.05       0.07               1.12              2.98    0.20             (0.03) 6% 
 1978M02     0.00     0.04       0.01               0.47              2.99    0.22             (0.03) 6% 
 1978M03     0.00     0.05       0.11             (0.12)              2.82    0.22               0.07 4% 
 1978M04    (0.00)    0.05       0.00             (2.84)              2.81    0.24               0.04 10% 
 1978M05    (0.00)    0.04       0.03             (4.46)              2.74    0.24               0.04 7% 
 1978M06    (0.00)    0.04       0.01             (3.25)              2.80    0.29               0.08 5% 
 1978M07     0.00     0.04     (0.03)            (5.77)              2.90    0.27               0.05 3% 
 1978M08     0.00     0.03     (0.00)            (9.23)              2.90    0.29               0.11 3% 
 1978M09    (0.00)    0.02       0.01           (12.03)              2.94    0.28             (0.02) 10% 
 1978M10     0.00     0.03     (0.05)          (11.41)              3.18    0.31               0.01 3% 
 1978M11     0.00     0.03     (0.03)          (14.77)              3.29    0.29             (0.15) 6% 
 1978M12     0.00     0.03       0.05           (10.54)              3.32    0.25               0.03 5% 
 1979M01     0.00     0.03     (0.01)          (10.01)              3.27    0.22               0.07 7% 
 1979M02    (0.00)    0.03     (0.01)            (8.25)              3.34    0.25             (0.01) 16% 
 1979M03     0.00     0.03       0.05             (8.27)              3.30    0.27               0.01 22% 
 1979M04    (0.00)    0.02       0.03             (6.23)              3.26    0.23             (0.02) 32% 
 1979M05    (0.00)    0.03       0.06             (1.27)              3.07    0.27               0.03 21% 
 1979M06    (0.00)    0.03       0.00               1.20              3.00    0.25             (0.03) 36% 
 1979M07     0.00     0.03       0.04               1.90              2.92    0.25               0.05 43% 
 1979M08    (0.00)    0.03     (0.01)            (0.10)              2.88    0.23               0.07 29% 
 1979M09    (0.00)    0.02     (0.03)              1.15              2.99    0.22               0.10 25% 
 1979M10         -       0.01       0.05               2.14              2.86    0.17             (0.03) 31% 
 1979M11     0.00     0.00       0.00               4.06              2.88    0.20               0.02 17% 
 1979M12     0.00     0.00       0.07               6.87              2.91    0.24               0.13 11% 
 1980M01     0.00     0.00       0.01               4.43              2.82    0.25               0.14 4% 
 1980M02     0.00    (0.01)      0.01               3.19              2.86    0.21               0.02 6% 
 1980M03     0.00    (0.04)      0.02               3.99              2.90    0.21             (0.17) 8% 
 1980M04     0.01    (0.02)      0.09               7.54              2.64    0.25               0.09 1% 
 1980M05     0.00     0.03     (0.03)              7.97              2.72    0.20               0.10 26% 
 1980M06     0.00     0.05       0.01               1.13              2.73    0.22               0.10 85% 
 1980M07     0.00     0.04       0.08             (2.36)              2.56    0.25               0.04 96% 
 1980M08     0.00     0.03     (0.11)            (2.91)              2.88    0.26               0.06 88% 
 1980M09    (0.00)    0.02       0.04             (1.34)              2.82    0.24               0.02 94% 
 1980M10     0.00     0.01       0.03             (2.81)              2.74    0.24               0.12 100% 
 1980M11     0.00    (0.02)      0.04             (2.70)              2.67    0.21             (0.03) 94% 
 1980M12     0.00    (0.03)      0.08             (1.00)              2.71    0.22               0.00 2% 
 1981M01     0.01    (0.02)    (0.10)            (0.80)              2.85    0.19             (0.02) 0% 
 1981M02     0.01    (0.03)    (0.02)            (2.68)              2.95    0.21             (0.03) 0% 
 1981M03     0.01    (0.01)      0.01             (0.26)              2.97    0.21               0.02 1% 
 1981M04     0.01    (0.01)      0.00             (1.16)              2.98    0.19               0.01 13% 
 1981M05     0.01    (0.04)    (0.03)              0.07              3.03    0.22               0.04 30% 
 1981M06     0.01    (0.02)    (0.07)              2.20              3.31    0.20               0.01 50% 
 1981M07     0.00    (0.02)    (0.02)              2.57              3.30    0.18             (0.10) 98% 
 1981M08     0.00    (0.03)      0.02               5.19              3.30    0.16             (0.06) 95% 
 1981M09     0.01    (0.02)    (0.12)              6.76              3.68    0.18             (0.15) 92% 
 1981M10     0.01    (0.01)    (0.01)              3.99              3.88    0.21             (0.01) 70% 
 1981M11     0.00     0.02       0.12               2.55              3.57    0.27               0.14 79% 
 1981M12     0.01     0.02     (0.02)            (0.47)              3.85    0.24             (0.02) 100% 
 1982M01     0.01     0.01     (0.30)            (1.18)              5.29    0.27             (0.06) 99% 
 1982M02     0.00    (0.00)    (0.01)            (0.17)              5.38    0.26             (0.11) 96% 
 1982M03     0.00     0.01       0.05               3.69              5.26    0.28             (0.07) 99% 
 1982M04     0.01     0.01     (0.11)              5.70              6.01    0.28               0.12 99% 
 1982M05     0.00     0.02       0.04               7.96              5.80    0.27               0.02 95% 
 1982M06     0.00     0.02       0.04               4.75              5.62    0.28             (0.11) 72% 
 1982M07     0.00     0.02     (0.05)              9.37              5.85    0.27             (0.06) 61% 
 1982M08     0.01     0.05     (0.08)            11.83              6.46    0.27             (0.05) 89% 
 1982M09     0.01     0.06       0.05             12.64              6.15    0.28             (0.03) 100% 
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 1982M10     0.02     0.06     (0.13)            13.51              7.01    0.27             (0.05) 98% 
 1982M11     0.01     0.06     (0.29)            14.64            10.00    0.20             (0.02) 99% 
 1982M12     0.03     0.06       0.02             12.26            10.13    0.25               0.07 97% 
 1983M01     0.02     0.06     (0.14)              3.45            11.31    0.25               0.10 96% 
 1983M02     0.01     0.06     (0.21)            (2.39)            14.17    0.24               0.02 95% 
 1983M03     0.02     0.06       0.04             (2.79)            13.43    0.23             (0.03) 62% 
 1983M04     0.02     0.06     (0.13)            (2.43)            15.16    0.23               0.09 36% 
 1983M05     0.02     0.06     (0.05)            (3.70)            16.13    0.21             (0.01) 29% 
 1983M06     0.09     0.05       0.04             (4.79)            15.43    0.22               0.00 35% 
 1983M07     0.00     0.05     (0.04)            (5.27)            15.13    0.22               0.06 7% 
 1983M08         -       0.05       0.05           (10.39)            14.16    0.22             (0.01) 11% 
 1983M09         -       0.05     (0.51)            (6.32)            29.05    0.32             (0.04) 79% 
 1983M10     0.27     0.06     (0.12)            (4.62)            27.36    0.40               0.01 84% 
 1983M11         -       0.06       1.04           (30.63)            13.49    0.33               0.04 1% 
 1983M12         -       0.06       0.56           (26.21)            11.92    0.22               0.04 9% 
 1984M01         -       0.08     (0.15)          (16.73)            10.65    0.27               0.05 14% 
 1984M02         -       0.07       0.23             (9.80)              8.66    0.33             (0.04) 61% 
 1984M03         -       0.07     (0.09)            (7.34)              9.87    0.30               0.00 59% 
 1984M04         -       0.07     (0.22)            (5.73)            12.78    0.30             (0.00) 56% 
 1984M05         -       0.10       0.06             (1.80)            11.74    0.29             (0.12) 52% 
 1984M06     0.29     0.17     (0.28)              3.15            12.99    0.29             (0.03) 81% 
 1984M07         -       0.21     (0.21)          (14.85)            16.00    0.23             (0.02) 82% 
 1984M08         -       0.24       0.08             (7.75)            14.74    0.27               0.08 99% 
 1984M09         -       0.28     (0.32)            (3.88)            21.46    0.15             (0.00) 100% 
 1984M10     0.11     0.32     (0.08)              1.95            21.85    0.09             (0.00) 100% 
 1984M11    (0.00)    0.35       1.09             (2.62)            10.24    0.10               0.02 100% 
 1984M12    (0.01)    0.34       0.25             (5.00)            12.30    0.11             (0.02) 100% 
 1985M01    (0.07)    0.25       0.01             (0.74)              9.72    0.08               0.07 40% 
 1985M02    (0.00)    0.23     (0.41)            10.13            17.17    0.03             (0.05) 0% 
 1985M03     0.01     0.26     (0.20)            19.10            20.95    0.03               0.01 0% 
 1985M04     0.00     0.26       0.79             19.25            11.67    0.03               0.01 0% 
 1985M05    (0.00)    0.28       0.20             17.02              9.63    0.01               0.03 0% 
 1985M06    (0.00)    0.26       0.10             18.16              9.04   (0.04)             (0.02) 0% 
 1985M07     0.01     0.23     (0.04)            18.28              9.01    0.00               0.10 0% 
 1985M08    (0.00)    0.14       0.77             15.67              5.18   (0.04)             (0.04) 0% 
 1985M09     0.00     0.11     (0.10)            14.79              5.94   (0.04)               0.03 0% 
 1985M10     0.01     0.10     (0.22)            16.42              7.52   (0.10)               0.04 0% 
 1985M11     0.00     0.10     (0.13)            10.48              8.67   (0.07)             (0.04) 0% 
 1985M12     0.01     0.09     (0.12)              8.15            14.23   (0.02)             (0.01) 0% 
 1986M01     0.00     0.10     (0.19)              7.07            12.70   (0.02)               0.05 0% 
 1986M02     0.15     0.21     (0.12)              5.72            13.52    0.01             (0.03) 0% 
 1986M03    (0.06)    0.18       0.69             (4.66)              7.93    0.01               0.03 2% 
 1986M04    (0.00)    0.14       0.23             (6.37)              6.28    0.01               0.08 13% 
 1986M05     0.00     0.09       0.16             (5.15)              5.43   (0.04)               0.01 1% 
 1986M06     0.00     0.09     (0.01)            (6.88)              5.55   (0.04)             (0.04) 0% 
 1986M07    (0.01)    0.09       0.06             (6.81)              5.12   (0.04)             (0.06) 0% 
 1986M08     0.00     0.08     (0.05)            (8.06)              5.47   (0.07)               0.07 0% 
 1986M09    (0.00)    0.07       0.03             (8.48)              5.43   (0.08)               0.06 0% 
 1986M10    (0.00)    0.07       0.15             (7.83)              4.78   (0.05)               0.14 0% 
 1986M11         -       0.06     (0.03)            (5.91)              5.16   (0.07)               0.00 0% 
 1986M12     0.00     0.04       0.42             (3.81)              4.74   (0.15)               0.07 0% 
 1987M01    (0.00)    0.04       0.05             (4.05)              4.49   (0.21)               0.03 0% 
 1987M02     0.00     0.02     (0.02)            (6.10)              4.52   (0.25)               0.13 0% 
 1987M03     0.00     0.06     (0.06)            (5.93)              4.84   (0.28)               0.03 0% 
 1987M04    (0.00)    0.06       0.00             (5.65)              4.69   (0.31)               0.02 3% 
 1987M05    (0.00)    0.06     (0.12)            (6.56)              5.39   (0.28)               0.07 1% 
 1987M06    (0.00)    0.06     (0.02)            (5.89)              5.60   (0.27)               0.04 7% 
 1987M07    (0.00)    0.05       0.01             (3.39)              5.48   (0.30)               0.11 31% 
 1987M08     0.00     0.06       0.03             (0.78)              5.35   (0.30)               0.06 37% 
 1987M09     0.01     0.06     (0.27)            (0.56)              7.39   (0.27)               0.04 84% 
 1987M10     0.01     0.07     (0.15)            (1.80)              8.51   (0.27)             (0.44) 29% 
 1987M11     0.01     0.07     (0.17)            (1.59)            10.50   (0.23)               0.04 28% 
 1987M12    (0.00)    0.08       0.24             (4.79)              9.32   (0.14)               0.05 31% 
 1988M01     0.00     0.08     (0.21)            (6.15)            11.69   (0.11)             (0.01) 55% 
 1988M02     0.01     0.06     (0.11)            (4.67)            13.36   (0.10)             (0.01) 58% 
 1988M03     0.00     0.08       0.08             (3.06)            12.47   (0.09)               0.12 26% 
 1988M04     0.00     0.09     (0.01)            (3.38)            12.47   (0.05)               0.05 48% 
 1988M05    (0.01)    0.09     (0.08)            (3.35)            13.99    0.00               0.07 47% 
 1988M06     0.01     0.08     (0.08)            (2.27)            15.49    0.03               0.01 38% 
 1988M07    (0.00)    0.08     (0.23)            (0.55)            19.55    0.05               0.04 31% 
  
 1988M08     0.00     0.08       0.00               1.62            19.79    0.09             (0.06) 50% 
 1988M09     0.01     0.07     (0.10)              2.12            22.46    0.11             (0.02) 87% 
 1988M10     0.00     0.08       0.11               1.30            20.04    0.10               0.06 21% 
 1988M11    (0.00)    0.09       0.33             (0.94)            15.63    0.08             (0.01) 9% 
 1988M12    (0.00)    0.09       0.57             (2.18)            10.80    0.06               0.00 3% 
 1989M01     0.00     0.09     (0.14)            (1.53)            12.46    0.05               0.10 7% 
 1989M02         -       0.07     (0.10)              0.93            14.14    0.11             (0.08) 14% 
 1989M03    (0.00)    0.07     (0.13)              1.60            17.02    0.16               0.01 26% 
 1989M04     0.01     0.07     (0.26)              2.75            22.92    0.17               0.03 48% 
 1989M05     0.00     0.08       0.13               3.17            20.55    0.18             (0.05) 29% 
 1989M06     0.01     0.09     (0.08)              5.33            22.79    0.20             (0.04) 46% 
 1989M07     0.00     0.10     (0.17)              8.07            27.26    0.25               0.09 57% 
 1989M08         -       0.11       0.29               6.25            21.31    0.22               0.04 49% 
 1989M09     0.00     0.15       0.08               8.30            19.68    0.14               0.02 90% 
 1989M10     0.01     0.16       0.45               9.78            13.77    0.14             (0.04) 97% 
 1989M11     0.01     0.16     (0.06)              9.17            15.58    0.19             (0.00) 97% 
 1989M12     0.01     0.13       0.73               9.68              9.52    0.20               0.04 64% 
 1990M01     0.00     0.12     (0.44)              9.58            16.50    0.27             (0.01) 46% 
 1990M02     0.01     0.13     (0.14)              2.19            19.38    0.15             (0.02) 21% 
 1990M03    (0.00)    0.15       0.16               1.53            16.62    0.13             (0.02) 15% 
 1990M04     0.00     0.17     (0.20)              3.05            20.94    0.11             (0.06) 2% 
 1990M05     0.01     0.15       0.61               4.57            13.19    0.13               0.09 0% 
 1990M06     0.01     0.15     (0.07)              3.42            14.54    0.18               0.03 0% 
 1990M07     0.03     0.13     (0.01)              3.23            14.73    0.17               0.05 1% 
 1990M08     0.05     0.14       0.15               0.82            12.43    0.21             (0.08) 1% 
 1990M09     0.03     0.21     (0.07)            (4.41)            13.29    0.34             (0.10) 1% 
 1990M10         -       0.20     (0.10)            (8.36)            14.93    0.38             (0.02) 7% 
 1990M11     0.09     0.19     (0.10)          (10.24)            15.78    0.33             (0.01) 0% 
 1990M12         -       0.20       0.15           (16.20)            14.25    0.29             (0.00) 0% 
 1991M01         -       0.22     (0.18)          (13.02)            17.32    0.28               0.06 2% 
 1991M02         -       0.18       0.75           (10.08)              9.87    0.29               0.09 25% 
 1991M03         -       0.17     (0.02)            (9.87)            10.34    0.30               0.02 0% 
 1991M04    (0.01)    0.16       0.43             (6.14)              7.37    0.28               0.03 0% 
 1991M05    (0.00)    0.13       0.16             (3.82)              6.50    0.19               0.00 0% 
 1991M06    (0.00)    0.12       0.12             (2.98)              6.00    0.11             (0.01) 0% 
 1991M07         -       0.12     (0.10)            (1.38)              6.62    0.08               0.05 0% 
 1991M08    (0.03)    0.15       0.04             (0.97)              6.35    0.05             (0.02) 0% 
 1991M09         -       0.17       0.07               0.26              6.00   (0.06)               0.01 0% 
 1991M10         -       0.17       0.08               0.48              5.48   (0.03)               0.03 0% 
 1991M11    (0.01)    0.17       0.12             (0.61)              4.99   (0.05)             (0.01) 0% 
 1991M12    (0.00)    0.17       0.10             (1.02)              5.02    0.00               0.02 0% 
 1992M01    (0.00)    0.16       0.11             (2.07)              4.30   (0.07)               0.02 2% 
 1992M02    (0.02)    0.15       0.10             (2.12)              3.97   (0.10)               0.03 2% 
 1992M03    (0.03)    0.13       0.11               0.32              3.75   (0.16)             (0.01) 0% 
 1992M04     0.02     0.12     (0.14)              3.94              4.39   (0.11)               0.04 0% 
 1992M05     0.02     0.12     (0.18)              4.56              5.44   (0.02)               0.06 0% 
 1992M06    (0.03)    0.11       0.04               2.16              5.41    0.00             (0.01) 0% 
 1992M07    (0.03)    0.12       0.01               0.93              5.28   (0.05)             (0.03) 0% 
 1992M08    (0.06)    0.12     (0.05)              3.02              5.74   (0.05)             (0.06) 0% 
 1992M09     0.08     0.13       0.25               5.28              4.75   (0.00)             (0.02) 0% 
 1992M10    (0.02)    0.12       0.10               5.03              4.36    0.00               0.03 0% 
 1992M11     0.03     0.11       0.05               5.86              4.30    0.08             (0.02) 0% 
 1992M12    (0.02)    0.11     (0.00)              7.64              4.41    0.18               0.01 0% 
 1993M01     0.01     0.11       0.09               6.08              3.88    0.17               0.00 0% 
 1993M02    (0.00)    0.10       0.07               6.89              3.62    0.20               0.07 0% 
 1993M03     0.01     0.10       0.13               7.05              3.31    0.23               0.01 0% 
 1993M04     0.03     0.09       0.01               6.13              3.19    0.24               0.05 0% 
 1993M05     0.03     0.08     (0.14)              0.98              3.68    0.23               0.04 0% 
 1993M06     0.01     0.07     (0.02)            (2.87)              3.82    0.22             (0.03) 0% 
 1993M07     0.02     0.07     (0.05)            (3.08)              3.91    1.39               0.03 0% 
 1993M08     0.01     0.08     (0.09)            (2.86)              4.39    1.66               0.07 0% 
 1993M09     0.06     0.08     (0.03)            (4.63)              4.66    1.79               0.02 0% 
 1993M10    (0.03)    0.10       0.06             (5.61)              4.39    1.70               0.16 0% 
 1993M11    (0.03)    0.12       0.01             (7.84)              4.61    1.60             (0.03) 8% 
 1993M12    (0.01)    0.13       0.05             (4.27)              4.84    1.33               0.21 43% 
 1994M01    (0.00)    0.12       0.00             (1.88)              4.71    1.42             (0.03) 66% 
 1994M02     0.00     0.12       0.02             (1.50)              4.58    1.51             (0.05) 57% 
 1994M03    (0.00)    0.11       0.18             (1.76)              3.90    1.60             (0.11) 29% 
 1994M04    (0.01)    0.11       0.07             (2.76)              3.60    1.47               0.04 12% 
 1994M05    (0.01)    0.11     (0.02)            (2.89)              3.87    1.40               0.03 2% 
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 1994M06     0.00     0.11       0.10             (1.51)              3.60    1.47             (0.05) 0% 
 1994M07    (0.03)    0.10       0.04             (2.60)              3.53    0.31               0.05 0% 
 1994M08     0.01     0.06     (0.02)            (0.62)              3.77    0.19               0.07 0% 
 1994M09    (0.02)    0.04     (0.01)            (2.24)              4.00    0.17             (0.03) 0% 
 1994M10    (0.04)    0.04     (0.05)            (1.94)              4.28    0.14               0.01 0% 
 1994M11    (0.04)    0.05     (0.03)            (0.94)              4.87    0.15             (0.08) 0% 
 1994M12     0.02     0.05     (0.00)              4.42              5.47    0.22             (0.02) 0% 
 1995M01     0.01     0.04       0.01               5.53              5.39    0.25             (0.09) 0% 
 1995M02     0.05     0.05     (0.06)              3.73              5.89    0.33               0.09 0% 
 1995M03     0.01     0.08     (0.02)              1.27              5.97    0.38               0.01 4% 
 1995M04     0.00     0.09       0.04             (5.45)              5.77    0.44               0.01 67% 
 1995M05    (0.01)    0.09       0.03             (7.67)              5.59    0.38               0.07 81% 
 1995M06    (0.01)    0.08       0.04             (7.09)              5.34    0.31             (0.02) 58% 
 1995M07     0.00     0.06       0.14             (7.02)              4.81    0.37               0.04 40% 
 1995M08     0.01     0.04     (0.01)            (5.65)              4.93    0.37             (0.03) 28% 
 1995M09     0.01     0.04     (0.04)            (2.65)              5.07    0.33               0.01 3% 
 1995M10    (0.00)    0.05     (0.07)            (0.07)              5.63    0.38             (0.02) 0% 
 1995M11     0.01     0.06     (0.02)            (1.07)              5.80    0.38               0.01 0% 
 1995M12     0.00     0.07       0.04             (1.85)              5.90    0.30               0.04 0% 
 1996M01    (0.00)    0.08       0.04             (1.93)              5.72    0.32               0.06 1% 
 1996M02    (0.00)    0.08       0.05               2.48              5.59    0.37               0.01 25% 
 1996M03     0.00     0.08       0.01               1.94              5.68    0.36               0.01 74% 
 1996M04    (0.00)    0.08       0.08               1.96              5.17    0.33               0.03 60% 
 1996M05     0.00     0.08       0.07               2.79              4.88    0.39             (0.01) 55% 
 1996M06    (0.00)    0.08       0.05               3.22              4.75    0.43             (0.02) 30% 
 1996M07     0.00     0.07       0.07               5.16              4.50    0.44             (0.05) 11% 
 1996M08    (0.00)    0.07       0.11               4.91              4.10    0.42               0.04 3% 
 1996M09     0.00     0.06     (0.02)              4.91              4.24    0.43               0.02 1% 
 1996M10     0.00     0.07     (0.01)              5.34              4.42    0.43               0.03 1% 
 1996M11     0.00     0.07       0.01               6.02              4.43    0.39               0.05 1% 
 1996M12     0.00     0.07       0.03               5.42              4.62    0.38               0.00 2% 
 1997M01     0.00     0.06     (0.04)              7.31              4.74    0.34             (0.01) 2% 
 1997M02    (0.00)    0.06       0.07               9.28              4.43    0.23               0.01 1% 
 1997M03     0.00     0.05       0.01             12.45              4.53    0.21             (0.05) 4% 
 1997M04     0.00     0.05     (0.02)            14.58              4.63    0.25             (0.02) 5% 
 1997M05     0.00     0.06     (0.02)            15.85              4.77    0.24               0.06 4% 
 1997M06     0.00     0.06     (0.02)            14.71              4.93    0.23               0.02 8% 
 1997M07     0.10     0.07     (0.15)            14.89              5.71    0.28             (0.00) 7% 
 1997M08     0.04     0.09       0.06             11.93              5.07    0.29             (0.14) 17% 
 1997M09     0.12     0.10       0.06               6.93              4.43    0.30               0.03 36% 
 1997M10     0.03     0.12     (0.09)            (2.94)              4.67    0.28             (0.21) 47% 
 1997M11    (0.01)    0.11     (0.02)            (8.52)              4.76    0.28             (0.03) 71% 
 1997M12     0.15     0.13     (0.14)            (6.06)              5.55    0.29               0.00 58% 
 1998M01     0.06     0.14     (0.02)            (8.99)              4.94    0.34             (0.06) 46% 
 1998M02    (0.05)    0.13       0.09           (19.56)              4.60    0.28               0.15 26% 
 1998M03    (0.08)    0.12       0.01           (14.45)              4.74    0.25             (0.01) 10% 
 1998M04     0.08     0.10       0.18             (9.81)              4.08    0.21             (0.07) 2% 
 1998M05    (0.03)    0.09       0.00             (6.89)              4.00    0.18             (0.11) 0% 
 1998M06     0.08     0.09     (0.03)            (6.90)              4.16    0.18             (0.06) 0% 
 1998M07    (0.00)    0.10     (0.02)            (6.18)              4.12    0.10             (0.04) 0% 
 1998M08     0.04     0.09     (0.04)            (8.91)              4.30    0.13             (0.14) 0% 
 1998M09    (0.00)    0.09       0.07             (9.94)              3.97    0.07               0.09 0% 
 1998M10    (0.07)    0.09     (0.01)          (13.52)              3.99    0.02               0.19 0% 
 1998M11    (0.03)    0.09     (0.00)          (14.19)              4.37    0.01               0.04 0% 
 1998M12    (0.01)    0.09       0.04             (5.41)              4.51   (0.01)             (0.01) 1% 
 1999M01    (0.01)    0.09       0.09             (3.78)              4.07   (0.07)               0.00 1% 
 1999M02     0.01     0.08       0.05               0.06              3.86   (0.03)             (0.01) 0% 
 1999M03    (0.01)    0.08       0.07               1.39              3.64   (0.04)               0.08 0% 
 1999M04    (0.02)    0.07       0.07               3.12              3.44   (0.05)               0.16 0% 
 1999M05     0.00     0.05     (0.00)              5.19              3.57   (0.02)             (0.07) 0% 
 1999M06    (0.00)    0.05       0.01               7.19              3.58   (0.03)               0.08 0% 
 1999M07     0.01     0.04       0.01               8.10              3.55   (0.02)             (0.01) 0% 
 1999M08     0.04     0.04       0.02               7.36              3.49   (0.01)             (0.02) 0% 
 1999M09     0.04     0.04       0.01               3.24              3.38    0.00             (0.02) 0% 
 1999M10    (0.02)    0.04       0.01               0.77              3.35    0.03               0.02 0% 
 1999M11     0.02     0.04       0.01               0.17              3.46    0.05               0.08 1% 
 1999M12    (0.01)    0.04       0.02               0.75              3.54    0.02               0.08 3% 
 2000M01     0.00     0.04     (0.03)              0.32              3.46    0.05             (0.07) 11% 
 2000M02     0.01     0.03     (0.02)              1.30              3.48    0.04             (0.00) 19% 
 2000M03     0.01     0.03       0.12               3.28              3.18    0.06               0.01 17% 
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 2000M04     0.01     0.03     (0.02)              2.92              3.23    0.09             (0.04) 17% 
 2000M05     0.04     0.03     (0.03)              3.30              3.28    0.10             (0.09) 18% 
 2000M06     0.01     0.03     (0.01)              4.66              3.31    0.11               0.11 8% 
 2000M07     0.04     0.03     (0.04)              1.32              3.33    0.11             (0.01) 18% 
 2000M08     0.00     0.03       0.05             (1.38)              3.13    0.07               0.01 10% 
 2000M09     0.03     0.03     (0.04)            (0.78)              3.26    0.09             (0.07) 22% 
 2000M10     0.11     0.03     (0.03)            (1.13)              3.35    0.11             (0.06) 22% 
 2000M11    (0.04)    0.10       0.00             (3.93)              3.20    0.07             (0.01) 9% 
 2000M12     0.01     0.08       0.04             (5.62)              3.16    0.09               0.05 96% 
 2001M01    (0.01)    0.07     (0.05)            (5.24)              3.22    0.11               0.03 64% 
 2001M02    (0.02)    0.06     (0.02)            (6.80)              3.45    0.11             (0.04) 69% 
 2001M03     0.02     0.05       0.05             (0.62)              3.32    0.12             (0.12) 71% 
 2001M04     0.04     0.06     (0.02)              1.33              3.35    0.12               0.05 41% 
 2001M05    (0.01)    0.06     (0.00)            (0.34)              3.31    0.08             (0.01) 44% 
 2001M06     0.04     0.05       0.01             (0.46)              3.27    0.05             (0.00) 0% 
 2001M07     0.02     0.05     (0.02)            (0.79)              3.22    0.06             (0.03) 0% 
 2001M08    (0.04)    0.06     (0.01)            (2.67)              3.27    0.05             (0.02) 1% 
 2001M09     0.00     0.07       0.01             (1.87)              3.29    0.03             (0.15) 21% 
 2001M10     0.01     0.08     (0.01)            (0.48)              3.26    0.02               0.06 19% 
 2001M11     0.00     0.08       0.04             (0.07)              3.13    0.05               0.09 11% 
 2001M12    (0.01)    0.07       0.07               0.56              3.06    0.02               0.03 15% 
 2002M01    (0.00)    0.06       0.05               2.24              2.91   (0.01)               0.01 22% 
 2002M02     0.00     0.05     (0.01)              4.75              2.98    0.02             (0.02) 14% 
 2002M03    (0.00)    0.05       0.08               5.82              2.80   (0.02)               0.04 3% 
 2002M04    (0.01)    0.03     (0.02)              6.57              2.90   (0.03)               0.00 1% 
 2002M05    (0.02)    0.03     (0.01)              6.73              3.01   (0.01)               0.02 0% 
 2002M06     0.01     0.03     (0.01)              7.67              2.99   (0.01)             (0.06) 0% 
 2002M07     0.02     0.03     (0.05)              5.12              3.15   (0.02)             (0.06) 0% 
 2002M08     0.01     0.03     (0.00)              3.25              3.12   (0.01)               0.00 1% 
 2002M09     0.01     0.04     (0.02)              2.62              3.16    0.01             (0.07) 3% 
 2002M10     0.01     0.04     (0.01)              3.02              3.20    0.02               0.05 8% 
 2002M11     0.01     0.04     (0.02)              2.94              3.24    0.01               0.02 33% 
 2002M12    (0.01)    0.04       0.02               1.70              3.31    0.05             (0.03) 47% 
 2003M01     0.01     0.04       0.02               1.51              3.25    0.11               0.01 39% 
 2003M02     0.01     0.05     (0.01)            (2.81)              3.25    0.06             (0.02) 32% 
 2003M03    (0.01)    0.05     (0.01)            (2.78)              3.24    0.11               0.01 33% 
 2003M04    (0.01)    0.06       0.01             (3.25)              3.25    0.07               0.05 37% 
 2003M05    (0.01)    0.05     (0.03)              0.47              3.41    0.07               0.05 53% 
 2003M06     0.03     0.05     (0.00)            (0.67)              3.36    0.08               0.03 32% 
 2003M07     0.02     0.04       0.01             (1.55)              3.27    0.07               0.02 17% 
 2003M08     0.01     0.04     (0.01)            (1.08)              3.23    0.09               0.04 15% 
 2003M09    (0.00)    0.04       0.00             (2.15)              3.28    0.10               0.04 10% 
 2003M10     0.01     0.05       0.05             (2.73)              3.12    0.07               0.07 6% 
 2003M11     0.01     0.06     (0.01)            (4.21)              3.19    0.08             (0.01) 2% 
 2003M12    (0.00)    0.05       0.00             (4.35)              3.23    0.07               0.06 6% 
 2004M01     0.01     0.05     (0.04)            (5.19)              3.37    0.03               0.03 16% 
 2004M02     0.00     0.05     (0.02)            (5.61)              3.39    0.08               0.04 18% 
 2004M03     0.00     0.07       0.03             (5.83)              3.33    0.07             (0.01) 23% 
 2004M04    (0.01)    0.06       0.03             (4.54)              3.28    0.10             (0.05) 39% 
 2004M05    (0.00)    0.06       0.00             (3.36)              3.29    0.11             (0.00) 26% 
 2004M06     0.01     0.06     (0.03)            (1.61)              3.36    0.10             (0.00) 11% 
 2004M07    (0.00)    0.06     (0.02)            (1.73)              3.41    0.10               0.01 12% 
 2004M08     0.00     0.06     (0.00)            (1.05)              3.47    0.09               0.02 15% 
 2004M09     0.00     0.06     (0.01)            (0.25)              3.49    0.05               0.05 9% 
 2004M10     0.00     0.06       0.01             (0.47)              3.48    0.08               0.04 3% 
 2004M11    (0.00)    0.06     (0.00)            (1.23)              3.59    0.07               0.08 3% 
 2004M12     0.00     0.06       0.02             (1.96)              3.65    0.08               0.04 5% 
 2005M01    (0.02)    0.05     (0.02)            (2.66)              3.77    0.10             (0.00) 5% 
 2005M02    (0.01)    0.04       0.06             (1.23)              3.63    0.04               0.04 4% 
 2005M03     0.00     0.04       0.01               0.90              3.64    0.04             (0.04) 4% 
 2005M04    (0.01)    0.04       0.02               1.47              3.55    0.03             (0.00) 2% 
 2005M05     0.00     0.03       0.05               2.46              3.38    0.01             (0.01) 2% 
 2005M06     0.03     0.03       0.02               3.35              3.33    0.01               0.04 1% 
 2005M07     0.00     0.03     (0.00)              3.45              3.29    0.03               0.04 1% 
 2005M08     0.00     0.02       0.02               3.51              3.28    0.05             (0.01) 2% 
 2005M09    (0.00)    0.02       0.04               2.60              3.12    0.02               0.05 5% 
 2005M10    (0.02)    0.02     (0.02)              2.74              3.18   (0.00)             (0.06) 12% 
 2005M11    (0.02)    0.01     (0.01)              5.11              3.30   (0.00)               0.03 11% 
 
